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INTRODUCTION
Korea has existed as an autonomous state for most of its 4,000 
years by virtue of the control or intervention of its powerful neighbor, 
China. Whenever the power of China was not sufficient to protect the 
autonomy of Korea, another nation, generally Japan, would try to gain 
a foothold in the Korean kingdom. Until 1895, the international status 
of Korea was largely determined either by Chinese supremacy or by ri­
valry between China and Japan.
Japan terminated China's claim to control over Korea as a result 
of the Japanese victory in the Sino-Japanese War. However, Japan was 
then challenged in its control of Korea by Russia. The rivalry between 
Japan and Russia ended with the defeat of Russia in the Russo-Japanese 
war. Japanese control of Korea was thus firmly established.
The international relations of Korea have been primarily the 
record of her relationship with the neighboring powers, namely : China,
Russia and Japan. The peninsula of Korea has been a determining factor 
in the course of Far Eastern International relations which had assumed 
large proportions before the outbreak of the European war in 1914.
Korea has affected world politics to a greater extent than most west­
erners are aware. Therefore modern Korea's international relations can 
be best understood by studying her relations with China, Russia and 
Japan from the events leading up to the Sino-Japanese war to the year 
1907 which marked virtual "annexation" of Korea by Japan.
This thesis primarily attempts to exaroine Korean foreign and 
domestic affairs during the struggle between China and Japan for the
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possession of Korea, the diplomatic and military struggle between 
Russia and Japan for the coveted prize, and the supremacy in the Far 
East that Japan won by her victory in the Russo-Japanese war» Sub­
sequently, this thesis examines comparatively the Chinese, Russian and 
Japanese methods of diplomacy in the attempt to establish their suprem­
acy in Korea, and analyzes the reason for the failure of Korea to pre­
serve her independence.
Korean relations with other foreign powers, especially the United 
States, are covered in order to present the necessary terms of reference 
for the position of the Korean court's attempt to regain her indepen­
dence .
In the preparation of this thesis Korean sources which obviously 
reflect Korean views, are used abundantly. Therefore it would seem 
wise to explain that this is somerdiat an "unbalanced" study in terms of 
giving equal attention to the national sources of the several protag­
onists in Korea. Some sharply controversial questions have been nec­
essarily discussed, and this thesis can not reasonably anticipate 
immunity from the criticisms of those vdio will differ with it. The 
author can only say that he has sought to be fair and just. Any one who 
tries to keep in the middle of the rather tortuous road that runs be­
tween those vdio regard the Japanese as a model people and those whom 
regard them as "varnished savages", and between those Wio assert that 
the Korean are "afflicted saints" and those who assert with equal 
vehemence that they are "the most contemptible people on earth", must 
expect to be assailed from both sides.
One apologetic note toward my fellow countrymen, the Koreans must 
be offered, Alexis de Tocqueville stated in the Preface to his The
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Old Regime and the French Revolution;
I have not shrunk from wounding the feeling of 
individuals and class (nor from) affronting certain opin­
ions and ancient loyalties, laudable though these may be.
In so doing I have often regret but never any qualms of 
conscience, and I can only hope that those vdio may be 
inclined to take offense at anything in this book will 
realize that its author has aimed at honesty and impartiality.
Sharing the feeling of Tocqueville, it is hoped that sufficient 
new information is contained herein to justify its presentation.
A careful evaluation of each event in the thesis will, it is hoped, 
permit one to form a more accurate judgment and sophisticated interpreta­
tion of Far Eastern international politics, which have now attained a 
magnitude that renders them of even more profound significance to the 
world.
A final word concerning utilization of Far Eastern language source 
materials is necessary. The author has translated Korean and Japanese 
sources materials. With few exceptions, the customary rule is followed 
of presenting oriental names with the family naiæ first (that is Kim, 
Ok-kyun instead of Ok Kyun Kim).
I wish to express my sincere appreciation to Professor Rufus George 
Hall, Jr., my major adviser, who in addition to the invaluable sugges­
tions and time afforded to this dissertation, has made my graduate work 
a busy, stimulating and rewarding experience. My thanks also go to 
Professors John Paul Duncan, Percy Wilson Bucanan, Oliver Earl Benson 
and W. Eugene Hollon who read this dissertation and helped in the 
preparation of this work. I also want to express my appreciation to 
Professor Park Hyuk-byong at Song Kyun Kwan University, Seoul, Korea 
who rendered vital and prompt service to my frequent and often unusual 
request for source materials in the preparation of this work.
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In actual writing I have benefited much from the patient and 
critical reading of the manuscript by Professors C. D. Batchler and 
Homer Nicholson. I wish to acknowledge ray appreciation to both of 
them. I also want to express my gratitude to Sue Nichols for typing 
the final copy.
POWER POLITICS IN KOREA AND ITS IMPACT ON KOREAN FOREIGN 
AND DOMESTIC AFFAIRS, 1882-1907
CHAPTER I 
SINO-JAPANESE RIVALRY, 1882-1894
Factional Struggle Within the Korean Court
The factional struggles within the Korean court clearly definable 
as early as 1882 were of two kinds. One of them involved the personal 
rivalry between Queen Min and Tai Wen Kun^, the Regent for the King.
The other was between the conservatives and progressives. Both factions 
engaged in a political struggle for the control of governmental power. 
These factions were sometimes intermingled as the occasion demanded but 
their main objective was to maintain political supremacy over the 
country,
Tai Wen Kun, father of the King, attempted to be the real ruler. 
The Queen, a woman of natural ability and of imperious will, had gathered 
about her a faction which v/as wholly inimical to the plans and tactics 
of the Regent.
When the King was twenty-tvra, Tai Wen Kun retired as Regent in 
1873. The Queen's brother, Min Sung-ho, was appointed as Prime Minister,
Tai Wen Kun may be translated "Prince-Parent". Born in Seoul 
on January 22, 1811. He died on February 22, 1898. He served as a 
Regent for King Ko Jong, his son, during the letter's minority. Tai 
Wen Kun was a man of strong nationalism and was extremely anti-foreign 
in his foreign policy. In 1886, Tai Wen Kun selected Queen Min as his 
daughter-in-law believing the Min family had no desire for political 
power in the court. He was only following the tradition of isolation­
ism which had been handed down ever since the virtual destruction of 
Korea by the Hideyoshi-led Japanese invasion of 1592-98.
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Through the Queen's influence, the Min faction came into power. With
the utmost celerity, all government high positions were occupied by
2members of the Min faction of their sympathizers.
Tai Wen Kun had been obliged to witness impotently the changes 
that had taken place in the policy of his country, but had given up none 
of his old prejudices nor his confidence that Korea could still hold 
her own against the "barbarians of the West". The new departure was 
incredible to him; still more incredible to him was the Queen, who was 
mainly responsible for this departure and vAio had brought it about, not 
from any patriotic sense of the welfare of the country, but as a lever 
for procuring the favor of the King and acquiring office for the members 
of her own family-the Min.
The Queen's faction was opposed to the most cherished prejudices 
of the Regent. They favored the growth of Roman Catholicism and the 
policy of listening to China's advice in the matter of foreign relations. 
The extreme opposition of the Regent to all reforms and to the opening 
of the country to foreign intercourse naturally inclined his rivals in 
that very direction, and it was directly through the Min faction that 
the policy of non-seclusion was inaugurated. The Regent opposed it to 
the end. The Queen was standiiig solidly for what she conceived as 
progress in favor of opening up the country to the civilizing influence 
of the West, and her faction were the first to take the lead in all 
innovations. The steps had to be slow for Korea was not ready to
2Seoul National University Historical Research Room, Kuksa Kaisul. 
("Lecture on Korean National History") (Seoul, Duk-Hung Su-Rim, 1947), 
p. 581. The young King's imperial name is Ko-=jong, twenty=sixth King 
of the Yi Dynasty, whose queen is Queen Min.
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inaugurate sweeping innovations. But in Seoul a faction arose which 
was determined to force the Koreans to an extreme policy of reform 
based on Japan’s Meiji Restoration. This faction was composed of court 
officials not members of the Min family.
Some leaders of this radical faction, such as Pak Yong-hyo, So 
Kwang-bom, Kim Ok-kyun, Hong Young-sik had studied in Japan and had 
witnessed the sweeping changes there. The Japanese were naturally in 
full sympathy with these young extreme radicals, then known as the Pro­
gressives, who grew restive under the slower methods of the Mins. As 
the King was not completely under the domination of the Min family, he 
looked with considerable complacency upon the efforts of the radicals 
to introduce reforms independently of the Min faction. The plans of 
reform presented by the Progressive leaders met with a favorable hearing
3from the King.
As the reform plan succeeded, the power of the Min gradually 
waned, not because the latter disliked the idea of reforming Korea but 
because the Progressive faction was achieving the reform and would 
naturally attain more and more power at court as success crowned its 
efforts. It was at this point here that the difficulty began. The 
personal element v;as present in full force, and this was the rock on 
which the reformation of Korea split. For with the Min faction, as a 
whole, questions of national policy were entirely secondary to the 
preservation of the ascendency which they had gained. The Min faction
3C. N. Weems, (ed) Hulbert's History of Korea (London; Routledge 
& Kegan Paul, 1962), Vol. II, pp. 217-218; Nam-son Chai, Chuson Yoksa 
("The History of Korea") (Seoul; Tong Myungsa, 1945), pp. 100-101=
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also came to realize that the Japanese were bent upon putting power 
into the hands of radicals. In pure self-defense, the Min faction 
decided to turn to China for support. From this point, the Min faction 
became not the Progressive but the Conservative.
In the meantime, the Japanese encouraged a band of young Korean 
Progressives, who were highly patriotic and who believed that Korea 
could make the same progress vhich Japan had achieved, to form a company 
of Korean soldiers, to be drilled by Japanese officers. This body of 
men who were selected from Yang Ban (the nobility class) was drilled 
by Japanese instructors. These soldiers were treated much better in 
the matter of food, pay, clothing and living quarters than were the 3,700 
members of the regular Korean army whose pay was usually two or three 
months in arrears, and who for a similar period did not receive a grain 
of rice. There were angry mutterings against the Japanese drilled sol­
diers who were being treated so much better than the regulars. When the 
King v/as advised of this matter, he ordered that a month's allowance of
4rice be given out to the discontented regular army. This work was 
assigned to Min Kyom-ho, the overseer of the government finances, and 
he in turn transferred the matter to his subordinate officials, vÆio 
apparently sold the rice and with the proceeds purchased a large quan­
tity of sand vÆiich they doled out to the hungry soldiers.^ Discontented
4Yi Dynasty Court, Ilsonq Rok ("Daily Records of the Office of 
Royal Palace Historians") 1882-1896. Reserved for Seoul National 
University Library. June 1, 1882. Hereafter cited as IIsong Rok.
^Ibid., June 3, 1882.
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with this mistreatment from government officials, the soldiers congregated
in various places and determined that since they must die in any event
they would rather die fighting than starving. On the night of July 23,
1882, they arose in revolt.^
This military revolt is better known as Im-0 Kun-ran ("lm-0 Military
Revolt") in Korea because it broke out in the year of Im-0. The Min
family was the main target of attack. Several of the, including Min
Kyom-ho, were killed and others fled. The palace was invaded, and Queen
Min was saved by a trick, for she was carried out on the back of one of
the regular army, Kim Chong-hyun who claimed she was his sister. She
escaped to a country retreat. A party of rebellious soldiers killed the
Japanese military instructors. The Japanese Legation was burned and
several Japanese were killed; for the Japanese were believed to be the
cause of the reform which brought about the plight of old-style soldiers.
The Japanese minister Hanabusa escaped to Chemulpo (Inchon) and thence 
7to Nagasaki.
The rebellious soldiers the ex-Regent restored to power. Upon 
his return Tai Wen Kun appealed to the angry soldiers to return to their 
living quarters and urged them to maintain order and peace. Tai VJen Kun, 
thinking that the hated Queen was dead, proclaimed national mourning 
in her honor. However, it was postponed until the body of the Queen 
was found.^
^Ibid., June 5, 1882.
7Ilsonq Rok, June 9, 1882. Sec also Chang Do-mu, Im-0 Kunran 
kwa Kapsin Chonqbyun ("Im-0 Military Rebellion and the Political Change 
of the Year of Kap-Sin") (Seoul: Dok-Hung So-Rim, 1927), pp, 42-45= 
Queen's uncle, Minister of War, was assassinated by angry soldier.
^Chung-chang Mun, Kunse Ilbon yi Choson Chimtu-sa ("The Records 
on Japanese Aggression to Korea") (Seoul; Seoul National University
Press, 1964), pp. 166.
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Tai Wen Kun enjoyed a brief triumph. Instigated, no doubt, by his 
emissaries, the military revolt expelled the Min faction as well as the 
radical Progressives. Since the hated Queen was supposed to be dead, 
some fondly believed that the good old days had returned. The victorious 
Tai Wen Kun declared a policy of "Korea for Koreans", terminated all 
reform laws and disbanded the new army units. He reestablished Korean 
isolationist policy with respect to foreign influences. When Count 
Inouye arrived at Chemulop (Inchon) on 5 August, 1882, he began negotia­
tions for the payment of an indemnity. But the ex-Regent put him off,
9and practically refused to negotiate; so Inouye returned to Japan.
The escaped Queen and her faction were desperate. Queen Min sent 
a strong representation to Peking demanding protection, and pointed to 
Tai Wen Kun as the guilty party. Li Hung-chang, Senior Grand Secretary 
of the State of China, realizing that unless China acted now, she must 
forever forfeit her claim to suzerainty over Korea, dispatched a force 
of 3,000 to put down the rebellion. This action caused the conservative 
Min faction to turn unreservedly toward China and consequently gave the 
latter occasion for beginning a series of encroachments upon Korea’s 
practical independence which culminated in the Sino-Japanese war of 
1894-1895.
The Chinese generals seized Tai Wen Kun and sent him to China for 
three years. The disappearance of Tai Wen Kun brought the Min faction 
back to power. Queen Min herself returned to Seoul with a Chinese
^Ibid., pp. 158-169.
-11-
escort»^^ The Japanese were now able to settle their claims with 
Korea, for the Korean government under the restored Min faction agreed 
to pay an indemnity to Japan for the Japanese killed during the military 
rebellion- The Treaty of Chemulpo was signed on August 30, 1882 by the 
Japanese minister Hanabusa and the Korean representative, Kim Hong-jip. 
Under this treaty Korea agreed to the following five articles;
1. Punish the rebels who killed the Japanese.
2. Pay an indemnity of 500,000 Yen to the bereaved.
3. Pay 500,000 Yen over a period of five years to cover the 
physical damage done to Japan.
4c Permit the stationing of Japanese soldiers to guard the 
Japanese Legation.
5. Make an official^apology to Japan by sending a high-ranking 
Korean official.
The Chinese, by virtue of the fact that they had acted as the 
Queen's deliverers, now had a firm hand on the Korean government.
Through Chinese influence, P. C. Von Mollendarff, an official of the 
Imperial Maritime Customs of China, was invited to establish a customs 
service in Korea and to act as a general advisor to the Korean Foreign 
Office. In addition the Chinese generals were made councillors of the
^^Ilsong Rok, July 25, 1882. The Chinese generals invited Tai Vfen 
Kun to a banquet and to inspect their ships in Inchon. There was one 
ship, in particular, to which they called his honorable attention.
They begged him,to go abroad and note the wonders of the apartments 
below. The Regent went. Once below, he found the door shut. Sin Ki- 
sok, "Tai Wen Kun ui Kuchi Sokhoe - Chungkuk ui Taehan Kansup ui 
Ilchol" ("A Study of Kidnapping and Release of Tai Wen Kun by China - 
An Aspect of China's Intervention of Korea"), Chongchi Hak, I. No. 1 
(April, 1905, pp. 27-33).
^^Carnegi Endowment of International Peace, Korea; Treaties and 
Agreements (Washington; Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,
1921), pp. 6-5. The Korean government sent Park, Yong-ho, as envoy 
extraordinary to bear a message of apology to Japan.
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Board of military affairs of the Korean government, and Ching Shu-tang, 
in assuming his duties as commercial agent, posted a notice in Seoul 
which read in part as follows:
I wish to inform the people that I have received the 
appointment of Commissioner for China to manage the Commerce 
of Korea - vAiereas Korea has been dependent upon China since 
the time Kichi was appointed King of Chosen, several thousand 
years ago, and people . . .  have been wonderfully obedient 
to our existing dynasty . . .
Therefore, the Chinese government has issued trade 
regulations benefitting Korea; and I hope the merchants 
and citizens will appreciate this fact, and obey these 
regulations, that harmonious feeling may exist between 
China ^ d  Korea, especially as Korea is a dependency of 
China.
In the foreign affairs of Korea, China disclaimed all influence, 
and thus pursued a double course. On the one side, she openly avowed 
her duty and intention to maintain the King of his throne. On the 
other, she left to him the control of his foreign relations and the 
entire responsibility for vAiatever obligations he might incur to 
foreign powers.
In their revulsion against the policies of Tai Wen Kun, the 
returned Queen's faction made some tentative motions toward the re­
formers. Judge 0. N. Denny, formerly American Consul General in Tien­
tsin was invited to act as adviser to the foreign office. Teachers
were invited from the United States and General Dye, a veteran of the
13American Civil War, to drill the Korean Army.
12Quoted in Frederick M. Nelson, Korea and the Old Orders in 
Eastern Asia (Baton Rouge, Louisiana State University Press, 1945), 
p. 165.
13Byong-do Lee, Kuksa Daikwan ("The Records on Korean History") 
(Seoul; Paik-Yong-Sa, 1954), p. 657.
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For the moment it looked as if Korea had embarked upon a successful
career as a member of the Family of Nations. Min Yong-ik, nephew of
the Queen, was sent to America with a commission to study Western civ- 
14ilization, and if Korea could have been left alone, without foreign 
rivalries and interference, all might lave gone well. However, the 
growing factional struggle between Conservative and Progressive again 
invited foreign interference.
The influence of the Queen over the King was all-powerful. When 
her old enemy, Tai Wen Kun was removed from the political scene all the 
offices in the state were once more filled by her relatives. All their 
sympathies were with the old civilization of China and the reformers 
who had come back from Japan, vdio were members of rival families to the 
Min, could find no outlet for their abilities and aspirations. By the 
beginning of 1884, the Conservative and Progressive element were clearly 
differentiated - with the Queen and her relatives on the one side, with 
a platform of conservatism and the friendship and protection of China, 
and the reformers on the other, with the platform of Progress, which 
would gradually enable Korea to stand alone, and friendship with Japan.
The presence of a strong body of Chinese influence made it necessary 
for the Progressives to seek Japanese support of like character in order 
to carry out their plans. The leaders of the Progressive party commun­
icated with the Japanese and reached an understanding that Japan should 
back them in their attempt to destroy Chinese influence and retain
^'^Ibid., p. 658.
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Korean independence.^^ The Progressive leaders thereafter met frequently 
with the Japanese to plan the uprising for December 4, 1884, The first 
important conference v/as held at the residence of Pak Yong-ho with the 
presence of Secretary Shimamura representing the Japanese Legation in 
K o r e a , A t  this conference, they agreed to stage a coup d'etat on the 
day vdien the new post office was to open, December 4, 1884,
On the evening of December 4th, the foreign envoys, several high 
officials of the government, members of both factions and the Chinese 
generals were invited to attend a banquet to celebrate the inauguration 
of the postal service. The Japanese minister had excused himself on 
the plea of ill health,
The dinner began at an; early hour, about six o'clock, and about
seven o'clock a fire alarm was sounded as a pre-arranged signal by the
Progressives. A house immediately in front of the post office was in
flames. Min Yong-ik, the nephew of the Queen, going out to observe was
attacked by assassins, but instead of being killed as was intended, was 
18only wounded. All was in confusion. The foreign and domestic guests
^^Ok-kyun Kim, Kapsin Ilrok ("The Records of Year of Kapsin" or 
"Kim Ok-kyun Diary") (Seoul; Seoul National University), Sept, 14,
1884. Kdjn Ok-kyun was a leader of the Progressive faction, the other 
leaders were Pak Yong-ho, So Jai-pil, and So Kwang-bom. They had been 
in Japan and were deeply impressed by Japanese modernization. See 
also, Young-yi Kim. Yun Chi-ho Sunsanq Yakchon ("Short Biography of 
Yun Chi-ho") (Seoul; Choson Kidokkyo Kamviwon, 1932), p. 42,
^^Kapsin Ilrok, November 4, 1884, See also, Chang, Imo Kunran 
kwa Kapsin Chonqbyun, p. 367.
17Mun, Kunse Ilbon yi Choson Chimtu-sa, p. 215; Kim, Yun Chi-ho 
Sunsanq Yakchon, p. 42.
3 8Dr. Allen, the first American Presbyterian Missionary treated 
Min Young-ik so well the King and his court became friends of the 
missionaries from then on.
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hastily dispersed. The two leaders of the conspiracy, Kim Ok-kyun 
and Pak Yong-ho, then went to the Japanese Legation to make sure of 
the readiness of the Japanese.
They were greeted by the Japanese Legation Secretary, Shimamura, 
who showed them the Japanese troops lined up and waiting for the order 
to march. Assured of Japanese support once more, the two Progressive 
leaders hastened to the palace, being joined on the way by other Pro­
gressive leaders. So Kwan-bom, Hong Yong-sik and many others. Entering 
the royal presence, they informed that the Chinese had caused trouble 
in the city and were going to take possession of the King's person, and 
that he should hasten to a place for safety, Kim Ok-kyun asked the King 
to send to the Japanese minister asking for protection, but the King
refused. However the Japanese minister with, some 200 troops was already 
19in the palace,
Kim Ok-kyun then obtained the King's seals and made out orders, as
if direct from His Majesty, for a number of Conservative leaders to
20come to the palace. The summons were sent in the early morning of 
December 5, 1884, to the Conservative leaders, Min Tae-ho, Min Yong-rauk, 
Cho Yong-ha, Han Kyu-jik, and Yi Cho-yun, They were seized and assas­
sinated as soon as they arrived at the palace. These murders were 
committed without the knowledge of the King, Following the liquidation
19Kapsin Ilrok, October 18, 1884. Japanese writer, Tabohashi 
gives strong pro-Japanese view saying that Japanese troops arrived at 
palace after Japanese minister received King's message asking for 
protection, Kiyoshi Tabohashi, Kindai Nissen Kankei no Kenkyu (Study 
of Japanese-Korean Relations in Modern Time") (Chosen Sotokufu, 1940: 
2 Vols.) I, p, 926,
20Mun, Kunse Ilbon Yichoson Chimto Sa, p, 218.
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of the pro-Chinese, Min faction leaders, the government was reconstruc-
21ted so as to include all the leaders who had participated in the coup.
The Progressive coup looked as if it had been successful up to this
22stage, but the Chinese regarded it differently. General Yuan Shih-kai, 
after expiration of a three hour ultimatum to the Japanese to evacuate, 
made a military attack upon the palace. The Chinese force outnumbered 
the Japanese seven to one. The Japanese fell back and on December 6, 
forced their way out of Seoul to Inchon and escaped to Japan, taking
23with them the Korean Progressive leaders who had survived the fighting.
These events signed the death warrant of any hope of reciprocity
24between Japan and Korea. The Queen's party rested in the hands of 
its Chinese friends, and all plans for reorganization and reforms of a
21In the new cabinet, Yi Chae-won and Hong Yong-sik were made 
Prime Ministers, Pak Yong-ho General-in Chief, So Kwang-bom Minister 
of Foreign Affairs, Kim Ok-kyun Minister of Finance, and So Chai-pil 
Lieutenant General. See Mun, Kunse Ilbon yi Choson Chimtu-sa, p. 219.
22Yuan was sent to Korea as "Resident-General" to supervise the 
Korean government after the mutiny of 1882 in Seoul. He was a dominant 
figure in Korea until 1894, when he fled to Peking. In 1913 he was 
elected the first president of the Republic of China.
23Kapsin Ilrok, December 6, 1884. The Korean Progressive leaders 
landed in Ja^®, expecting that they would be received like heroes, 
and that theÿ%ould return with a strong army to fight the Chinese.
But the Japanese Foreign minister told them that Japan was not going 
to war with China over the matter. "We are not ready to war with 
China yet" he said. See Tai-won Min, Kapsin Jonqbyun kwa Kim Ok-kyun 
(The Kapsin Revolution and Kim Ok-kyun) (Seoul; Kukje Muniniia Hyophue, 
1947), pp. 246-249.
'̂̂ The Coup d 'etat. of December 1884 (Korean call as Kapsin Jonqbyun) 
failed because the Progressive leaders as well as Japan were impatient 
and anxious to achieve their aim in haste. See Percival, Lowell, "A 
Korean Coup d'etat," The Atlantic Monthly, November, 1886, pp. 599-618. 
This writer takes the Japanese view by holding that the Japanese min­
ister at Seoul was most reluctant to cooperate with Korean Progressives 
in the coup d'etat.
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national scope were held in abeyance.
The next ten years witnessed a battle of wits in Korea between
Japan, China and Russia, with China holding the best cards, until 1894.
None of the three was ready for war, but while both China and Russia
were contemptuous of Japan, it was the latter alone vdio tightened her
belt and made ready for the fray.
Japan proceeded to settle her claims with China for damages
inflicted by the Chinese troops. In this effort, the Japanese failed
to attain their objectives. The situation became more complicated and
the strained relations between China and Japan were temporarily relieved
when China and Japan signed a convention at Tientsin in which it was
agreed that both nations should withdraw their troops from Korea.
Should any "grave disturbance" "of great moment or concern to China or
Japan, occur viiich might of necessity call for troops from the outside
for the suppression thereof," each nation before sending such troops,
should give due notice in writing to the other. This convention came
25to be known as the convention of Tientsin. The agreement pleased the 
Min faction because it removed their fear of a possible return of the 
pro-Japanese Progressive leaders to Korea under Japanese armed support.
The rule of the Min faction with Chinese support was one of notor­
ious mal-administration. The selling of office, the tyranny of local 
officials, and exorbitant tax burdens on the people were commonplace.
25Tongni Kyosop Amun ("Ministry of Yi Dynasty Foreign Affairs), 
Tonqni Kyosop Amun Ilgi ("The Yi Dynasty Foreign Ministry Archives), 
1882-1896, Reserved for Korean National Library, Seoul. April 18,
1885. Although both China and Japan withdrew their troops in 
compliance with this treaty, Chinese superiority in Korea was main­
tained .
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As a consequence, several armed rebellions ensued in the provinces.
Of these, the uprising by a religious sect called the Tonghak was the 
most serious one.
The Tonghak Rebellion
From 1893 to 1894 the Tonghak Society became a major political 
factor. This secret Society had a strong continuity as a religious 
order and was active in achieving social equality. One of its major 
aims was to restore the ideal condition in Korean traditional order 
and clean up the corrupt officials and eradicate all foreign influ­
ences. The creator of the Tonghak Society was Cho Che-u, who accepted 
from Confucianism the concept of the Five Great Relations,from 
Buddhism the law for cleansing the mind and from Taoism the law for
cleansing the body. Finally, from Catholism, he took important
27organizational elements.
The basic doctrine of Tonghak is the thesis that "Man is Heaven." 
Cho Hae-wol (1829-1898), the second leader of Tonghak likened a weaving 
girl to Heaven at a loom. He said that the children's cry is the voice 
of Heaven. Since man is heaven, all men are lofty and equal. Disdain­
ing men by men is against the will of Heaven. He emphasized "Serving 
men as one serves Heaven." He further maintained that all men should
The five relationships are: ruler and subject, father and son, 
elder brother and younger brother, husband and wife, friend and 
friend. All of them except the last involve the authority of one 
person over another.
27Chi Y. Oh, Tonghak Sa ("History of Tonghak") (Seoul; Hapmun 
Sa, 1946), p. 32. Tonghak in Korean means "Eastern Learning". Cho 
Che-u founded this religious sect in Kyongsang Province in 1859. In 
1865 Tonghak was banned by order of the government and the religion 
went underground. See also C. N. Weems, Korean Reform and Independent 




bè revered with equality and without discrimination. He advocated love 
and forgiveness over falsehood, and fairness and righteousness over 
arrogance of authority and superiority. This theory was developed into 
the doctrine that there is nothing in the every day life of human 
beings \Æiich is not the heavenly way and that there is nothing in the 
universe but the facsimile of Heaven. He said "every matter and every 
thing is Heaven." This means that "Heaven is nourished by what is 
Heaven." One can see that reverence to Heaven, to man and to matter 
are one and the same thing. This doctrine is not merely a scholar's 
theory but the voice of the people emanating from experience in actual 
life. Cho Hae-wol was by no means a scholar. To perceive the way is 
to know oneself-that "I am the Heaven and Heaven is I." To serve the 
Lord of Heaven is to understand him. He emphasized that one should 
"develop one's own Heaven" by way of self-consciousness. The Tonghak 
seeks neither salvation after death nor eternal life in the world to
come. Since man is Heaven, its ideal is to realize a paradise on
.. 28 earth.
Tonghak was a revolutionary religion founded on a nationalistic 
concept stimulated by the spirit of Korean independence from any 
foreign power- Its idea was the destruction of the traditional belief 
in the supremacy of China. With Chinese superiority eliminated, there 
would be no alternative for Korea except to become both politically 
and philosophically independent. The Min faction and Progressives
Do-ha Lee, (ed) Chondokyo Chankon Sa ("The Records of Tonghak 
Religion") (Seoul; Chongsimri Won), 1939, II, pp. 6-7.
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tended to rely on support by foreign powers to achieve their political 
supremacy and thereby compromised the independence of Korea. But the 
Tonghak movement was a genuine Korean independence movement not char­
acterized by reliance on foreign influence or support.
The pressure had mounted in the Tonghak Society to taking action 
on their social and economic grievances as well as to demand the expul­
sion of foreigners. The corruption of the Min faction's administration, 
vdiich was intensified by a heavy tax program, led the Tonghak leaders 
to determine that their Society ought to be mobilized publicly to clean 
up government and protect people. Moreover, the increasing foreign
influence stimulated the leaders to reemphasize the importance of pre-
29serving traditional Korean values. xn essence, Tonghak contained a 
seed of nationalism or, more specifically, national consciousness.
The unity of the Tonghak membership and its wide-spread support 
alamfâd the Min faction. In 1892, the government sent a high-ranking 
Royal Inspector, Cho Pyong-sik, to put down the Tonghak movement in the 
southern provinces. Inspector Cho tracked down Tonghak members, arrested- 
and murdered the Tonghak followers, and plundered their property. In 
March, 1893, Tonghak leaders determined to make a direct appeal to the 
King for the purpose of gaining royal recognition supporting and 
championing national solidarity.At the end of March, 1893, fifty
29Sun-kun Lee, Hankuk Sa ("History of Korea") (Seoul; Young-dan 
Hakhai, 1964), pp. 12-14. See also Do-ha Lee, Chondokyo Chanqkon Sa, 
II, pp. 46-49.
30"Kuksa Pyunjip Wuiwon Hae ("National History Editorial
Committee"), Tonghakran Kirok (Records of Tonghak Rebellion), (Seoul; 
1959), p. 116. Hereafter cited as Tonghakran Kirok.
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representatives of Tonghak entered Seoul and presented before the
palace gate, with pathetic ceremonies, a petition that their sect be
tolerated. Their appeal was refused, and they were driven away by 
31the King's order.
Denied a hearing by the King, the Tonghak leaders gave full support
to a physical revolt against the government. Late in April, 1893, a
mass meeting was held, and on April 25, the mass assembly passed a
resolution to launch a civil war. Its purpose would be to drive
corrupt officials out of the government and to expel the foreign in-
32fluence. Peasants made up the majority of this meeting.
Alarmed at the formidable aspects of this mass meeting, the gov­
ernment sent a civilian official. Oh Yung-jung, to the southern province 
for the purpose of pursuading the Tonghak leaders to disperse their 
followers and settle their grievances by peaceful means. The leaders 
flatly rejected the emissary. In Seoul, the pro-Chinese cabinet
proposed to the King that China be asked to give military aid against 
33the Tonghaks, but the King overruled the proposal and decided to use 
Korean troops only. The King ordered Oh Yung-jung to give the Tonghaks 
one more chance to disperse their forces. On Inay 15, 1893, Oh Yung-jung
^^Ibid., p. 117.
32Tonghakran Kirok, pp. 118-120. In March, 1893, threatning 
plackards were fastened to foreigner's gates in Seoul inveighing 
against the Christian religion and warning all foreigners to leave 
the country at once. See U.S. Department of State, Papers relating 
to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1894, Apr. 1. pp. 809. 
Hereafter cited as Foreign Relations. See also, Sang-gi Kim, Tonghak 
kwa Tonghakran ("Tonghak and Tonghak and Tonghak Rebellion") (Seoul; 
Taesong Chulpansa, 1947), pp. 57-58.
33Hyon Hwang, Maechon Yarok ("Records of Maechon"), National 
History Material Series, No. 1 (Seoul, 1955), p. 132. Queen Min in­
dicated that the Tai Wen Kun was again making a bid for power through 
Tonghak leaders.
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presented an ultimatum in the name of the King. If the mobilized 
Tonghaks were not disbanded by May 19, the forces would autack them.
The Tonghak leaders acceded to this demand and dismissed their assembled 
followers on May 17.^^
However, the Tonghak leaders passed an extremely nationalistic 
manifesto which read in part:
Chinese, Japanese and Western rebels and thieves are 
now introduced into the very bowels of our land and anarchy 
has reached its zenith. Just look around on the capital 
under present condition. It is the lair and den of barbarians.
Our three thousands millions of people in the Eastern Kingdom 
are now all in the grasp of wild beasts, and our ancestral 
home of 500 years duration will shortly witness the disaster 
of dispersion and dismemberment. Alas for charity, patriotism, 
prosperity, prudence, filial p^ety, brotherly love, loyalty, 
and faith! What has become of’ them all at the present time.
We who number several millions have sworn to the death 
that we will unite in one common effort to sweep out all 
foreign rebels and bring them ruin in our sage desire to 
render to our country the fidelity which even a dog will 
show his master, and we humbly hope that every one, within 
one common solution, will combine their efforts and will 
select loyal and patriotic gentry^^o assist them in support­
ing the wish of the country
In the meantime^ it was reported that many thousands of Tonghaks 
were collected at the town of Po-eun in the eastern part of Chung- 
chong Province, and that their numbers were daily increasing. Every 
day brought fresh rumors of their strength, and amongst Koreans there 
was much alarm. Although almost without arms, the Tonghaks were said 
to be nonetheless regularly drilling, and to have professed their
34Oh, Tonghak Sa, pp. 83-94.
35Quoted in Spencer J. Palmer (ed.) Korean American Relations, 
Documents pertaining to the Far Eastern Diplomacy of the United 
States (Berkeley; University of California Press, 1963), Vol. II, 
pp. 315-316.
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intention of marching on Seoul. They erected a wall about their encamp­
ment, in the center of tAich was a large flag with the inscription "Down 
with the foreigners. May the right flourish!" They declared that they 
had no fear of the soldiers who might be sent against them as the sol­
diers, instead of attacking, would join them.^^
The next significant move of the Tonghak force was the work of
Chon Bong-jun. He was one of the radical members in the Society. He
gave the down-trodden peasants hope and new life in the midst of the
awful night of ever-increasing official corruption and oppression. In
February, 1894, Chon led about a thousand of his Tonghak followers in
an attack on Kobu county breaking into the small arsenal attached to it.
The Tonghaks virtually controlled the entire county and were gaining
37power in the Cholla Province. The King issued a decree condemning 
Tonghaks as rebels on February 15. Eight hundred troops under the 
command of Hong Ke-hung, most trusted general of the Queen, were sent 
to Cholla Province. The Hong troops met the Tonghak forces and were 
defeated. It was rumored that over half the Hong's troops fled 
before the encounter. When the Tonghaks moved into Chon-ju City, 
capital of Cholla Province, the danger seemed to threaten the whole 
country. General Hong signified his inability to cope with the
"̂^Tonghakran Kir ok, pp. 129-132.
37Oh, Tonghak Sa, pp. 251-253. According to N. Katswiku, Nikkan 
Kappo Hi-Shi ("The Secret History of Japanese Annexation of Korea), 
Japanese aided the Tonghaks and had a "blood alliance" with Tonghaks 
leaders, Chong Bong-jun. But it is doubtful to agree with N.
Katsuiku's view. Tonghaks were strictly nationalist; with strong 
anti-foreign ideology.
*20■̂ Ôh, Tonghak Sa, pp. 116-119.
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situation. Then it was that the Min faction at the Court, instigated 
by Yuan Shih-kai, Chinese Resident-General in Seoul, recommended that 
the King call Chinese military help. By this time, the King, discour­
aged by the success of the rebellion in the South, asked Chinese 
39aid, reversing a decision of a year earlier.
China promptly responded, and feeling perfectly safe because of
her newly built navy and German drilled troops, proceeded to violate
the Li-Ito Convention of Tientsin and dispatched 2,000 Chinese troops
40to Korea on June 7. Then the Chinese government sent the Japanese
Legation in Peking a memorandum which included the following words:
"It is in harmony with our constant practice to protect our tributary
states by sending our troops to assist them. General Weh has been
ordered to Cholla Province to restore the peace of our tributary 
41state." Thus, in plain words, China by force of arms reasserted 
her ancient claims to suzerainty over Korea as a vassal state.
On June 1, 1894, just five days before the first Chinese detach­
ment embarked at Tientsin for Korea - a large Korean government force 
surrounded the city of Chonju and made an historical proposal to Chon 
Bong-jun. The commander of the government force, in the name of the
39Hwa-an ("The Yi Dynasty Court Repository on Korea-China 
Relations") (Seoul; Korean National Library), Vol. XXIX, February 
15, 1894; Tonghakran Kirok, p. 166.
40Il-an ("The Yi Dynasty Court Repository on Korean-Japanese 
Relations") (Seoul; Korean National Library), Vol. XXVIII, June 7, 1894.
^^The Japanese Archives in Korea (The 1894-1910 Series, Photo­
graphed for the Hoover Institution, Stanford University), Vol. XXVII,
No. 158, pp. 167-168. Hereafter cited as J. A. (Korea).
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King, informed Chon that Chinese forces were about to move into the 
country and that this was no time for Koreans to be fighting each
o t h e r . I f  the Tonghak forces would evacuate the city, the King
would undertake to see that neither the Chinese nor any other for­
eigners remained in the country. The essential patriotism of the 
whole Tonghak order was reflected in the fact that Chon accepted this 
appeal for national unity, transferred the city to the government 
troops and moved toward the south.
The Chinese troops had not helped in the suppression of the
Tonghak. Meantime, it became known that the Japanese were also send­
ing troops to Korea, and the Korean government, fearing trouble, asked 
the Chinese to leave. This the Chinese promised to do, but because 
500 Japanese marines landed at Chemulpo (Inchon) and came to Seoul on 
June 10, the Chinese held their troops where they were. On June 13, 
800 Japanese soldiers came to Seoul and relieved the marines. These 
soldiers had arrived at Chemulpo and along the road to Seoul, at cer­
tain points they threw up earth works, while they left a guard at the 
ferry near Seoul and at other important places along the Seoul road.
Later, on June 16, 3,000 additional Japanese troops landed in 
a]Chemulpo.
There was no longer any reason for foreign troops to remain in 
Korea. The Chinese had come to put dov/n the Tonghaks, and the 
Japanese had come ostensibly to protect their nationals. With the
"̂ L̂ee, Hankuk Sa, pp. 100-101; Foreign Relations, 1894, App. I.,
p. 20.
43Tongni Kyosop Amun Ilgi, June 10, 13, 16, 1894; Foreign 
Relations, 1894, App. 1, p. 20.
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Tonghak problem solved by the patriotism of Tonghaks, the King asked
44both forces to leave at once,
China agreed to leave, rejecting a Japanese proposal that they
participate in a Korean-Chinese-Japanese Commission to supervise the
financial, administrative and military reform in Korea. The Chinese
reply pointed out that the Tonghak rebellion had already been settled,
that China would not interfere in the Korean internal administration,
and that Japan had no right to do so because Japan recognized the inde-
45pendence of Korea.
In spite of Japanese minister Otori's assurance to the foreign 
representatives that the purpose of Japanese troops in Seoul was only 
to protect the Japanese Legation and property, the real purpose was to 
oust the traditional Chinese supremacy in Korea. It was then that the 
idea of reforming the Korean government and removing the anti-Japanese 
Min faction was proposed. The Secretary of the Japanese Legation, 
Sugimura, sent a memorandum to the Tokyo government asking his government 
to use the occasion to extend Japanese power, carry out a revolution 
against the Min faction, and enforce reforms. The memorandum, sent 
from Sugimura on June 13 to Foreign minister Mutsu read:
1. Through our action in this occasion we must suppress
44Tongni Kyosop Amun ("Ministry of Yi Dynasty Foreign Affairs"). 
Tongni Kyosop Tonqaang Samu Amun Ilgi (The Diary of the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs & Trade of the Yi Dynasty"), 1882-1886. Seoul. Vol. 
XXXX, June 14, 1894.
45Kuksa Pyunjip Uiwonhoe ("National History Editorial Committee") 
Sokum Chongsa ("The Diary of Kim Yun-sik") (Seoul; 1958), p. 313.
Kim Yun-sik was Foreign minister of Korea from 1894-1896.
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the pretensions of the Chinese in Korea, reduce the power 
and influence of the Chinese over Korea in the future, and 
secretly increase our power.
2. Arouse a revolution within Korea, remove either the 
Min faction or the neutrals from the government.
3. When matters are settled, we must attain agreement 
with the Chinese government and advise the Korean government 
to carry out internal reforms under the allegation that the 
Korean government has not been able to subdue th^^insurgents 
and hence has disturbed the neighboring nations.
The Japanese government, on June 22, declared its intention to 
carry out the reforms alone, and on June 23, ordered that 8,000 troops 
at Inchon should march into Seoul. Japan clearly formulated her policy 
to oust Chinese influence from Korea by means of force, if necessary.
At this point, Japan had come to the conclusion that she could never 
assume her proper place in the Family of Nations until she had demon­
strated her ability to face and defeat China.
On June 27, 1894, the Korean government sought to end the deadlock 
by requesting the Western representatives in Seoul to offer the friendly 
offices of their governments to the withdrawal of Chinese and Japanese 
forces from Korea. For this purpose, the Korean government sent an 
identical note to the British, French, American and Russian ministers 
in Seoul which read in part;
. . o at this moment the troops of the two nations, namely 
China and Japan, are in occupation of Korean soil. The first 
by invitation, to aid in quelling a rebellion; the other 
without invitation . . .  The necessity for the presence of 
both of these has now ceased. The Chinese authorities are 
now willing to remove their troops from Korean soil, provided 
Japan will remove hers. But Japan refuses to remove her 
troops until the Chinese have been removed, and neglects to 
entertain any proposition for simultaneous removal of both.
^^Chong-sik, Lee, The Politics of Korean Nationalism (Berkeley; 
University of California Press, 1963). p. 39.
-29-
The presence of a large army in time of peace is a 
menace to the peace and integrity of Korea. Korean govern­
ment respectively submit to the Foreign representatives and 
their governments will use their friendly offices ^  affect­
ing an amicable solution of the present situation.
The British, French, American and Russian representatives in Seoul
48jointly requested the Chinese and Japanese to simultaneously withdraw. 
But the Chinese refused to go until the Japanese did, and the Japanese 
refused to go until reforms had been introduced vdiich would clear the 
political atmosphere and give some semblance of truth to the fiction 
of Korean independence. The Korean government was thrown into consterna­
tion v^en on June 25, 1894, the Japanese minister Otori demanded that
a declaration be given the next day by the Korean Foreign Office, on
49whether Korea is a tributary of China or not. The following answer 
was given: "Korea being an independent state enjoys the same sovereign
right as does Japan and that in both internal administration and foreign 
intercourse Korea enjoys complete independence."'^
On June 28, 1894, the Japanese minister Otori had an audience with 
the King and presented the following five points of reform: (1) Re­
form the central government and the local government system and select 
personnel from all classes and familiès. (2) Reform the financial 
system and cultivate the resources in the country. (3) Readjust the 
laws, reform the judicial system, and bring about impartial trials.
'̂̂ Tongni Kyosop Tongsanq Samu Amun Ilgi, Vol. XXXX, June 21, 1894,
48Foreign Relations, 1894, App. I, p. 38.
49Sokum Chongsa, pp. 316-317.
^^Kyo, Chong, Hankuk Kenyon Sa (Later Year of Korean History), 
National History material Series; No, 5, (Seoul, 1957), I, p, 84,
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(4) Suppress the insurrections within the country and establish
necessary military preparation for the maintenance of order. (5)
51Firmly establish the educational system.
The Korean government refused to accept these reforms, arguing 
that Korea could not accept the Japanese reform proposal because it
was clearly an interference with internal affairs, and instead made a
52demand that Japan withdraw their troops. Japan ignored the Korean
demand and further demanded of the Korean government that the Chinese
troops be withdrawn immediately; because Korea was an independent state,
the Chinese were not justified in sending their troops "to safeguard
53a traditional tributary state". When the Korean government replied 
that it was in the process of negotiating with the Chinese for withdrawal 
of their troops, minister Otori answered that the reply was unsatisfac­
tory, and threatened to carry out reform by means of force.
It was on July 19, 1894, that a great change came in Korea. On 
this day Otori received definite permission from Tokyo to use "oppres­
sive means" in Korea and Yuan Shih-kai left Seoul for Tientsin. Yuan 
Shih-kai's silent withdrawal from Korea can be explained by his fear of 
the Japanese. At this time he was not only diplomatically helpless, but 
there was a rumor that the Japanese troops were about to attack the 
Chinese Legation. Yuan's withdrawal clearly marked the rise of Japanese 
influence and fall of Chinese influence in Korea.
J. A. (Korea), XXVII, No. 395, pp. 586-591. Otori, before this 
demand was made on Korea, frankly reported to foreign minister Mutsuoku 
that he would "force" reforms. Kim, Yun Chi-ho Sunsang Yakchon, p. 73.
52Lee, Hankuk Sa, p. 195.
53J. A. (Korea), XXVII, No. 422, p. 652.
5^Ibid., No. 423, pp. 627-628.
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On July 23, the Japanese troops broke into and took possession of
the palace, humiliating the Korean sovereign, and later seized the King
and crowned prince as "prisoners." The pro-Chinese, Min faction was
driven out of the court and the ex-Regent, Tai Wen Kun, was induced
55to take over the government.
On July 24, a council of State was formed with Kim Hong-jip^^ 
as its president and Otori himself as its advisor. This was called 
the new government of Kap-oh (or 1894) and was composed of pro-Japanese 
Progressive faction. In the meantime, Japan informed China that the 
sending of more troops to Korea would be considered as an act of war. 
Ignoring Japan’s threat, China ordered her troops in Manchuria to 
cross the Yalu River. Having chartered the British ship, Kowshing, 
the Chinese filled it with reenforcements and sent it to Inchon. On 
July 25, the Japanese Navy sank Kowshing in the harbor of Inchon.
Three days later the Chinese government acknowledged the outbreak of
57hostilities, and on August 1, 1894, both Japan and China declared war.
Thus Japan determined to pursue an imperialistic policy toward 
Korea vÆiile China followed a policy of maintaining the status quo.
The weakness of the Korean government created the pattern of the 
struggle for power primarily as one between Japan and China,
55Lee, Hankuk Sa, p. 207; Tai Wen Kun was reluctant to take over 
the government. At the desire of the King the ex-Regent agreed to 
take power with a stipulation that the Japanese should not interfere 
with Korean affairs; Hwang, Maechon Yarok, pp. 145-146. See also Won- 
chul Lee, Wanqkunq Sa ("Records of the Royal Palace") (Seoul; Kuwang 
Sil, 1948), p. 25; Kim, Yun Cho-ho Sunsang Yakchon, p. 74.
^^Kim Hong-jip was a man of a strong personality and progressive 
tendencies, altogether a valuable man for the emergency since he had 
the entire confidence of the Japanese.
57Kim, Yun Chi-ho Sunsang Yakchon, pp. 74-75.
The End of Chinese Influence
Japan's declaration of war, stated in part as follows:
. . .  Korea is an independent state . . .  It has, however, been 
China's habit to designate Korea as her dependency, and openly 
and secretly to interfere with her domestic affairs . . .  We 
in virtue of the treaty concluded with Korea in 1876, and 
looking to possible emergencies, caused a military force 
to be sent to that country.
On August 20, 1894, Japan recognized Korea's independence in her
alliance with Korea against China. It was an offensive and defensive
alliance which read as follows :
Article I. The object of alliance is to maintain the
independence of Korea on a firm footing and to promote the
respective interests of both Japan and Korea by expelling 
Chinese soldiers from Korean territory.
Article II. Japan will undertake all warlike operations 
against China, both offensive and defensive, vfliile Korea will 
undertake to give every possible facility to Japanese soldiers 
regarding their movement and supply of provisions.
Article III. This treaty shgll cease at the conclusion 
of a treaty of peace with China.
In reality, by this forced alliance, Korea was to give every
possible aid to Japan to defeat China.
The modernized Japanese soldiers took Pyong-yang^^ on September 
15 and ended the war on land. On September 17, the greatest naval 
engagement of the war took place off the mouth of the Yalu River, and
^^Korea; Treaties and Agreements, p. 9.
59William W. Rockwill (ed). Treaties and Agreements with or 
Concerning China and Korea 1894-1904 (Washington: Government Print­
ing Office, 1908), p. 429; J. A. (Korea), XXVII, No. 706, pp. 337- 
338. This treaty was signed between Japanese minister Otori and 
Korean Foreign minister Kim Yun-sik.
^^"A Visit to the Battle of Pyong-yang," Korean Repository 
VII, (1895), pp. 10-14.
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after a battle of four and a half hours of fighting, Japan won the 
battle. In Seoul, meanwhile, various reforms had already been put 
into action, and a new pro-Japanese government was set up on December 7,
Tai Wen Kun was prominent in the government; the well-known 
strength of his personality did much to give stability to the new 
regime. The pro-Chinese Queen retired from active-participation in 
politics for the time being. The new cabinet chosen was pro-Japanese. 
They called themselves Progressive. Kim Hong-jip was appointed as 
prime-minister, and all cabinet members were appointed by permission 
of the Japanese.It was evident that Japanese influence was over­
whelmingly predominant in Seoul, since the government had committed 
itself to the policy of selecting Japanese advisers for its various 
departments.
The month of October saw the Chinese driven across the Yalu and 
a measure of order restored on Korean soil. It also saw the resur­
gence of the Tonghak in the southern provinces. The Tonghaks seeing 
that the Chinese and Japanese were occupied by the war, took the 
occasion to re-enforce their attempts to expell the Japanese controlled 
government in Seoul.About two hundred Japanese troops aided the 
government forces, and at every point the government troops were 
successful. A large number of Tonghak leaders were killed.
By the end of 1894, the scene had shifted violently. Gone was 
the Chinese suzerain claim, the arrogant Chinese Resident-General Yuan
^^Sokum Chong Sa, p. 202.
°‘̂0h, Tonghak Sa, p. 263. 
^^Lee, Hankuk Sa, pp. 378-379.
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Shih-kai, the Chinese merchants who had been so strong in Korea. Japan 
had almost completely dominated Korea's government during the hostil­
ities, and she was prepared to reap the benefits of her success in 
increasing her control over the economic and political affairs, not 
of China but of Korea.
In Japan, meanviiile, the war brought a strong national unity, and
on February 1, 1895, the House passed unanimously a resolution to vote
64any amount of appropriations needed for the prosecution of war.
But by this time the war virtually ended with Japanese victory. Re­
alizing China's military defeat, as early as October, 1894, Li Hung- 
chang attempted to bring about a collective mediation, and Mutsu, the 
Japanese Foreign minister, by January, 1895, completed a draft treaty 
of peace in order to prevent the possibility of intervention by a third 
p o w e r . A t  the same time, Japan still continued to prepare for war.
On January 8, Ito, Japanese Prime-minister, urged that Japan should 
take up military and diplomatic matters first and leave all other things
T ^ 66for later.
The desire for peace in China was strong by March, 1895. Before 
this time England, in October, and America, in November,- 1394, attempted 
to mediate for peace. Li Hung-chang left Tientsin on March 14, and 
arrived at Simonoseki on March 19 for a peace mission. On March 20, Li 
met Ito; and an attack by a Japanese assassin injuring Li in the face 
helped bring about a quick armistice. On April 1, Ito presented
64Tatsuji Takeuchi, War and Diplomacy in the Japanese Empire 
(Garden City; Doubleday & Co., 1935), p. 113.
65Tatsuji, Takeuchi, War and Diplomacy in the Japanese Empire 
(New York; Doubleday, Page & Co., 1935), p. 127.
^^Mitori Karaatsu (ed.) Ito Ko Jen Shu (Works of Prince Ito),
(tokyo; Association of Prince Ito, 1928), II, p. 32.
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Japan'S peace terras to Li. On April 9, Li presented counter proposals. 
After some disputes over the peace terras, on April 17, Li and Ito 
finally signed a peace treaty. This is called the Treaty of Shimo- 
noseki, the first article of vdiich read:
China recognize the full and complete independence and
autonomy of Korea, and in consequence the payment of tribute 
and the performance of ceremonies and formalities by Korea 
to China, in derogation of such independence and autonomy, 
shall wholly cease for the future.
The other important provisions of the treaty included : (1)
China's cession of the Liaotung peninsula, Formosa and the Pesca­
dores; and (2) China's payment of an indemnity of 200^,000,000 tails.
When the news of the declaration of independence reached Korea 
there was a great rejoicing among the cabinet members, and "the largest 
and most brilliant entertainment" was given to the foreign diplomatic 
corps by the Korean government. It is highly questionable whether 
Korea's independence dated from the day Wien the Shiraonoseki treaty 
was signed. Japan already recognized Korea's independence when she 
forced the treaty of 1876 at Kwang-hwa. Since then the western powers 
namely; United States, England, France, Germany and Russia, also recog­
nized the independence and sovereignty of Korea in their treaties. The
independence of Korea was an accepted and established fact by the na­
tions, Japan being the first. The fact that Japan restated the indepen­
dence of Korea in 1895 indicates her ulterior aim in recognizing the 
independence of Korea but for her future scheme in that country. It is
^^Korea; Treaties and Agreements, pp. 11-20.
^Ibid.
^^Korean Repository, VII (1895), pp. 235-237.
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clear that Japan’s repetition in recognizing the already recognized
independence of Koreas meant not to recognize it but to destroy it.
The later Japanese policy in Korea supports this assumption.
The impact of the Sino-Japanese War on international relations in
the Far East and on the world was significant, but it was particularly
so on the fate of China and Korea. Although some of the peace terms
70were dropped in China's favor, the war demonstrated the weakness of 
China. Within a few years after the treaty of Shimonoseki, China was 
forced to make leases, concessions, and "spheres of interests on influ­
ences" to European powers. As Korea, her position of "younger brother" 
to China ended forever, and she became a stake of Russo-Japanese imper­
ialism. As for Japan, she received almost everything she could expect 
at that time. As a Japanese historian later said:
The Sino-Japanese war gave Japan everything for which 
she had contended especially the independence of Korea as 
against Chinese claims of suzerainty and the recognition of 
Japan on the basis of equality with the powers. It was Japan's 
first challenge to the powers and her first bid for world 
recognition.
Japan did not receive such a big gain from the war as the above
quotation might seem to indicate. As early as September, 1894, after
the battle of Yalu, China attempted to solicit the intervention of a
third power, and she was advised to come first to terms directly with
Japan. By March, 1895, Russian Czar Nicholas became anxious to extend
72his influence to Manchuria and Korea. Russia's policy at this time
70This refers to the restoration of Liaotung Peninsula to China 
through the Russian, French and German intervention.
71Quoted in Roy H. Agaki, Japan's Foreign Relations, 1542-1936 
(Tokyo; The Hakuseido Press, 1937), p. 10.
72Ki-suk Sin, Tonqyanq Uekyo Sa ("The Records on the Oriental 
Diplomacy") (Seoul; Tongku Munwha Sa; 1948), p. 368.
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was being formulated by her finance minister, Count Serge Witte, who
believed that the preservation of the status quo in Manchuria would
work to the advantage of his country. In April, Russia proposed that
France, Germany, and Great Britain advise Japan to restore the Liaotung 
73peninsula to China in the interest of peace.
France was ready to support the Russian proposal under the obliga­
tions of their Dual Alliance; moreover, France was anxious to claim a 
reward from China in the form of concessions in the southern provinces, 
-adjacent to Indo-China. Germany was eager to join the intervention for 
different reasons. She sought diversion of Russian energies to Asia 
to relieve pressure on her own frontiers and to isolate France in 
Europe. And Germany like Russia and France, was also ready to ask 
favors from a prostrate China. The British government was becoming 
friendly to Japan. To her, Japan was a check on Russian expansion, and 
she prefered to see Japan rather than Russia dominant in Korea and 
South Manchuria. However, Great Britain did not oppose the interven­
tion because she feared that a strong stand might jeopardize her posi­
tion in Europe.
On April 23, 1895, only six days after the signing of the treaty 
of Shimonoseki, the representative of Russia, France, and Germany in 
Tokyo presented to the Japanese Deputy Foreign minister identical notes 
which read:
. . .  the possession of the peninsula of Liaotung 
claimed by Japan would be a constant menace to the capital 
of China, would at the same time render illusory the
73Liaotung peninsula constitutes a little strip of Manchurian 
territory, jutting out into the sea between the Bay of Korea and 
the Gulf of Chihli, with Port Arthur and Dairen, it is the most 
strategic stronghold in China and the key to the Far Eastern situation.
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independence of Korea and would henceforth be a perpetual 
obstacle to the permanent peace of the Far East. Consequently 
the government of Russia, France and Germany advise Japan 
to renoun<yg the definite possession of the peninsula of 
Liaotung.
Japan at this time had no force to meet the tripartite interven­
tion, nor did she have any power to turn to for help. Therefore it
75was decided to yield to the three powers. On May 5, Japan informed
the three powers that she accepted the recommendation and renounced
definitely the possession of the Liaotung peninsula,and on May 9,
she received the congratulations of the three powers for acting in the
77interest of the general peace. A feeling of militarism began to rise 
in Japan as a result of the belief that force only can be met with force. 
To the Japanese the intervention was a bitter pill to swallow, but it 
was also a blessing in disguise because it forced them to realize the 
imperative need for rapid progress and preparation to take revenge on 
Russia. The Russian-initiated tripartite intervention was the real 
beginning of Russo-Japanese rivalry in the Far East, and Korea, freed 
from traditional Chinese vassalage, became the principle stake of this 
contest for the next ten years.
74Quoted in A. M. Pooley (ed). The Secret Memoirs of Count Tadasu 
Hayashi (New York; The Knickerbroker Press, 1915), p. 85,
75Opinions among the ruling circle in Japan were divided. Ito 
was for an international conference that would consider the matter 
of Liaotung, while the Foreign minister Mutsu was for acceptance of 
the three power's demand.
In the face of superior and overwhelming forces Japan gave way, 
receiving in lieu of the territory an additional indemnity of 
30,000,000 taels.
77Takeuchi, War and Diplomacy in the Japanese Empire, pp. 117-119,
CHAPTER II
RUSSO-JAPANESE INFLUENCE AFTER SINO- 
JAPANESE WAR, 1895-1897
Japanese Active Interference and 
Assassination of Queen Min
The Korean government, suffering from the double shock of losing 
the support of China after the Sino-Japanese war in 1895, and of being 
exposed suddenly to the forces of western power politics and imperalism, 
fought a desperate and losing battle for her independence. Korea was 
to be involved in the conflicts of the modern diplomatic policies and 
power politics of states under the western system. Under the alterna­
tive domination of stronger neighbors, she was to be merely a tool for 
the execution of the international policies of these contending states, 
Japan and Russia.
The administration was corrupt. Factional strife within the 
circle of the court that was rooted in the precedents of centuries, 
weakened the government. Into this situation, an expanding Russia 
found scope for implementing an active policy in Korea especially when 
Japan moved ahead too rapidly in her attempt to gain control over the 
Korean government.
The Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895, had arisen from conflicting 
wishes of the belligerent powers regarding Korea. China asserted tradi­
tional suzerain rights over the peninsula Kingdom, and the interests of 
Japan made Korea's effective independence imperative. As a result of 
the war both recognized the independence of Korea. However, Korea
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lacked material strength which rendered her real independence impossible. 
From the Japanese point of view, Korea's strength could be secured only 
by a thorough reform of her administration and financial and legal sys­
tem, which had sunk into a state of unspeakable corruption and decay. 
Japan seemed to be left with the task of building Korea and of reforming 
the national institutions of the Korean people vhose political training 
in the past seemed to have made them practically impervious to such an 
effort. Perhaps no work more delicate and more liable to blunder and 
misunderstanding could befall a nation than that of setting another's 
house in order where the necessity for changes were not even recognized.
The Japanese minister, Otori, entered into the enforced reform 
program. He induced the King to appoint a council of seventeen members 
empowered to pass reform measures,^ and this body issued a series of 
remarkable reform decrees, called in toto the Kap-oh Reform:
Article I. Henceforward the year from the establish­
ment of the dynasty is to be the date on all official doc­
uments within the Kingdom and without.
Article II. The agreements with China shall be altered 
and ministers plenipotentiary shall be sent to the various 
powers.
Article III. The distinction between patrician and 
plebeian rank shall be done away and men shall be selected 
for office according to ability, without distinction of 
birth.
Article IV. The system of superiority of scholar 
class over the military shall be abolished, and a form 
for mutual salutation shall be established according 
to the rank.
Article V. The law which renders the family and
^Chong, Han-kuk Kenyon 5a, I, p. 88; Kim, Chi-ho Sunsang 
Yakchon, pp. 74-75.
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connections of a criminal liable to punishment shall be 
totally abrogated. The offender only shall be punished.
Article VI. The adoption of a child shall be permitted 
only viBien a person does not have any child from his legit­
imate wife or concubine.
Article VII. Early marriages are strictly forbidden.
A man must be twenty years old and a woman sixteen before 
they can marry.
Article VIII. Widows of high or low estate shall be 
permitted to marry as they please.
Article IX. The law authorizing the keeping of offi­
cial or private male or female slaves shall be abolished 
and it shall be forbidden to buy or sell any person.
These reforms were definitely revolutionary and too drastic a
change from the centuries-old Chinese way of life in Korea. The forced
reforms carried within them the seed of their own failure. In addition
to these articles of political and social reform, there was an economic
reform which included: (1) The adoption of silver and copper for
money; (2) a new system of monetary units; (3) centralization and
uniformity of the financial system; (4) establishment of banks; and
3(5) uniformity in measure and weight, etc. All these reforms were 
forced on the Korean government by Japan, and it was "only a pretext" 
for Japan’s aggressive action in Korea. Of this torse has stated:
In the Japanese-Korean treaty of 1876 Japan had 
imposed on Korea the assertion that Korea was an indepen­
dent state; and at no time, surely, in the history of the 
world have such drastic reforms been imposed on an
independent state. The reform of Korea was, however, only
2Kuk-sa Pyun-chip Yi-won Hae (National History Editorial 
Committee, Kap-oh Sil-ki ("True Records of the Year of Kap-oh") 
(Seoul, 1958), July 3, 4, and 11, 1894.
"Kap-oh Sil-ki, July 17, 1894.
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a pretext. Japan was resolved on aggressive action in 
order to establish her position among the nations, and 
especially, to transfer fro^ China to herself the pre­
dominant position in Korea.
These reforms had little effect outside of Seoul, Wiere provin­
cial magistrates disregarded the order of the King, saying he was a 
helpless Japanese prisoner. Japanese minister Otori had built his 
tactical machinery for putting through reforms but he was convinced 
that the ex-Regent was not to be trusted, Tai Wen Kun was interested 
in power and preserving Korean tradition rather than Japanese enforced 
reform programs, and there was growing rivalry between the progressive 
faction and Tai Wen Kun. Otori's failure to reconcile these two rivals 
was brought to the attention of the Tokyo government. Otori was re­
called and Count Inouye Kaoru was newly appointed to Seoul as a 
Japanese minister.^
Count Inouye, one of the foremost of the statesmen who created 
the new Japan, arrived at Seoul on October 20, 1894, and practically 
administered the government in the King's name. There were Japanese 
controllers in all the departments, the army was drilled by Japanese 
instructors, a police force was organized and clothed in Japanese uni­
forms, a council of Koreans was appointed to draft a scheme of reform. 
Count Inouye as Japanese adviser had the right of continual access to 
the King, and with an interpreter sat at the meeting of the pro-Japanese 
cabinet. Japanese ascendency was increasingly apparent in new appoint­
ments, regulations, abolitions and reforms. Count Inouye claimed that
4Hosha B. Morse, The International Relations of the Chinese 
Empire 1894-1911, (3 Vol., London; Longmans, Green and Co., 1918),
I, p. 20-22.
^Lee, Han-kuk Sa, pp. 295-297.
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Japan'S purpose was to reform the administration of Korea, but he 
failed to mention that Japan's forced reform had violated Korea's 
sovereignty.
Count Inouye obtained from the King the pardon of Park Yong-ho and 
So Kwang-bom, vAio had been in exile in Japan since the emeute of 1884. 
Park and So were brought back from Japan and made Minister of Interior 
and Minister of Justice respectively.^ On January 5, 1895, Inouye 
presented a reform plan to the King which had been already approved by 
the pro-Japanese cabinet. The King accepted the following reform pro­
posal :
(1) All thought of dependence on China shall be put away.
(2) The line of succession and rank in the Royal Family
shall be clearly marked.
(3) The King shall attend to public business in person
and in consultation with his ministers, and the
Queen shall not interfere in government matters.
(4) The affairs of the Royal Household shall be kept 
quite distinct from the general government.
(5) The duties of Ministers and other officials shall be 
clearly defined.
(6) Taxes shall be regulated by law and additions to them 
are forbidden.
(7) The assessment, collection and disbursement of tlie 
national revenue shall be in the hands of the 
Finance Department.
(8) The expenses of the Royal Household shall be reduced, 
that the example may become a law to the other depart­
ments .
(9) An annual budget shall be made out so as to regulate 
the management of the revenue.
^Whang, Mae-chon Ya-rok, p. 217,
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(10) The laws governing local affairs shall be speedily 
revised in order that their varioos fianctions may 
be differentiated.
(11) Intelligent young men shall be sent to Japan to 
study.
(12) A method for the instruction of military officers 
and a mode of enlistment for soldiers shall be 
determined upon.
(13) Civil and criminal law must be clearly defined and 
strictly adhered to and imprisonment and fines in 
excess of the law are prohibited.
(14) Men shall be employed irrespective of their origin.
Ability alone shall determine a man^s eligibility 
whether in Seoul or in the country,
Inouye attempted to remove the Queen's share of political control 
and keep down the power of the Mins. The conservative faction opposed 
Japanese reforms which were basically a pretext to secure political 
and economic control of Korea. Another measure of Inouye's reform 
further antagonized the Yang Ban (nobility class). At this time the 
Conservative Queen Min supported a new pro-Russian political faction 
vmich had emerged out of the Tripartite Intervention. Japan had tried 
to drive the Queen out of politics. Her family had been prescribed, 
her bitter foe Tai Wen Kun had been elevated to power. Even the King 
had been used against her; in the Ancestral Oath, His Majesty had 
sworn that his wife would no longer figure in the political life of
gKorea. But that had not restrained Queen Min, who immediately resumed 
her political operation supported by the pro-Russian faction. Queen
7Quoted in Weems, Hulbert’s History of Korea, II, pp. 278-279.
^Naegak Popche-guk Kwanbo-kwa ("Official Gazette Section, 
Legislation Bureau, Cabinet of Korea"). Kwan Bo ("Yi Dynasty 
Court Official Gazette") 1894-1910. Seoul, January 12, 1895.
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Min's resistance against the Japanese was so strong that the Japanese 
government tried to compromise with her through Count Inouye who
9recommended a conciliatory policy toward Korea.
Cleverest of the Queen’s maneuvers was the one involving Park 
Yong-ho, a home minister. Exercising all her skills, the Queen 
separated Park from her father-in-law, then caused Park to break with 
the Japanese. Home Minister Park was constantly working with other 
members of the Cabinet, not only to see that improvements in taxation, 
general administration and facilities for public enlightenment were 
carried out, but also to provide against any Japanese influence which 
he considered fundamently prejudicial to Korean independence. The 
Japanese under Inouye were finding that their schemes for effective 
permanent control in Korea were being opposed gradually by Park.
Under the Queen's secret instructions, he had faced the conflict 
between Korean and Japanese interests and had chosen the former.
The direct action which designed to expell Park out of office in
9K. Asakawa, The Russo-Japanese Conflicts : Its Causes and Issue
(Boston; William and Co., 1904), p. 258. At this time there were two 
different policies held by political parties in Japan with regard to 
the Korean question; the radical policy advocated an immediate and 
complete overthrow of all opposition to the Japanese scheme in Korea; 
and the other was the moderate and conservative policy v\hich had the 
same object of final absorption of Korea by pacific means.
^^Weems, Hulbert's History of Korea, p. 283. See also, Lee, Han­
kuk Dok-rip Un-dong Sa, pp. 141-142. The extreme misconduct of Japanese 
nationals in Korea - also promoted this move to overthrow Japanese in­
fluence in Korea.
Count Inouye himself had admitted: Japanese residents in Korea
must be reformed. They are not only impolite, but often insult the 
Koreans. They are rude in their treatment of Korean customers and 
when there is some slight misunderstanding they do not hesitate to 
use weapons. Those who are not merchants, are still rude and violent.
Japan Gazette, June 29, 1895, quoted in Korean Repository, V. II, 
(1895), p. 310.
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July came from Tai Wen Kun. In April, 1895, a new grievance incited 
Tai Wen Kun to a vigorous effort to get rid of the Home Minister.
Tai Wen Kun's most beloved grandson, Yi Chun-yong, nephew of the King, 
was reported to have conspired with the Tong Hak members to depose the 
King, assassinate pro-Japanese cabinet members and assume the reins 
of p o w e r . I t  was not clear that he had even connected with the plan, 
but the very fact that his name had been used in such connection was 
enough to send him into banishment on the island of Kyo-dong, off 
Kwang-ha.
This was a big political damage to Tai Wen Kun and a tremendous 
personal prize for Park Young-ho. It was Park who won the lasting 
gratitude of the King and Queen by exposing the machinations of Yi 
Chun-young. Park's increasing association with the Queen, coupled 
with his growing popularity were the serious obstacles for the power of 
Tai Wen Kun.
Tai Wen Kun was determined that Park Young-ho should be expelled 
from the Cabinet. To this end he devised a scheme which with the 
probable sanction of the Japanese, seemed to promise success. He laid 
before the King grave charges of treason against Park, which though 
not believed either by the King or the Queen, convinced them that it 
would be impossible to shield him from probable destruction; for Tai 
Wen Kun would spare no pains to see Park put out of the way and it was 
evident that the Japanese would not take any strong measure to protect 
him. The Queen advised Park to escape before action could be taken on 
the charge of treason. He complied and forthwith escaped again to
~̂'*'Kwan Bo, March 29, 1895. "Report on Tai Wen Kun and Yi Chun- 
young Conspiracy," J. A. (Korea), XXVIII, No. 208, pp. 78-79.
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12Japan.
Thus Korea lost the service of one of the most patriotic Koreans.
If the Japanese could have put Tai Wen Kun in the background and allowed 
Pak Young-ho to work out his plans on terms of amity with the Royal 
family, all the evils vdiich followed might easily have been averted.
It was this act of allowing Tai Wen Kun to carry out his scheme of 
personal revenge that caused the whole trouble; there has never been a 
time, before or since, vhen brighter hopes for Korea were more ruth­
lessly sacrificed.
To Japan the Queen was the greatest obstacle to the scheme of 
controlling the Korean government. After removing the Chinese obstacle, 
however, Japan was surprised to find that she had one more to liquidate. 
'This time it was the Korean Queen. Queen Min is considered by many 
Korean historians to be the Elizabeth of Korea. She, like the illus­
trious Queen of England, had many personal shortcomings, such as vanity, 
love of flattery, extravagance and intolerance of opponents. But she 
was a woman of iron will, of intense patriotism, and of astute judgment. 
She firmly believed that the Koreans should manage their own affairs.
She perceived instinctively that beneath all expressions of good will 
and official guarantee of Korean independence, Japan had ulterior
designs with regard to Korea. She vigorously opposed the spread of
13Japanese influence as endangering Korean sovereignty.
The Japanese Daily Advertizer, October 12, 1894 states;
12"The Downfall and Departure of the Minister of Home Affairs" 
Korean Repository, V. II (1895), pp. 268-270; Weems, Hulbert's History 
of Korea, pp. 283-284.
13Kim, Yun Chi-ho Sunsang Yakchon, p. 84.
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The Queen of Korea has always appeared to us as 
a personality even more noteworthy than her neighbor
of Peking (the Dowager Tzu Hsi of China) at any
rate she has for many years exercised in the squalid 
Court of which she was the head, powers of mind and 
will-Yg-a striking figure in any station and in any 
age."
The Japanese, disappointed with slow progress of their influence
in Korea and blocked by the Queen in their desire to obtain a railway
15concession from Pusan to the Yalu River, recalled Inouye, their 
moderate minister to Seoul, and replaced him with Lieutenant General 
Miura as Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to Korea.
On his departure for Seoul politically and diplomatically immature 
General Miura stated of his future policy in Korea: "By profession a
soldier, I have had no experience in diplomacy, I declined all their 
well meant offers" (the experienced diplomat's advice); "being content 
to rely on my own resources," (on the resources of a soldier); "I have 
a diplomacy all my own, which I propose to try in Korea, I believe
16that it is a fit place to try my own theory of diplomatic methods."
On August 31, 1895, General Miura landed at Inchon and replaced 
Inouye on the following day. Upon his arrival at Seoul, Miura, as he
expected, found the Queen's faction placing every obstacle in his way 
and the most powerful supporter of the Queen, Min Yong-vdian, was sent
14Quoted in Korean Repository, II. (1895), p. 435.
^^Seoul National Uniersity, Kuk-sa Kai-sul, p. 651.
^^Quoted in Fred H. Harrington, God Mammon and the Japanese 
(Madison; University of Wisconsin Press, 1944), p. 263. General Miura 
was, withal, a strenuous man and is said to have considered the solu­
tion of the Korean difficulties merely a matter of prompt and vigorous 
action.
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to the United States as Korea's minister
The Queen increased the personnel of her household, and restored 
many of her old extravagances so well remembered by the reformers.
She had been further embittered by the sharp rivalry shown against her 
and the Min faction by Tai Wen Kun and his party. The Queen finally 
planned a coup d 'etat, early in October, 1895, with a view to disbanding 
the soldiers trained by Japanese officers and replacing the pro-Japanese 
cabinet members with her f a c t io n . F or  a while it looked to the 
Japanese as if all their work and influence were to come to nothing.
They had been blocked by the Queen. A crisis was imminent, and it was 
at this juncture that some of the Japanese in Seoul prepared plans to 
get rid of the Queen,
The new Japanese minister, Miura commenced immediately an anti- 
Queen and military diplomacy, supporting and establishing close rela­
tions with the Queen's enemy, Tai Wen Kun. The aged Tai Wen Kun asked
Miura for assistance in effecting a radical change, and it was decided 
19to grant it. Miura wished to strengthen the declining influence of 
Japan. Only one little "woman" stood in the way of both men's desires 
Once she was liquidated, all must go well, they thought. On October 3, 
1895, Miura; Sugimura, his first secretary; and Okamoto Ryunosuke, the 
Japanese adviser to the Korean Department of War, met in their Legation 
to decide upon their plan of operation. It was decided that the
17'Dong, Chon, Japanese Annexation of Korea; A Study of Korean- 
Japanese Relations (Ph.D. Diss., University of Colorado, Boulder, 1955), 
p. 175.
Queen's faction now turned to Russian power to expell Japanese 
influence from Korean Court. Lee, Han-kuk Sa, p. 458.
^^Korean Repository, III (1890), pp. 122-124.
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operation was to take place only on condition that Tai Wen Kun defin­
itely pledged himself to refrain from the actual administration of 
the country. Thus î-îiura secured from Tai Wen Kun a signed statement
renouncing any claim to administrative power, in the event that success
20of the plot should make his faction predominant. Tai Wen Kun was
strongly anti-foreign but his personal rivalry against the Queen caused
his cooperation with Japan.
Miura prepared plans to capture the palace, murder the Queen, and
hold the King under Japanese control. Having no way of knowing of the
Japanese plot, both the King and Queen seemed to feel safe from any
attack. Miura had already brought over from Japan professional assassins,
21Soshi, to carry out the plot. On the night of October 8, 1895, Mtira
after consulting with his more experienced advisers at the Japanese
Legation, engineered a coup d'etat in which a mob of Japanese Soshi,
22Korean adherents and members of the Kurentai and a Japanese army unit
entered the palace and went at once to the royal apartments murdering
the Queen and members of her family vdiom she had brought to power in
23the anti-Japanese struggle.
20Korean Repository III (1896), pp. 125-126. See Lee, Han-kuk Dok- 
rip Un-dong Sa. pp. 164-157.
This signed agreement between Miura and Tai Wen Kun was concluded 
at Tai Wen Kun's residence on October 7, 1895. This agreement further 
states: Kim Hong-jip (pro-Japanese) should be appointed as Prime- 
Minister to facilitate Japanese enforced reforms.
21Hyo-jung, Yun, Pung-un Han-mal Bi-rok ("Secret Records on the 
Stormy End of Yi Era") (Seoul; Yadam Sa, 1931), pp. 132-135.
22Kurentai in Japanese, meaning a special Korean army unit drilled 
and officered by Japanese. Korean call it as Hullyondae.
23Kim, Yun Chi-ho Sunsang Yakchun, pp. 86-87; Eun-sik, Park,
Hankuk Tongsa("A Tragic History of Korea") (Seoul; Talsong Insoeso,
1945), p. 115.
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The murder of Queen Min was according to the Korean official 
report, carried out in the following brutal manner:
In the early morning of ^tober 8, 1895 the 
Japanese soldiers entered the Palace. They met at the 
front gate Korean guards and after killing the latter 
they went on. These Japanese Soshi, numbering about 
forty rushed with drawn swords into the private rooms, 
seizing all the palace women they could catch, dragging 
them round by the hair and demanding where the Queen 
was. This was seen by many, including Mr. Sabatin, a 
foreigner, connected with his Majesty’s guard . . .
After searching the various rooms, the Soshi found the 
Queen in one of the side rooms where she was attempting 
to hide, and catching hold of her cut her down with 
their swords . . .  she was laid upon a plank, wrapped up 
with a silk comfort (used as bed-clothing) and taken 
out into the court-yard to a grove of trees not far 
distant in the deer park, and there kerosene oil was 
poured over the body and foggots of wood piled around 
and all set on fire . . .  these Japanese Soshi . . .  in 
order to make sure that they had done their work as 
ordered, took several of the women of the Court to the 
body and compelled them to identify it as that of 
Her Majesty . . .  every precaution had been taken by 
the Japanese and the Korean traitors who were assisting 
them, to prevent Her Majesty Queen from escaping . . . .
Yi Kiung-chik (of noble blood and then Minister of 
the Royal House), . . . was killed with swords by the 
Japanese in His Majesty's presence. His Royal Highness, 
the Crown Prince, . . .  was seized, his hat torn off 
and broken, and he was pulled about by the hair and 
otherwise maltreated. (Both the King and the g^own 
Prince however, were not "seriously injured.")
At about the time when the Queen was being killed, the Tai Wen 
Kun and Miura came into the palace accompanied by the Japanese sol­
diers and sought and obtained an audience with the King. At this 
audience, while still fearing of his life, the King of Korea was 
forced to sign three documents which read:
24A copy of the report prepared by Kwon Chae-hyong, Vice-Minister 
of Justice under pro-Russian cabinet, Kaequk Obaek Sanyon Palwol 
Sabyon Pokoso ("Report of the August, 1895 Incident").
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le The Cabinet was thereafter to manage the affairs of 
the country.
2. Yi Chai-mium, vAio had accompanied Tai Wen Kun on his 
entrance into the palace, was appointed minister
of the Royal Household.
253. A Vice-minister of the Royal Household was appointed.
When the King signed all these three documents, the Japanese troops 
were withdrawn from the palace. Thus the Japanese controlled the gov­
ernment as well as the Royal Palace including the Minister of the Royal 
Household. Tai Wen Kun became as a puppet of the Japanese and the 
King became a prisoner of the Japanese.
On the following day two proclamations were announced. The first
proclamation stated that Tai Wen Kun was returned to inaugurate a change 
of cabinet. The pro-Queen ministers, Yi Pom-jim, and Yi Wan-yong were 
dismissed^^ and a full cabinet composed entirely of Japanese sympathiz­
ers were installed.
Then the second proclamation, signed by Tai Wen Kun himself idiich 
read in part;
I have now entered the palace to aid His Majesty, 
expel the low fellows, save the country and introduce peace.
Every one should attend to their usual affairs and feel no 
alarm. Thg^e who now interfere with me will have cause to 
repent it.
The palace gates were guarded by the mutinous Kurentai with
fixed bayonets, who allowed a constant stream of Koreans to pass out.
Very early in the morning, Mr. Walber, the Russian Charge d 'affairs,
25KwanJBo, August 20, 1895.
^^Kwan Bo, August 22, 1895.
27Ibid., August 20, 1895 Korean Repository II (1895), 0. 389.
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and Dr. Allen, the American Minister, came to the palace and sought 
audience with the King^^ but were told that the King was unwell and 
could not see them. They insisted, however, and succeeded in seeing 
the King, who told them that he still had hopes that the Queen had 
escaped, and besought their friendly offices to prevent further trou­
bles. Immediately thereafter, these representatives paid a visit to
the Japanese Legation to express displeasure andgrave concern over the
29Japanese Minister's part in the shameful incident.
It soon became evident that the Japanese authorities in Seoul
intended to deny any responsibility for the outrages committed.
Despite the fact that the Queen had been murdered, the Japanese controlled
Korean government issued an edict of deposition of the Queen, as if she
was still alive, to the level of the lowest c l a s s . T h e  King refused
to sign this edict; however, this edict was proclaimed by Tai Wen
Kun.^^ Miura and the pro-Japanese cabinet denied the crime committed
and the new foreign minister, Kim Yun-sik said that not a single
32Japanese was present in the palace.
Miura stated in his dispatches to the Tokyo government that the 
origin of emeute was a conflict between Japanese drilled Korean troops, 
who desired to lay a complaint before his majesty, and the guards who
28Lee, Hankuk Sa, p. 619.
29J. A. (Korea), XXVIII, No. 359, pp. 494-495. Park, Hankuk 
Tongsa, pp. 180-182,
30Kwan Bo, August 22, 1895.
31Kim, Yun Chi-ho Sunsang Yakchon. p. 88.
32Seoul National University, Kuk-sa Kai-sul 654.
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33tried to prevent their entrance into the palace. However, vdien the 
news of the assassination of the Queen reached Japan, the Japanese 
government immediately denied all knowledge of and connection with the 
murder of the Queen. But the assassination of the Queen created such 
resentment among the Koreans and the foreigners in Korea that the 
Japanese government sent Komura, director of the Diplomatic Bureau, 
to Seoul to investigate the whole matter. The situation was so serious 
that soon Miura and the entire staff of the Japanese Legation were 
recalled and upon their arrival in Japan they were arrested and charged 
with the a f f a i r . T h e  fact of their arrest and trial was a distinct 
disclaimer on the part of the Japanese government that it was accessory 
to the Crime; and in spite of the utter inadequacy of the trial and 
its almost ludicrous termination, the Japanese government was not an 
official party to the crime, excepting in so far as the appointment 
of such a man as Miura can be called complicity.
But the vigorous action of the Japanese government in arresting 
Miura and putting him on court trial had a strong influence upon the 
course of events in Korea. The Korean public and the foreign represen­
tatives in Seoul were demanding that the murder of Queen Min should be 
investigated, and the responsibility for it placed where it rightly 
belonged, Russian, American, French and English representatives in 
Seoul were openly talking of not recognizing the new pro-Japanese 
Korean cabinet which was formed after the assassination of the
33Report on Palace Incident from Miura to Foreign Minister, 
Saion-ji, J. S. (Korea), XXVIII, No. 424, pp. 552-553.
34Lee, Hankuk Sa, p. 661,
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35Queen, Accordingly, on November 25, the foreign representatives were
invited to the palace, and it was announced in the presence of the King
that the minister of war and the chief of police were dismissed.On
the following day the edict degrading, the Queen was rescinded and the
Justice Department tried and punished all guilty persons, except Tai 
37Wen Kun.
A hearing by a Japanese Court which was held at Hiroshima fully 
established the undeniable fact that Miura initiated and organized the 
plans and gave the instructions to kill the Queen. The entire gang 
of conspirators including Miura was acquitted. The court then concluded
that what happened after any of the accused entered the palace was so
38confused that it was unable to establish to adjudge anyone's guilts.
A "Copy of the Decision of the Japanese Court of Preliminary
Inquiries", dated January 20, 1896, read:
The accused, Miura Goro, assumed his official duties 
as His Imperial Majesty Envoy Extraordinary and Minister 
Plenipotentiary at Seoul on the 1st of September, the 28th 
year of Meiji (1895). According to his observations, 
things in Korea were tending in a wrong direction. The 
Court was daily growing more and more arbitrary, and 
attempting wanton interference with the conduct of State 
affairs . . .  The accused felt it to be of urgent impor­
tance to apply an effective remedy to this state of affairs.
The decision arrived at on that occasion was that 
^^J, A. (Korea), XXVIII, No. 385, pp. 517-518.
^^Kwan Bo, September 6, 1895. Cho Yi-yun, Minister of War, Kwon 
Yong-chin, Chief of police were of members of the mutineers who plotted 
the assassination of Queen Min. Cho and Kwon were the most ordinary 
men of inferior rank before Queen's assassination.
37Thirty Koreans were arrested and tried in Seoul Court, charged 
with participation in the murder of the Queen. Three were executed.
/̂ °Yun, Pung-un Han-mal Mil-sa, p. 146.
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assistance should be rendered to the Tai Wen-kun’s entry 
into the Palace by making use of the Kunrentai . . .  the 
Japanese . . . .  It was further resolved that this oppor­
tunity should be availed of for taking the life of the 
Queen, who exercised overwhelming influence in the Court.
They at the same time thought it necessary to provide 
against the possible danger of the Tai Wen-kun’s interfer­
ing with the conduct of State affairs in the future . . . .
To this end, a document containing pledges required of the 
Tai Wen-kun on four points was drawn by Sugimura Fukashi 
. . .  the Tai Wen-kun . . .  gladly assented to the condi­
tions proposed and also wrote a letter guaranteeing his good 
faith . . .  Miura Goro further issued instructions to Umayabara 
Muhon, Commander of the Japanese Batallion in Seoul, ordering 
Commander of the Japanese to facilitate the Tai Wen-kun's 
entry into the Palace by directing the disposition of the 
Kunrentai troops, and by calling out the Imperial force for 
their support . . .  Miura told them that on the success of 
the enterprise depended the eradication of the evils that 
had done so much mischief to the Kingdom for the past twenty 
years, and instigated them to dispatch the Queen when they 
entered the Palace . . . .  With the Kunrentai as vanguard, 
the party then proceeded toward the Palace at a more rapid rate 
. . . .  About dawn, the whole party entered the Palace thru 
the Kwang-hwa Gate, and at once proceeded to the inner chamber.
Notwithstanding these facts there is no sufficient 
evidence to prove that any of the accused actually committed 
the crime originally meditated by them . . . .  For these 
reasonsaccused, each and all, are hereby discharged
In this report, the Japanese Court failed to mention what happened 
after the entrance of the assassins into the palace chamber because the 
motives to assassinate the Queen were established in cold-blood as the 
deliberately planned result of the conspiracy. But the conspirators 
who proceeded to the inner chamber to murder the Queen were discharged.
Japanese officials assumed virtual control in Korea, though they 
were careful to remain behind the scene. Tai Wen Kun remained at the 
King's side and resumed charge of affairs. But among the Korean populace
39"Official Report on Matters Connected with the Events of 
October 8th, 1896, and the Death of Queen Min," The Korean Repository,
III (1896), 120-142.
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there was deep dissatisfaction with the anomalous position of their 
King in the hands of what was popularly called "the Rebel Cabinet."
The Japanese attempt to minimise their responsibility and their
unjust trial of the assassins failed to check the rising resentment of
the Koreans against them. The Japanese had to abandon their aggressive
policy in Korea; therefore they sent the former minister to Seoul, Count
Inouye, to Korea in order to conciliate the resentful Koreans. On
October 31, 1895, Inouye arrived at Seoul as a Special Imperial Envoy
of Condolence to the King of Korea. Upon his arrival in Seoul, he
called on American, Russian and English representatives and promised his
40willingness to expell Tai Wen Kun from power. However, this was only 
a verbal conciliatory attitude toward foreign representatives.
The King, with the Crown Prince, was now a virtual prisoner in 
his own palace. There had been a small palace guard, loyal to His Ma­
jesty, under the command of the aged and infirm General Dye, but its 
number had been gradually depleted until when the palace was invaded by 
the Queen's assassins, it was contemptuously pushed aside and could do 
nothing. The King himself was in constant fear of assassination, and 
lived in such dread of poison that he secretly obtained from the home 
of an American citizen each day the only food that he dared to eat.
The Japanese were lying low awaiting the subsidence of the storm of 
reproach which beat upon them from every side. Secure in the possession 
of their main objective, the killing of the Queen, they left every­
thing in the palace to the care of their Korean henchmen there.
40Report from Inouye to Sai-on Ji, J. A. (Korea), XXVII, No. 425, 
pp. 562-554. Tai Wen Kun held an empty honor as a mere figure head.
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The conservative faction, taking advantage of the popular resent­
ment, gathered their fordes to murder Progressive leaders aiid save the 
King from the "Japanese prison," On November 28, Yi Bom-jin, Yi Wan- 
yong and Yi Yung-young planned a counter-revolution to break into the 
palace and deliver His Majesty from the hands of the traitorous cab­
inet. This attempt failed because one traitor of the counter-revolu­
tionary group secretly revealed the vhole plan to the Acting Minister
41of Defence, 0 Young-jung, However, it reminded the Japanese of 
Korea's determination to resist her scheme in Korea.
Following this incident,(the Chun-sang Mun Affair) the Russians 
began to take an active leadership of the anti-Japanese p a r t y . O n  
December 26, 1895, as a revenge on the Korean people, the Japanese 
forced on the King and the Cabinet the issuance of an edict against the 
wearing of top-knots which had long been a sign of Korean manhood.
This proved a good issue on which to arouse the people against Japan.
In January, 1896 the Korean nationalists attacked the Japanese and the 
pro-Japanese Koreans in various provinces of Korea. This situation led
41Kim, Yun Chi-ho Sunsang Yakchon, p. 94. Upon the failure of 
the plan, eight of the counter-revolutionarists were given asylum in 
the American Legation. American Minister Sill requested the use of 
American warship to convey them to safety but this request was denied 
by the American government.
42Kim, Yun Chi-ho Sunsang Yakchon, p. 95. Yun Chi-ho was one of 
the members of the anti-Japanese party and participated in Chun-sang 
Mun Affair.
43Kwan Bo, November 14, 1895. The Top-Knot on the head of a 
Korean man was the traditional sign of his citizenship and manhood.
A ceremony was held vdien the top-knot was raised, and Koreans were 
very proud of the custom. Therefore, when Yu Kil-jun, minister of 
Home Affairs of the pro-Japanese cabinet announced "the top-knot 
cutting ordinance", it stirred a great resentment among the people.
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the government in Seoul to dispatch the majority of the palace guard 
to the areas of the uprising to put down the disturbances.
Taking advantage of this unguarded moment, Yi Pom-j in and Yi 
Wan-young, the leaders of the pro-Russian party, conferred with Carl 
Waeber, Russian Charge d'Affairs, and had him land 120 Russian marines 
from the Russian warship at Inchon on February 9, 1896. Russian
marines with one cannon marched to Seoul reinforcing the légation
 ̂ 44 guard.
44J. A. (Korea), XXIX, No. 353, pp. 683-684; Mun, Kunse Ilbon yi 
Choson Chimtu Sa, p. 523.
The King's Escape to the Russian Legation
Japan attempted to bring Korea under its rigid control, and at the 
same time to block every Russian move toward Korea. Japanese enforced 
reforms and the assassination of the Queen turned the Conservative 
faction toward Russia for the purpose of preserving Korean independence 
from the Japanese yoke. When the King of Korea escaped from the 
Japanese controlled palace to the Russian Legation, all Japanese 
attempts to control Korea had failed.
An aggressive Russian policy toward Korea was indicated when 
Alexis de Speyer arrived to take over the Russian Legation in Seoul on 
January 13, 1896. De Speyer had served as temporary head of the Russian 
Legation in Tokyo. He was a man of aggressive temperament who would
45replace the mind-mannered Waeber as Russian Charge d'Affairs in Seoul. 
There was an immediate and obvious change in the tone which Russia 
assumed. From the very first. De Speyer showed plainly that he was 
sent to impart a new vigor to Russo-Korean relations because things had 
been developing too slowly. Accordingly De Speyer arrived on January 
13, 1896, to take over the Seoul Legation and was actually the Charge 
d*affairs off the record on the Russian diplomatic list from February 
13 to February 28 while Waeber received his credential for a Mexican 
post. But Waeber did not leave. With anti-Japanese Korean officials 
taking refuge at the Russian Legation and with considerable coming and 
going of secret messages between the palace and the Russian Legation,
‘̂^Baron Rosen, Forty Years of Diplomacy (London; George Allen and 
Unwin Ltd., 1922), I., p. 126.
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Waeber may have known for days in advance that the King would soon make
46an effort to become his guest.
The pro-Russian Korean leaders, such as Yi Bora-jin, Yi Young-yong
and Yi Wan-yong had been secretly in contact with the Russian Legation
and on February 10, 1896, Russian minister Waeber agreed to provide the
47King asylum at the Russian Legation. Then Yi Bom-jin sent a secret
letter to the King through a Palace woman informing the King that Tai
Wen Kun and the Japanese were actively planning a plot to remove His
Majesty from the throne and urged him to take refuge at the Russian 
48Legation.
The frightened Kingimmediately accepted this advice, and the plan
was successfully carried out on February 11, 1896. The King and the
Crown Prince arrived at the Russian Legation in the early morning and
were at once received courteously. Yun Hyo-jung in his Pung-un Han-mal
Birok ("Secret Records on the Stormy End of the Yi Era") gives a vivid
description of how the King escaped the palace saying that:
"The King and Crown Prince left the Palace in closed 
chairs such as palace women used. Their escape was
^^Lee, Hankuk Sa, p. 729.
47Whang, Han-kuk Kenyun Sa, pp. 193-194. Pro-Russian group had 
bribed the Russians by promising that they could change the situation 
and would lead Korea to serve Russian interests.
48"Report on Pro-Russian Yi Pom-jin conspiracy" J. A. (Korea), 
XXIX, No. 356, pp. 692-693.
According to the Secretary of the American Legation, Dr. Allen, 
when the King asked him whether it would be wise to seek help from 
Russia, he endorsed the proposal and brought the Russian minister 
to the House of a Korean Officer entrusted with the royal plan. 
Harrington, God, Mammon and the Japanese, pp. 288-289.
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carefully planned. A number of similar chairs were carried 
in and out the several gates in order to familiarize the 
guards with the idea that they were paying many visits.
The palace ladies also brought good food to the guards.
Such acts of kindness naturally lulled their vigilance 
toward ladies chairs. So, when, early in the morning of 
February 11, two women's chairs were carried ou^gby the 
attendants, the guards took no special notice."
Russian Charge d'Affairs Waeber was a close friend of the dead
Queen and welcomed this opportunity for extending Russian influence in
Korea. As it was the custom in Korea for the King to work at night
and sleep in the morning, the members of the cabinet who resided in the
palace did not discover the King's escape for several hours. For the
pro-Japanese cabinet the situation had totally changed. Upon arriving
at the Russian Legation, the King suspended the anti-top-knot ordinance,
and declared his pro-Japanese cabinet members, Kim Hong-jip, Chang Pak,
Yu Kil-jun, Chung Pyong-ha to be traitors.
The organization of a new cabinet was immediately carried out.
No time was lost in issuing a royal edict justifying the necessity for
taking refuge in a Russian Legation and promising to punish the real
plotters of the Queen's assassination.^^ This was posted on the gates
49Quoted in Yun, Pung-un Han-mal Bi-rok, pp. 168-170. See also 
Hwang, Han-kuk Kenyi.in-sa, pp. 193-194.
^^The King's escape to the Russian Legation also aroused great 
unrest among the Japanese residents in Korea, vAio immediately sensed the 
blow to Japanese influence in Korea. Ito Hirobumi, Hisho Russian 
Gaiko-Hen ("Classified Documents on Diplomatic Relations of Japan") 
(Tokyo; Sobun-kuku, 1935), III, pp. 109-111.
51Kwan Bo, February 11, 1896. The new cabinet was composed of 
pro-Russian and pro-American members. However, it was heavily pro- 
Russian; Park Chong-ho as Prime-Minister, Yi Wan-yong as Foreign 
Minister, Yi Pom-jin as Minister of Justice and Chief of Police. All 
these three ministers were the leaders of the pro-Russian faction.
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of the Russian Legation and at various points throughout the city of
Seoul. The city hummed with excitement. Later in the day, a second
royal edict was issued, calling on the soldiers to protect their King,
52to cut off the heads of the chief traitors, and bring them to him.
The ex-cabinet members. Prime Minister Kim Hong-jip and Chong Pyong-ha,
Minister of Agriculture, were stoned to death by angry people. Another
minister, 0 Yun-jung, was murdered at his country home and the Foreign
52Minister, Kim Yun-sik was exiled to Che-ju island.
The heads of the foreign representatives in Seoul paid their 
respect to the King, the Japanese minister, Komura being the last to 
do so. For Japan, thrown into consternation by the move of the King, 
this was the historical hour of her temporary defeat in international 
diplomacy. However, Komura mustered up some courage and urged the King 
to return to the palace. The King, disliking the restriction imposed 
on him by the pro-Japanese cabinet and having now been completely re­
lieved from anxiety as to his personal safety, was in no mood to accept 
the cunning proposal. He refused. In fact, he remained in the Russian
Legation during the follov/ing year conducting affairs of State from it,
53and consolidating the strength of the pro-Russian government.
Waeber gained much more for his country than his successors, the 
protectorate over the King's person being only one of his triumphs.
In view of the King's trust in Waeber and the responsibility added to 
the Charge d'Affairs duties by the King's visit, the old hand was 
restored to the position he had never in fact relinquished.
Ibid., February 12, 1896.
53Lee, Hankuk Sa, p. 737.
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This liberation of the royal personage terminated at least 
temporarily the entire basis of Japanese influence in Korea built up 
since the Sino-Japanese war. The Japanese failure also intensified the 
hostilities of Koreans, who now not only hated the Japanese but regarded 
them with contempt. The anti-Japanese sentiment brought Koreans of 
the various classes closer to each other than they had been at any time.
To Russia this event was the crowning triumph of her policy in 
Korea. From the time that the King began residing at the Russian Lega­
tion, his hosts showed that they would put up with no interference 
with the liberty of the King and his freely chosen cabinet. However, 
it became apparent that Russia was at the same time taking advantage
of her favorable position to advance her own interests.From Pebru-
55ary, 1896, most of the Russian Pacific fleet was assembled at Inchon.
This fleet added up to 58,838 tons only 70 tons less than that of
Great Britain, the largest Pacific fleet.
On March 16, 1895, the King appointed Min Yong-whan as a Special 
Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to Russia for the 
coronation of the Czar. Ambassador Min was welcomed by the Russian 
Foreign Minister, Rovanov with exceptional hospitality as a sign of 
Russo-Korean friendship.While Korea's representative to Russia 
was receiving a warm reception, the Japanese were appealing to the
54Lee, Cho-son Tong-rip Un-dong Sa, pp. 189-190.
55The North-China Herald (Shanghai), LXI-XLXI, February 28, 1896,
p. 331.
^^Kuk-sa Pyun-chip Yi-won Hae (National History Editorial 
Committee), Min Chunq-chonq Kong Yuko ("The Memoirs of Min Yong- 
whan") (5 Vols., Seoul, 1958), III, pp. 123-124.
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King of Korea to return to the palace and condemning the Russian
57Minister in Seoul for his protection of the King.
During the festivities at the coronation of Nicholas II in St.
Petersburg, May, 1896, the Korean Ambassador presented a request from
the Korean King that the Tsar guarantee the safety of the King of
Korea vAile he was residing at the Russian Legation and send military
and economic aid to K o r e a . T h e  Russian Emperor interpreted this
request as the establishment of a protectorate over the smaller country.
The Russian ruler, inexperienced in international diplomacy, saw it
as "nothing but a very proper acknowledgement of homage to his power
and greatness" and was "utterly unsuspecting of any danger lurking
under a promise of protection given by a great monarch to a humble
59ruler of a small and insignificant kingdom".
In reply to the Korean King's request, the Russian Foreign Min­
ister, Lobanov negotiated with Ambassador Min. On May 28, 1896,
Lobanov and Min signed an agreement which read as follows :
I. The King, during his sojourn in the Russian Lega­
tion, will be protected by the Russian guard. He may remain 
in the Legation as long as he himself shall deem needful and 
convenient. The Russian government may assure moral guarantee 
of his safety* The Russian detachment, now located at the 
Legation, shall remain there at orders of the Russian Mini­
ster, and in event of need, may even be reinforced.
II. For the settlement of the question of the instruc­
tors, there shall be dispatched to Seoul a Russian officer 
of high rank whom the Russian government will charge
57Lee, Hankuk Sa, p. 742.
^^Min Chunq-chonq Kong Yuko, IV, pp. 326-327. See also Kim,
Yun Chi-ho Sungsang Yakchun, pp. 105-106. Yun Chi-ho was an inter­
preter for Ambassador Min.
59Rosen, Forty Years of Diplomacy, I, p. 125.
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entering with negotiations with Koreans on this subject—  
the officer, first of all, be charged to occupy himself 
with the question of setting up a King's body guard.
An equally competent person shall be dispatched from 
Russia for the study of Korea's economic situation and to 
ascertain the financial measures necessary.
III. The question regarding the sending of Russian 
advisers to cooperate with the Korean government is 
answered by the preceding point. The above-mentioned trust­
worthy persons will, under the diredtion of the Russian 
minister, serve as such advisers in the military and 
financial departments.
IV. The conclusion of a loan to the Korean govern­
ment will be considered as soon as the economic situation 
of the country and the needs of the government shall have
■ been ascertained.
V. The Russian government agrees to the amalgama­
tion (of its overland telegraph line with the Korean) 
and will supgjy the assistance requisite to this 
undertaking.
During the King's residence at the Russian Legation, some of the 
progressive movement continued to work. The pro-Russian party in power 
had carried out several remarkable reforms without Russian enforcement. 
Needed reforms were carried through; torture was abolished in the 
courts ; a concession was given to an Airierican Company to construct a 
railway between Seoul and Chemulpo (Inchon); various schools were 
founded with many imported Western teachers. The other reforms were 
put into practice through royal edicts, such as careful control over 
government expenditure; employment of able foreign advisers; reorganiza­
tion of provinces ; better royal postal service; and a new Council of 
State was instituted. The Russian cared "more for substance than 
shadow," and that they did not force the reforms of 1895 as the
^^Boris A. Romanov, Russia in Manchuria, 1892-1906 (Translated by 
Susan W. Jones, Ann Arbor; J. W. Edwards, 1953), p. 106. Korea Treaties 
and Agreement, pp. 81-109. See Lee, Han-kuk Sa, p. 750.
- 67-
Japanese had done previously.The North China Herald (September 4, 
1896) admired the Korean reforms of 1896 with saying that: "Reformation
of Korea is advancing. The advance is quite slow, it is true, but quite
solid."G2
The remarkable freedom of action enjoyed by the King during his 
residence at the Russian Legation came to be recognized generally by 
the Koreans. Russia now had taken the place that China formally occu­
pied and so far had followed the old policy of China in leaving the 
King absolute freedom to deal with his affairs of state. It is, however, 
the fact that certain advantages were gained for Russia and for its 
French partner. In July, 1896 a mining concession near the Tumen River 
was given to Russia. In the same month the right to build a railway 
from Seoul to Uiju, across Yalue from Antung, was- granted to a French 
syndicate.On August 29, 1896, the Valadivostok merchant, Jules
Bryner was given monopoly rights over the extensive forests of the Yalu 
64and Tumen region.
On October 19, 1896, Colonel Poutiata, with other Officers arrived 
at Inchon in the same Russian warship which brought Ambassador Min to
W. H. Wilkinson, The Korean Government (Shanghai; Kelly & Walsh 
Ltd., 1897), pp. 356-357. Some examples of Laws concerning reforms were 
Law No. I, "Organization of Courts of Law", dated March 25, 1896;
Imperial Ordinance No. 37, "Function and Organization of local officials" 
etc.
^^The North China Herald, (Shanghai), LXI - XLXI, September 4,
1896, p. 632.
63The French Syndicate worked under Russian direction.  ̂
Lee, Han-kuk Sa, pp. 780-781.. See "Foreign Concessions and
Their Development," Transactions of the Korean Branch of the Royal 
Asiatic Society of Great Britain (Seoul), VII (1916), Part I, pp. 273- 
274.
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Seoul from Russia. Russia's dispatch of Colonel Poutiata's group, for 
the purpose of training a royal body guard and possibly additional 
troops, was based upon the Korean-Russian Agreement which was signed by 
Ambassador Min and Foreign Minister Lobanov. It was clear, however, 
that this initial contingent of Russian military instructors had come 
at the specific request of the King. The pro-Russian cabinet in power 
quickly expelled the Japanese military instructors and placed the newly 
arrived twenty Russian officers and Russian weapons were purchased 
from Valadivostok. A Russian language school was established in Seoul 
and all important government posts were occupied by members of the 
Pro-Russian faction.
^^Seoul National University, Kuk-sa Kei-sul, p. 656; Lee, Kuk-sa
Tai-kwan, p. 469.
Japanese Compromise Policy with Russia
The Japanese at first regarded the Korean political change by the 
King's flight to the Russian Legation as a Russian plot successfully 
carried out at a very opportune moment, and a violent attack was made 
upon the government's foreign policy by the opposition party. But Japan 
did not take a strong policy in Korea although Japanese Prime Minister, 
Ito, was emphasizing a great Japanese colonization program on Formosa 
with Japanese people for its future development. Now the best thing 
to do in Korea was to retain the residue of her interest through a 
compromise with R u s s i a . A s  a result of this policy, Premier Ito,
General Yamagata and Count Inouye, the proponent of a moderate policy 
in Korea, came to the conclusion that to prevent a clash of Russian and 
Japanese interests in Korea, Japan must come to an agreement with 
Russia.Realizing that she was not yet ready for a trial of strength 
with Russia, Japan gave in and admitted the predominance of Russian 
interests in Manchuria, but she did ask in return clarification of the 
Russian position in Korea. Numerous efforts were made by Japan to come 
to an understanding with Russia both at St. Petersburg and Tokyo regarding 
the Korean issue.
^^Mun, Kunse Ilbon yi Choson Chimtu Sa, pp. 531-532.
^“̂J. A. (Korea), XXIX, No. 401, pp. 729-730. The Japanese comm­
enced a new approach, i. e., diplomacy to regain vÆiat she had lost.
^^Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Komura Gaikosi ("History 
of Komura Diplomacy") (Tokyo; Akadani Shoten, 1953), I. p. 82; Akagi, 
Japan's Foreign Relations, 1542-1936, p. 271.
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On jVIay 14, 1895, the representatives of the two powers in Seoul, 
Waeber arid Komura, signed a protocol, commonly known as the Waeber- 
Komura protocol, viiich read as follows:
The Representatives of Russia and Japan at Seoul, 
having conferred under the identical instructions from 
their respective governments, have arrived at the 
following conclusions :
Article I. While leaving the matter of His Majesty 
the King of Korea and his return to the palace entirely 
to his own discretion and judgement, the representatives 
of Russia and Japan will friendly advise His Majesty to 
return to that palace tihen no doubts concerning his 
safety could be entertained. The Japanese represent- 
tative, on his part, gives the assurance that the most 
complete and effective measures vjill be taken for control 
of Japanese Soshi.
Article II. The present cabinet ministers have been 
appointed by His Majesty of his own free will, and most 
of them held ministerial or other high offices during 
the last two years and are known to be liberal and 
moderate men. The two representatives will always aim 
at recommending His Majesty to appoint liberal and 
moderate men as ministers who show clemency to the 
subj ects.
Article III. The Representative of Russia quite 
agrees with the Representative of Japan that in the 
present state of affairs in Korea, it may be necessary 
to have Japanese guards stationed at some places for the 
protection of the Japanese telegraph line between Pusan 
and Seoul, and that these guards, now consisting of 
soldiers, who will be distributed as follows: 50 men
at Taiku, 50 men at Kaheng and 10 intermediate ports.
Ihis distribution may be liable to some change, but the 
gendarmes will afterward gradually be withdrawn from 
each place vdiere peace and order have been restored by 
the Korean government.
Article IV. For the protection of the Japanese 
settlement in Seoul and the open ports against possible 
attack by Koreans, two companies of Japanese troops may be 
stationed at Seoul, one company not to exceed 200 men.
These troops will be quartered near the settlements and 
shall be withdrawn as soon as no apprehension of such 
attacks could be entertained-
For the protection of the Russian Legation and
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Consulate, the Russian government may also keep guards 
not exceeding the number of Japanese troops at these 
places, and which wi^^ be withdrawn as soon as tran­
quility is restored.
This agreement, though presumably a quid pro quo agreement, was in 
reality a Russian victory. Under Article I, the representatives of 
Russia and Japan were to advise the King of Korea to return to his own 
palace when no doubts concerning his safety could be entertained. This 
decision was to rest entirely upon the discretion of the King, but his 
presence in the Russian Legation naturally made him more likely to accept 
the Russian minister's interpretation of what would be the safe time.
Under Article III, Russia acknowledged that it was necessary for 
the Japanese to maintain a force of two hundred "gendarmes" along the 
Japanese telegraph line from Pusan to Seoul, but this was less than the 
three companies of infantry which previously were deployed along this 
line.
Under Article IV, Japan was allowed to maintain two companies of 
soldiers in Seoul, one in Pusan and one in Wonsan, for the protection
of her settlements each not to exceed two hundred men. Russia had
the right to have a corresponding force for the protection of her lega­
tion and consulates. In view of the great disparity of Japanese and 
Russian interests in Korea, this article meant that Japan must reduce 
her forces, whereas, Russia had Japan's consent to increase hers. 
Furthermore, Article I practically represented an admission of the 
Japanese complicity in the coup of October 8, by including the provi­
sion that: "The Japanese Representative on his part, gives the assurance
69Korea; Treaties and Agreements, pp. 21-22; J. A. (Korea), XXIX,
No. 458, pp. 789-792.
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that the most complete and effective measures will be taken for the
70control of the Japanese Soshi.”
On July 3, 1896, Lobanov and Li Hung-chang, a Chinese Representa­
tive, signed a fifteen year defence alliance which provided that "in 
the event of any aggression directed by Japan against Russian territory 
in Eastern Asia, or the territory of China or that of Korea" the two 
contracting parties should "support each other reciprocally with all
the land and sea forces they may be able to dispose of at the moment,"
71and that neither one should make peace without consent of the other.
It is true that Russia was not playing an open game with Japan. 
This is clearly shown by comparison of the Russian promise to Korea,
with the Russian agreement with Japan the Yamagata Lobanov protocol
of June 18, 1896:
Article I. The Japanese and Russian governments should, 
with the object of remedying the financial embarrassments of 
Korea, counsel the Korean government against all unnecessary 
expenses and to establish an equality between expenditure and 
revenue. If, as a result of the reform vAiich should be 
considered indispensable, it should become necessary to have 
recourse to foreign debts, the two governments should of a 
common accord, render their support to Korea.
Article II. The Japanese and Russian governments should 
try to abandon to Korea, in so far as the financial and economic 
situation of that country should permit, the creation and the 
maintenance of an armed forces and of police organization of 
native subjects, in proportion sufficient to maintain internal 
order without foreign aid.
Article III. With a view to facilitating communication 
with Korea, the Japanese government shall continue to administer 
the telegraph lines idiich are actually in its possession.
70Asakawa, Russo-Japanese Conflict, pp. 252-263.
71William L. Langer, The Diplomacy of Imperialism, 1890-1902 
(New York: Alfred A. Knopff, 1936), I. 404.
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Article IV. In case the principles above expounded 
require a more precise and more detailed definition, or if' 
in the future other points should arise about which it should 
be necessary to consult, the Representatives of the two^gov­
ernments should be instructed to discuss them amicably.
This agreement had come because the strong militarist group of 
Japan, and particularly its leading statesmen such as Ito and Yama­
gata, thought that a direct understanding with Russia could and 
73should be reached. On the other hand, Russia could not hope to
compete with the Japanese forces in the Far East until the Trans-
Siberian Railway was completed. It was therefore essential that the
Russian government come to some sort of temporary agreement with Japan
about Korea. Japan sent Yamagata to the Coronation ceremonies at
Moscow with the handsomest offer the Japanese ever made. He proposed
to Russia that they divide Korea at the thirty-eighth parallel of
latitude the northern part to be a Russian sphere, the southern
73part (with the capital, Seoul) a Japanese sphere. But Yamagata's 
proposal was rejected on the ground that Russia had recognized the 
independence and integrity of Korea. The real reasons for this deci­
sion were probably these three : In the first place, Lobanov may have
feared complications with England and the United States. In both 
countries there was a strong sentimental and religious interest in 
Korea. Secondly, southern Korea, which was to be abandoned to the 
Japanese, was the most developed and the richest part of the country, 
and from the strategical and naval viewpoint, was of very great impor­
tance. Russian naval men had been trying to decide upon the port in
72J. A. (Korea), XXIX, No. 478, pp. 815-818. Text in Korea;
Treaties and Agreements, pp. 23-24.
73Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Komura Gaikosi, I. pp. 82-83.
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Korea that would best meet their needs. Curiously enough, there seems 
to have been little mention of Wonsan. Naval men were rather partial 
to Masanpo at the southern tip of the Peninsula, and for that reason 
would have opposed the relinquishment of all influence in the south. 
Thirdly, the Russians desired the independence of Korea and hoped even­
tually to be able to lay their hands on the whole country and therefore
74objected to a premature division of the inheritance. As Count Lams- 
dofff said in a later memorandum: "The fate of Korea, as a future
integral part of Russian Empire by forces of geographical and political
 ' 75conditions, had been determined upon by us."
Had both parties intended to observe the conditions of the protocol,
it would have signified for Japan that Russia had renounced separate
counsels and aid to Korea in military and financial spheres; for Russia,
that the integrity and independence of Korea, and the' equal interests
of both contracting parties in supporting it, had been confirmed; and
for Korea, existence "in position of equilibrium on the point of a
needle." However, the efficacy of the protocol can best be known by
the fact that sometime later, the Russian government stated that the
limitation of loans to "mutual accord" was invalid, as Russia had a
VSprevious agreement with Korea, which was unaffected by the protocol.
It has been pointed out that Japan compromised reluctantly with 
Russia in Korea for she was not ready to meet Russian power by armed 
clash. Then why did Russia "cooperate" with Japan? What was the real
74Langer, The Diplomacy of Imperialism, 1890-1902, I. p. 405.
75Romanov, Russia in Manchuria, p. 105.
^^Nelson, Korea and Old Orders in Eastern Asia, p. 236.
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factor in her foreign policy formulation toward Korea? Russia recognized
her Vital interest in Korea, and this interest could have been carried
out following the assassination of the Queen and the King's flight to
the Russian Legation. But Russian primary interest in Korea (1896) was
to secure the independence of Korea in order to check the Japanese
advance northward. Russia intended to make the conquest of Manchuria
77as her main diplomacy. However, Russia did establish her ascendency
in Korea and it was her not Japan that counted in 1896.,
It is to be noted that in these two Russo-Japanese Agreements both
Russia and Japan recognized the independence of Korea, but these were
done without consultation with the Korean government. Korea, most
affected nation in these agreements was not even officially informed
of these agreements until March 2, 1897. When the Korean government
did receive the official note from the government of Japan, Korean
Foreign Minister, Yi Wan-yong, wrote to the Japanese Foreign Minister:
I must call your attention to the fact that as my 
government has not been party to these agreements, its 
liberty of action, as an indepê ĝent state, can hot be 
restricted by these provisions.
77Seoul National University, Kuk-sa Kai-sul, pp. 653-656.
Korean, Treaties and Agreements, pp. 23-24. Note of the 
Minister of State of Foreign Affairs of Korea (Yi Wan-yong) to the 
Minister of Foreign Affairs of Japan, March 2, 1897. These Agree­
ments, Waeber-Kimura and Amagata-Lobanov were a clear impairment of 
Korean sovereignty.
CHAPTER III 
RUSSIAN ACTIVE INTERFERENCE AND ITS FAILURE 
Russian Aggressive Interference with Korean Government
The Russian commitment which first demanded attention was a pro­
posed loan to Korea. In June, 1896, the French offered a loan to the 
Korean government. Despite the fact that the two powers, Russia and 
France were allied, Lobanov sounded an alarm and advised the Korean 
government not to enter into any major financial transaction with France 
until the arrival of the Russian financial official.^
As the first step in that direction, an official of the Russian 
government was hastily dispatched to Korea to investigate the situation. 
The man chosen was Witte's factotum, Pokotilov. His many communica­
tions with St. Petersburg during the summer of 1896 emphasized the 
necessity of Russia's acting without delay. On his first meeting with 
the Korean King, that Potentate asked for a loan of three million yen 
with which to repay Japan, so that the Queen could be buried without
using Japanese money. At the same time, rumors predicted the opening
2of a Korean bank with British help. Pokotilov, having found Korean 
finances in a poor condition, decided that temporarily they could be 
let alone, but that they should be placed under a Russian adviser. In 
the early part of November, 1896, he left the Korean capital.
^Lee, Hankuk Tongrip Undong Sa, pp. 326-327.
?'Romanov, Russia in Manchuria, p. 109.
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In November, 1896, the Russian Foreign Minister began to move. On 
November 11, he submitted the charter of a Russo-Korean bank to examina­
tion by the cabinet's Financial Committee. He also agreed, in principle, 
to the Russo-Chinese bank making a loan to the Korean King whenever it
became opportune, with one condition that the Korean custom revenue
was to come under a Russian financial representative. At the same time, 
he requested the Korean minister of Foreign Affairs, Yi Wan-yong, to 
direct every effort toward activating such a move.^
Meanvhile, the Russian Naval Department was looking for an ice-free
4port in Korea and was seriously considering Masanpo. In January, 1897, 
Witte, Russian Finance Minister, was still dallying over the idea of a 
Russian financial adviser for Korea and urging Waeber to get a pledge 
of full support for the adviser from the King.
On February 20th, 1897, the King of Korea with the Crown Prince 
left the Russian Legation for their new palace perhaps because he was 
disillusioned with Russian economic ambitions or because he had seen 
the Russo-Japanese agreements which mutually guaranteed independence 
of Korea. The King, however, expressed his obligation to the "friendly 
spirit of the Russian government and his appreciation of the hospitality 
of the Russian minister, and proclaimed that his country was again in
5peace". The Russians did not limit the personal freedom of the King 
nor did they protest the establishment of the new palace. Taking
3Romanov, Russia in Manchuria, p. 110.
^Masanpo is one of the best harbors in the Southeast Korea. In 
the Spring of 1895, Nicholas II said: "Russia absolutely needs a port 
which open throughout whole year." "This port must be located in the 
Southeast of Korea." Quoted in Langer, The Diplomacy of Imperialism,
I, p. 172.
^Kwan Bo, February 20, 1897.
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Taking advantage of the King's return to the new palace, the Japanese 
in April attempted to gain the King's friendship through tlie Emperor 
of Japan.® But the King's warmed friendship continued with the 
Russians.
On September 26, 1897, K. A. Alexeiev arrived in Seoul as a finan­
cial adviser to the Korean government and began slowly to gain full 
financial understanding of the peninsula, and to lay the foundations 
for a Russo-Korean bank and for telegraphic connection between the two 
countries. The guards at the King's new palace and the training of
7the Korean army were under the supervision of Russian military advisers. 
Thus Russian influence in Korea by September became definitely supreme.
The Japanese interest in Korea was an economic penetration as the 
Japan Times, a leading Japanese newpaper stated: "No one can doubt
that the prevention of a hostile occupation of the Korean peninsula 
is of absolute necessity to Japan in carrying out her program of peace­
ful expansion in the domain of Commerce and Industry".® Japan was 
particularly concerned with the activities of the Russian military 
advisers in Korea, and she demanded that Russia withdraw them from 
Korea. To this the Russian government in 1897 replied to Tokyo saying, 
"Russia sent military advisers to Korea at the request of the King of
Korea, and therefore we could not refuse the request of the ruler of a
9country with whom we have diplomatic relations."
®Korean Repository, IV (1897), p. 159.
7Independent (Seoul), September 26, 1897.
®Quoted in Dong, Chon, Japanese Annexation of Korea, p. 208. 
9Quoted in A. M. Pooley, The Secret Memoirs of Count Tadasu 
Hayashi, p. 278.
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The Russians however, did not attempt to obstruct the plans of the 
nationals of the Western powers in Korea. The Korean government appoin­
ted Mr. Stripling, a British subject, as an adviser to the Police Depart­
ment. A mining concession was granted to a German syndicate, an Amer­
ican was put in charge of a normal school; Dr. Brown, a British citizen, 
continued to direct the work of the Finance Department, and the work 
on the Seoul-Inchon Railway was pushed vigorously by an American syn­
dicate. The Russians merely followed the Chinese policy to retain 
her power in Korea without exercising it.
Of the action of the pro-Russian government in appointing non- 
Russian foreigners to important posts of government and in granting con­
cessions to western powers, it may be interpreted that the Korean gov­
ernment realizing Russian ambition was determined to retain her indepen­
dence by skillful manipulation of foreign interests.
The Russian control over the Korean military establishment proceeded 
faster than its domination of finance and general administration. As 
late as November, 1897 an effective Russian hegemony had not been devel­
oped as far as the expansionists desired or as might reasonably be 
expected from the unequivocal program which Labanov evidently laid down 
in his agreement with Ambassador Min in St. Petersburg.
The position of the aggressivists surrounding the Tsar was strengthened 
by the fortuitous presence of Alexis de Speyer in Tokyo as temporary head 
of the Russian Legation. He exerted his greatest influence on the
^^Mun, Kunse Ilbon yi Choson Chimtu 5a, pp. 533-535.
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formulation of Russia's aggressive policy in Korea.According to
Baron Rosen, De Speyer was "one of those young diplomatic hopefuls who
are always ready to recommend to their government forward policies in
the hope of thereby acquiring credit for patriotism". Thus says Rosen
"this particular young gentleman proceeded to propose unilateral Russian
action directly contrary to the cautious course which was urged by the
12later Minister, Hitrovo, in Tokyo". De Speyer "kept assuring the
Foreign Department in his reports— which were much relished in high
places— that it was perfectly safe to go ahead with any plans we might
13wish to put through in Korea,"
De Speyer, new Russian Charge d'Affaires in Seoul had served as
temporary head of the Russian Legation in Tokyo'from July, 1896, to
August, 1897. while he was in Tokyo, he managed to influence Russian
policy toward Korea— even more than he did later during his months as
head of the mission in Seoul. He was a man of aggressive temperament
who had replaced the mild-mannered Waeber as Russian Charge d'Affaires
in Seoul. There was an immediate and obvious change in the tone which
Russia assumed. From the very first, De Speyer showed plainly that he
was sent to impart a new vigour to Russo-Korean relations as things had
been going too slowly. His plan seemed to include control of the Korean
army, acquisition of the timber, the mineral and railroad enterprises,
domination of Korean finance and Russian naval bases at Deer Island off 
14Pusan.
^^Rosen, Forty Years of Diplomacy, p. 142. Minister Waeber was a 
moderate realizing that an aggressive Russian policy would antagonize 
Koreans.
^̂ ibid.
^ Îbid, p. 143.
14tti^, pp. 143-146.
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By the end of September, 1897, he had persuaded the King to appeal 
to Russia for military protection and for a secret agreement that Russia 
would send a substantial number of troops to Seoul to guard the King and 
his palace. Under his active diplomacy, the royal guard and five battal­
ions of the Korean infantry (numbering about 3,000) came under Russian 
instruction.
On October 2, 1897, in a private audience with the Korean King, De 
Speyer demanded the immediate appointment of K. A. Alexeiev as Custom's 
Administrator. A month of negotiations followed. The Korean Foreign 
Minister Yi Wan-yong pointed out that MacLeavy Brown's contract had 
several years to run, but De Speyer angrily replied that this was no 
answer, as Alexeiev had been sent by the Imperial Russian government 
at the request of the Korean ambassador to St. Petersburg to assume 
control of the Korean Financial Department. De Speyer, in ominous 
tones, indicated that if Alexeiev were not assigned to his duties, he 
would report to the Russian Emperor. The frightened King decided that 
it would be "reasonable" to employ Alexeiev.
On October 24, 1897, De Speyer excitedly demanded Brown's ouster 
and Alexeiev's employment, and an answer or an Imperial audience within 
twenty four hours. Meanwhile, Alexeiev had managed to round up evidence 
of Brown's self-interest in handling of revenue received from customs.
^^Independent (Seoul), September 30, 189 7.
^^The Korean Repository (October 18, 1897), V., p. 33. Alexeiev 
is not to be confused with Admiral Alexeiev, Commander-in-chief of 
Russian Naval Forces in Pacific Water.
The Korean Custom and Treasury was under the charge of Brown, a 
British and an experienced member of the Chinese Custom Service. His 
contract was run until December, 1900.
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The Korean Foreign Minister, who still refused to sign Alexeiev's con­
tract, was forced to resign in favor of Cho Pyong-sik. Cho finally
17signed the pact with De Speyer on November 5, 1897. Finally, Brown 
was dismissed; but he refused to leave. The terms of Alexeiev's employ­
ment as "Chief Adviser and Chief Superintendent of Customs" were: con­
trol and supervision of all Korean financial matters and recommendation 
of a new Chief Commissioner who was to be subordinate to him.
Commenting on this turn of events, the Korean Repository said:
"Some months ago Korea gave Russia a gun, now she has handed her purse 
19to Russia!" and the Independent attacked the appointment of Alexeiev
20as an illegal action of the new Foreign Minister, Cho Pyong-sik.
The British policy in Korea at this time was concerned with expanding
its commercial interest and England was determined to protect her own
interest in Korea. The dismissal of Brown by Russian pressure seems to
have antagonized England greatly, and the,power alignment over Korea
21(1897) appeared to be England and Japan against Russia.
Thus in the delicate balance of power between Russia and Anglo-
Japanese alignment there was an opportunity for Korean government to
pursue a more independent policy. On October 12, 1897, the King of
22Korea proclaimed himself Emperor of Taihan Cheguk ("Great Han Empire"). 
17The Text of the Cho-De Speyer Agreement is found in The Indepen­
dent (Seoul), November 10, 1897.
no Weems, Korean Reform Movement, p. 391-392.
19Korean Repository, IV (1897), p. 434.
20The Independent (Seoul), November 7, 1897.
21Asakawa, Kusso-Japanese Conflict, pp. 274-276.
22Kwan Bo, October 12, 1897. King Yi Hyeung assumed the title of 
Emperor.
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This was an attempt to put himself on equal status with the monarchs
of Russia, China, and Japan and free Korea from foreign interference.
Russia, Japan and all treaty powers with Korea recognized the imperial
title of the Korean ruler. On the same day, the Emperor of Korea
issued the following Royal Edict.
. . . .  The future of the Empire has been transferred to a 
solid rock and prosperity has replaced anxiety and worry.
The establishment of independence and maintenance of free­
dom are solely due to the merciful help of Heaven and the 
continuation of our glorious Koreans. We will endeavor to 
do what is right and proper for our country hereafter, and 
we trust our subjects will renew their loyalty and patriotism 
in helping us to carry out our aim. Our hope is that every 
citizen in the land will consider the country's interest first 
before thinking of his private affairs. Let us^^ll join our 
hearts to preserve the integrity of our Empire.
In the next month, Russian influences received a setback vben a
squardron of ten British warships arrived at Inchon and restored Dr.
Brown as superviser cf the Korean customs, a position which he had, 
in fact, never relinquished. Alexeiev remained as Brown's subordi­
nate. Hulbert writes the following account of this incident:
When it became evident that a scarcely concealed plan 
v/as on foot to oust a British subject from the Korean 
Finance Department, Great Britain, by concentrating war 
vessels at Igghon, caused the Russians to alter plans 
temporarily.
Russia, however, was determined to maintain her dominant position
in Korea. Russian Finance Minister Witte told the German ambassador
to the Czar on November 13, 1897:
To let Japan into Korea now meant to make a Russo-
Japanese war inevitable, and to relinquish the financial
management of Korea and lose along with it the specially
‘̂'̂ Kwan Bo, October 12, 1897.
^^Homer B. Hulbert, The Passing of Korea, (New York; Doubleday 
& Co., 1906), p. 158.
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protected position of the Russian bank, these obviously 
meant the opening o|^Korea's door wide, primarily to 
Japanese influence.
When Pusan harbor had been opened in 1895, MacLeavy Brown marked 
off a portion of Deer Island as having better water than the mainland. 
In August, 1897, however, Waeber selected twenty acres on the island, 
lying partly within the area marked off by Brown, as the location for 
a Russian coaling station. Since Japan had a concession of the same 
character there, and both powers enjoyed the same privilege in the 
chosen harbor, no doubt Russia believed no objection would be raised to 
the accommodation. However, Great Britain, Germany and the United 
States all protested, claiming part of the disputed territory. But 
Cho Pyong-sik, the Korean Foreign Minister, asserted that there was 
no legal document proving its reservation.^^
In December, 1897, five ships of the Russian Asiatic Squadron 
arrived in Chemulpo and made a show of force. De Speyer, backed by 
Admiral Doubassov, temporary Far Eastern Commander-in-Chief for
Admiral Alexeiev, again brought up the matter of Deer Island. The
27Korean officials remained reluctant. On January 25, 1898, the
Russian gunboat, Sivoutch, arrived in Pusan harbor, and its officers
proceeded to stake out and plant trees on the chosen acreage. The land
belonged to Japanese citizens who protested; the officers yielded to
the Japanese Consul three days later when agreement was reached that
28the trees would reimburse the owners for use of their land.
25Romanov, Russia in Manchuria, p. 149.
^^Independent (Seoul), August 18, 1897.
^^Ibid., December 10, 1897.  ̂.
28Ibid., January 20, 1897^
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De Speyer, in a diplomatic countermove, demanded 280,000 square
meters of island for Russian settlement in Mokpo and Chinnampo, which
had only 900,000 meters set aside for each of the general foreign
settlements. This demand was withdrawn shortly following a few
diplomatic courtesies. But the Koreans now began to manifest ill
feelings toward the Russian demand for Deer Island. Even Russia's old
friend, Cho Pyong-sik, was reluctant to comply, and v.'as forced out as
Foreign Minister in favor of Yi To-chae, who was compelled to introduce
the Russian request in the Korean Council of State, but immediately
29thereafter, absented himself pleading sickness. The Russians attempted 
to reshuffle the cabinet and demanded appointment of an acting Foreign 
Minister who would approve their concession. Under Russian pressure 
an Acting Foreign Minister, Min Chong-muk, who would favor the Russian 
demand, was appointed.
On February 25, 1889, Acting Foreign Minister Min deciding to 
dispense with the approval of the Council of State, sent a note to De 
Speyer apologizing for delay in granting the concession and expressing 
his hope for better Russo-Korean relations. The entire Korean Council 
of State resigned in protest to Min's arbitrary action on the ground 
that it had been given no chance to participate in the deliberations 
which led to the Acting Foreign Minister's decision to grant the conces­
sion; but the resignation was not accepted by the Emperor.The Foreign 
Minister, Yi, asked to be dismissed as incompetent, but the Emperor
29"Deer Island Episode," Korean Repository, V. (1898), pp. 109-
113.
^^Independent (Seoul), February 25, 1898-
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would go only so far as to accept Acting Foreign Minister Min's resigna­
tion, leaving Yi in office. De Speyer then applied pressure on the 
Emperor by threatening to withdraw the Russian advisers. He thus 
succeeded in having Min returned to office as Minister of Foreign 
Affairs.
On February 38, 1889, the Russo-Korean Bank opened its doors.
A Russian managed the mint in Inchon. The combination of these circum-
32stances provoked Dok-rip Hyup Huai ("Independence Club") to action.
The Independence Club then sent a letter to the Finance Minister, asking 
if it were true that the Korean Finance Department had taken the gov­
ernment 's money from two Korean banks and deposited it in the Russo-
Korean bank, authorizing that bank also to collect and disperse all
government revenues. At this time, the Council of State tried to
resign for the third time in protest to De Speyer.
On March 7, 1898, indignant over the anti<-Russian feelings that 
were mounting among the Koreans, De Speyer sent to the Korean govern­
ment an ultimatum accusing the government of ingratitude and demanding 
that a decision be made within twenty-four hours as to whether further 
Russian assistance was needed. The ultimatum ran as follows:
Recently I have been informed that there exists a deplor­
able condition of affairs in Seoul : Many idlers among your
31Independent (Seoul), February 28, 1898; Chong, Hankuk Kenyon-Sa, 
I, pp. 176-177. Even though there was a veiled Russian ultimatum, the 
manifestation of Korean independence led by the Dok-rip Hyup Huai, 
prevented the Russians from obtaining land on Deer Island. Korean 
Repository, V, (1898), p. 159.
32So Jai-pil organized a political party called Dok-Rip Hyup Huai 
("Independence Club"), This advocated independence and sovereignty of 
Korea. Hereafter referred to as the Independence Club.
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people, claiming to be gifted politicians, create distur­
bance by opposing Russian interests. This state of affairs 
naturally causes great surprise to my Imperial Sovereign, the 
Emperor of Russia. At the request of your Imperial Sov­
ereign and your government, the Russian government had sent 
military instructors to drill the soldiers and to guard the 
palace, and an adviser for your financial department. This 
action, on the part of my government, plainly indicates 
Russia's intention of helping your country as a neighbor 
and her desire to strengthen your government. But your 
government did not seem to appreciate the importance of 
Russia's action at the time and now your government freely 
prevents Russia from accomplishing the advantages and 
beneficial results for your country which she intended.
The present attitude of your government is so plain that 
Russia cannot endure this condition much longer. There­
fore, my Emperor has graciously ordered me to report fully 
to your Emperor and inquire of your government definitely 
whether Korea still desires to be benefited by Russian 
help or not, and if the military instructor and finance 
adviser are not considered necessary by your Emperor and 
your government, my government will make some other 
arrangement according to ihe circumstances, but your gov­
ernment must maintain you^^independence in the future 
according to its ability.
On March 10, 1898, the Independence Club held Korea's first mass
meeting, demanding that De Speyer's offer to withdraw the Russian
advisers be accepted. The Korean Emperor, urged by the Club, aggreed
to accept the Russian offer saying, "your officials have accomplished
their work, and it is convenient for us to have them relieved from our
service. I feel grateful to you for suggesting the idea of relieving 
34these officials."
Upon receiving his Majesty's reply, De Speyer told the Korean 
Foreign Minister, sarcastically, that his government was glad to 
learn that Korea could maintain her independence without further
33Quoted in "Right about Pace" in Korean Repository, V. (1898),
p. 113 
34Korean Repository, V. (1898), pp. 114-115.
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assistance from foreign advisers and that the Russian advisers would 
35leave Korea. The Emperor was so pleased that he wanted to send an
ambassador to St. Petersburg to thank the Tsar for his consideration,
but Russia promptly announced that such plenipotentiary would not be
received.On March 16, 1898, De Speyer ordered the Russian experts
to return to Russia. On April 12, N. Matiunic relieved De Speyer
in Seoul and on April 27, the Russo-Korean Bank was closed, and Korea
seemed to become really free and independent of foreign countries.
On March 7th the Tsar's government "congratulated Korea on having
reached a point where they could dispose with" foreign advisers.
37This Russian action "provoked the most favorable comment." Quoting
the Moscow Gazette (March 21, 1898) the North China Herald said:
"Russia was about to retire from Korea and would henceforth consider
38Korea beyond her sphere of interest," "This event", remarked the
Korean Repository^ "was the first time in the history of the Yi Dynasty
39when the Emperor of Korea became really free from outside influence."
The haughty and self-righteous diplomacy of De Speyer could not 
have impressed the Korean Court favorably. At any rate, Russian dom­
inance thus collapsed, partly because of Russian errors of judgement 
but mainly because of the rise of a genuine Korean independence movement 
manifesting the patriotic spirit of the Koreans.
^^"Russia in Korea", The Saturday Review LXXXV (April 23, 1898), 
p. 549; Chong, Hankuk Kenyon Sa, I, pp. 210-212.
^^"Russia in Korea", The Saturday Review LXXXV (April 23, 1898),
p. 549. 
37.Korean Repository, V. (1898), pp. 116-117.
"̂ K̂orean Repository, V. (1898), p. 158.
39Korean Repository, V. (1898), p. 158.
The Rise of the Dok Rip Hyup Huai ("Independence Club”)
The Independence Club was formed by the Young progressives in 1895 
following the King's escape to the Russian Legation. A leader of the 
young Korean progressives was So Jai-pil, a naturalized citizen of 
the United States. In 1884, he joined Kim Ok-kyun in the emeute 
against the Min faction. When the emeute failed, he was exiled to 
the United States where he received the degree of Doctor of Medicine 
at George Washington University. He was invited by the Korean govern­
ment to be advisor to the Privy Council in early 1896. He succeeded 
in introducing many constructive reforms.
So Jae-pil was interested in liberalism and democracy, which he 
thought could be realized in Korea through enlightened reforms and 
popular education. "The main purpose of my return," he said "was to 
educate the people and cultivate leadership." He also wished "to 
establish a completely independent K o r e a " . H e  did not propose that 
the independence of Korea should be maintained by any new rejection of 
contact with foreign governments and people. He advocated the vital 
need of foreign assistance in education and in industrial development. 
But such aid should always contribute to the fundamentals of the 
platform: "Korea for Koreans." The gradual though steady development
of Korean resources with Korean capital, as far as possible under
^^To-tae, Kim (ed.), So Jai-pil Paksa Chaso-jon ("Autobiography 
of Dr. So Jai-pil") (Seoul; Sunonsa, 1949), pp. 149-162. So Jai-pil 
was of noble birth and belonged to the generation of young Koreans 
who came into contact with western ideas in 1870's.
41So Jai-pil Paksa Chaso-jon, p. 198. Soon after his return to 
Korea the King offered the post of Foreign Minister in the pro-Japanese 
cabinet. But he declined.
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foreign tutelage should be done. The speedy translation of foreign
textbooks into Korean that the youth could have access to the great
things of history, science, art without having to acquire a foreign
A2tongue: and long life to His Majesty, the King.
However, some of his innovations interfered with the private
schemes and privileges of the conservative cabinet ministers. They
informed the Emperor that So Jai-pil was not a servant of his but a
servant of the Korean people, which at that time was regarded as a
treason against the King,
Therefore, So Jai-pil decided to serve Korea as a private individual.
On April 7, 1896, he started both the first Korean newspaper and English
newspaper in Korea, known as Dok-rip Sinmun (The Independent). The
paper fearlessly advocated reform, independence of Korea, and supported
every effort to promote good government vAiich could make a strong and 
43free Korea.
In addition to his newspaper work, So Jai-pil organized a political 
party. This party, Dok Rip Hyup Huai ("Independence Club") had an ori­
ginal membership of approximately thirty persons, including both high-
44ranking government officials and civilians. On November 21, 1896, 
the party constructed an Independence Arch in Seoul to replace the gate 
of Welcoming and Blessing, where Korean Kings for centuries, had
42Weems, The Korean Reform and Independent Movement, 1881-1898,
p. 231.
43So Jai-pil Paksa Chaso-Jun, p. 213.
44The Independent (Seoul), July 4, 1894. Among them were : An
Kyong-su, the Minister of Police Affairs; Yi Yun-yong, the Minister 
of Finance; Yi Wan-young, the Minister of Foreign Affairs; Yi Chae- 
yun, mayor of Seoul,
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45greeted the envoys from Chinese Emperors. The erection of such an 
Arch also impressed the people with the reality of the independence 
of their country. The club opposed foreign intervention in Korean 
affairs, and advocated instead adoption of a sagacious policy on the 
part of the government designed to strengthen the country through its 
own efforts. They emphatically opposed the delegation of the country's 
military and financial affairs to foreign advisers.The objectives 
of the Club could be best explained by the following passage from the 
memorandum which the Club presented to the Emperor on February 20, 1898:
We, Your Majesty's humble servants desire to state that 
two important factors constitute an independent and sovereign 
state, namely; first it must not lean upon another nation nor 
tolerate foreign interference in the national administration; 
second, it must help itself by adopting a wise policy and 
enforcing justice throughout the realm. The power of estab­
lishing these two great principles had been invested to your 
gracious Majesty by Heaven above. Whenever this power is 
destroyed there is no sovereignty.
The object of erecting the Independence Arch and 
organizing the Dok Rip Hyup Huai by your humble servants 
is to reverence your Majesty's August throne and to 
strengthen the hearts of the people in order tô ĵ aintain 
our dynasty and the independence of our nation.
As indicated previously, its fundamental aim was to make an indepen­
dent and strong Korea that could stand alone before the world. The 
members of the Club were also interested in social and material devel­
opment of the nation as well as its independence. Some of these objec­
tives to quote So Jai-pil, were:
to discuss matters concerning national improvements 
and customs, laws, religions and various pertinent affairs
^^So Jai-pil Paksa Chaso Jon, p. 213.
'̂ b̂eaders of Independent Club attacked Russia's interference with 
Korea's military, diplomatic and financial affairs.
"independent (Seoul), February 20, 1898.
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of foreign lands. One of the main objectives of the Club 
is to create public opinion vmich has been totally unknown 
in Korea until lately. The Dok Rip Hyup Hoi is really the 
center of distributing useful information. It is therefore 
more of an educational institution than a political wigwam 
as is supposed by some. These weekly meetingggproduce wonder­
ful effects upon the thoughts of the members.
When Russia's power in Korea became evident and her demands for 
concessions increased, the Club held public meetings in Seoul and 
drafted a letter to the Emperor vigorously attacking the Russian ambi­
tions and the concessions made by the Korean government. The younger 
members of the Club led by Yun Chi-ho, Lee Sung-raan (Syngman Rhee) 
continued their radical activities. Street meetings continued, some
anti-Russian handbills were posted. Anti-Russian feeling mounted
49rapidly among the population in Seoul.
When the Russian minister De Speyer submitted an ultimatum 
accusing the Korean government of ingratitude and demanded to know 
whether further Russian assistance was needed, the Club welcomed this 
opportunity to hold a mass meeting to urge that the Emperor dismiss 
the Russian financial and military advisers.The Emperor yielded and 
dismissed the Russian advisers.
On August 3, 1898, the Emperor came to the conclusion that he 
would like to have a foreign body-guard. C. R. Creathous, American 
adviser in the Korean Justice Department was sent to Shanghai to find
4-8Independent (Seoul), March 13, 1898. See also "Dok Rip Hyup 
Hoi (Independent Club)" Korean Repository, V. (1898), p. 286.
49Kim, Yun Chi-ho Sunsang Yakchon, p. 189.
^^Chong, Han-kuk Kenyun Sa, I, 212. About 8,000 persons attended 
the mass meeting in Seoul manifesting anti-Russian sentiment. Chong 
was one of the radical group within the Independence Club. His 
book is one of the best sources on the Club's activities.
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the personnel for the Emperor's body-guard. Thirty men of various
nationalities were recruited and they arrived in Seoul on September 
5115th. This move caused intense excitement and resentment and the
Club was in the fore-front of the protest that was made on the grounds
that the presence of foreign body-guards for the Emperor suggested
v/eakness of the independence of the nation. Again, the Emperor yielded
52to popular clamor and dismissed the newly arrived foreign body-guard.
On September 20, 1898, the Club held another mass meeting to 
which representatives of all classes were called. The following 
articles were formulated and presented to the cabinet for imperial 
sanction:
1. Neither officials nor people shall depend upon foreign aid, 
but shall do their best to strengthen and uphold the Imperial power.
2. All documents pertaining to foreign loans, the granting of 
concession, in fact every document drawn up between the Korean 
government and a foreign party or firm, shall be signed and sealed 
by all ministers of the State and the president of privy council.
3. Important offenders shall be punished only after they have 
been given a public trial and ample opportunity to defend themselves.
4. To his majesty shall belong the power to appoint ministers, 
but in case a majority of the cabinet disapproves the Emperor's 
nominee he shall not be appointed.
5. All sources of revenue and methods of raising taxes shall 
be placed under the control of the Finance Department, no other 
department or officer being allowed to interfere therew^^h; and 
the annual estimates and balances shall be made public.
Several of these measures strike directly at the powers which
^^Independent (Seoul), September 15, 1898.
52Kwan Bo, September 25, 1898.
53Weems, Hulbert's History of Korea, p. 319; T. H. Yun, "Popular 
Movement in Korea", Korean Repository, V. (1898), pp. 455-559.
-94-
had been held for centuries by the Emperor himself and it cannot be 
supposed that His Majesty would listen willingly to the voice of the 
common people when they demanded such far reaching innovations. In 
such a country as Korea the clearly announced statement of the common 
people as to their wishes carries with it the implication that they 
have come to the point where they are ready to make revolution if their 
demands are not complied with. On the 5th of November the Emperor 
ordered the carrying out of these five articles.
The increasing influence of the Club v;as feared not only by the 
conservative Korean officials but by some of the Foreign representatives, 
such as those of Japan and Russia, who did not relish seeing Korean
55public opinion become aroused against foreign influence. The Club 
played an important role in the actual success of governmental reform, 
the withdrawal of Russian financial advisers and military instructors 
from Korea. The activities of the Club was a genuine Korean indepen­
dence movement characterized by self-reliance rather than reliance 
on foreign support or influence.
'̂̂Independent (Seoul), November 5, 1898.
55Kim, Yun Chi-ho Sunsang Yakchun, pp. 118-119.
Suppression of the Progressive Reform Movement
The Conservative elite felt that they lacked sufficient physical 
power to oppose a popular uprising in support of drastic reforms led 
by the progressive Independence Club. Hence, temporary concessions were 
made with no idea of real compliance. 'This was immediately followed by 
measures designed for securing a counter demonstration. The instrument 
selected for this purpose was the old-time Peddler's G uild.This 
was an extinct institution, but the name had survived, and the Conserv­
atives used it to bring together large numbers of men who were ready 
for any sort of work that would mean pay.
The plot against the Club was masterminded by Cho Pyong-sik, the 
incumbent vice-minister of the State Council. Cho produced an anonymous 
letter alleging that the Club intended to proclaim a republic on Novem­
ber 13, 1898 and elect Park Chong-yang, the incumbent premier, as pres­
ident; the vice-presidency and all cabinet appointments were to be 
filled by the Club officers. The Emperor soon yielded to the intrigue 
around him and on the basis of this letter the arrest of the leaders of 
the Club was ordered early on the morning of November 5. Seventeen were 
arrested and within a few hours an imperial order disbanding the Cliib 
was issued.
Its first president, Ahn Kyong-su, escaped to Japan, viciously 
charged with complicity in the murder of Queen Min. Yi Wan-young, who 
replaced him in the presidency, was bought off with an appointment as
It held a truly feudal relation to the government, often pre­
paring the roads and escorting officials on their j ourneys, acting 
as detectives, and forming militia according to occasion.
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a provincial governor. Yun Chi-ho, (and last) president of the Club 
was awakened in the middle of the night by a police detective who came 
to arrest him. Pleading for a few moments of privacy in which to 
dress, he escaped and fled to an American missionary school, Pai Jai 
Hak Dang, where he was safe under the protection of the American 
flag. The streets were crowded with police and soldiers with drawn 
bayonets. Edicts were posted branding the nationalist-reform leaders 
as traitors,
Instead of dispersing in compliance with the Imperial order the 
assembled Culb members went in a body to police headquarters and asked 
to be arrested. This is a peculiarly Korean mode of procedure, the 
idea being that if put on trial they would be able to shame their adver­
saries and incidentally embarrass the administration, for the prisons 
would not suffice to hold the multitude that clamored for incarceration. 
A surging crowd was massed in front of the Supreme Court demanding the 
release of the prisoners who had been accused, as the anonymous placards 
announced, of conspiring to establish a republic! The popular feelings 
were too strong for the courage of the Peddler Guild and they remained 
in the background. The agitation continued until the authorities were 
either frightened into submission or, deeming that they had shown the 
Club a glimpse of what they might expect, released the arrested men.^^ 
But the Club interpreted this to be a vindication of its policy and 
attempt to follow up the defeat of the conservatives by demanding the
57Kim, Yun Chi-ho Sunsang Yakchon, p. 124.
^^Weems, Hulbert's History of Korea, p. 321. When attempts to 
persuade the demonstrators to leave were unsuccessful, the use of arms 
was considered. Foreign Minister Min Chong-muk asked the opinions of 
the British and American representatives in Seoul all of vfhom were 
appalled at notion. Ibid, p. 314.
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arrest and punishment of the people who had played the trick upon their 
organization. As these men were very prominent officials ând had the 
ear of the Emperor, it was not possible to obtain the redress demanded.
So the month of November was given over to popular demonstrations.
Popular meetings were frequent but the drowd did not have the determina­
tion to come to a showdown with the government.
The Conservatives saw this and gauged the resisting power of the 
malcontents. The offensive tactics of the latter were confined merely 
to free speech and the Conservatives determined to see v̂ hat they would 
do when on the defensive. Accordingly, on the morning of November 21st 
the Peddlers attacked the people who had gathered as usual to discuss 
the stirring question of the times. The people of Seoul City took 
side with the Club and fights ensued between them and the Royal Peddlers, 
supported by the government. Riots took place. In order to protect 
certain worthies from justice, the government came near plunging the 
whole city into anarchy and ruin.
On thé 25th of November in the midst of this chaotic state of 
things the Emperor granted a great general audience outside the gates 
of the palace. The Emperor, û"- the presence of the representatives of 
the treaty powers and of officials, most graciously and solemnly promised 
to the people:
1. That the peddlers should be dispersed.
2. That the persons who manufactured the fabrications 
against the Club should be punished.
3. That the Club should be re-established again by 
Imperial decree.
4= That the Six measures so definitely and distinctively
- 98-  59promised by His Majesty should be carried out.
Again it was mere promise, calculated to bridge an actual and 
present difficulty. The members of the Club should have recognized 
this. The Emperor was surrounded by men inimical to a radical reform 
program, they had the support of the police and the army as well as the 
peddlers. The Club had not a single prominent representative in any 
really responsible and influential government office.They simply 
had the precarious voice of Korean popular feeling to sustain them.
Having secured this public promise of the Emperor, the Club should 
have waited patiently to see what would happen. If then the Imperial 
promises were not kept they should have waited and worked for a time 
when public sentiment among the leading men would compel reform. The 
eventual downfall of the Club was not solely blamed upon the govern­
ment. As Yun Chi-ho himself confesses, "The Popular meetings had gone 
beyond the control of the Club and the meetings, restarted on the 6th 
of December against sober advice, became careless and impudent. On the 
16th of December the Privy Council recommended the recall of Park Young- 
ho^^ from Japan. The popular meeting had the imprudence to endorse 
this action. The more conservative portion of the people revolted 
against the very mention of the name. Suspicion was excited that the
popular agitations had been started in the interests of Pak Yong-ho
62and they instantly lost sympathy of the people."
59The Independent (Seoul), November 26, 1898. T. H. Yun, "popular 
movement in Korea," Korean Repository, V. (1898), p. 468.
When the Independence Club actively delved into the political 
sphere, most of the moderates (those with government positions) with­
drew from membership. Chong, Han-kuk Kenyun-Sa, I, pp. 398.
^^Pak Yong-ho attempted to overthrow the government in 1895 and 
had been exiled in Japan. Lee Sung-man (Syngman Rhee), young radical 
leader of the Club proposed that all the political exiles in Japan be 
pardoned and that Pak Yong-ho be named as chairman of Privy Council.
^^Quoted in Weems, Hulbert's History of Korea, pp. 323-324.
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The government seized this opportunity and ventured to use violence 
in dispensing a handful of men who attempted to continue the fruitless 
demonstrations. The enemies of the liberal and progressive party had 
used this opportunity to the fullest extent, and when it was seen that 
the Club movement had at last been deprived of its strongest support, 
the popular voice, -its enemies came down upon it with cruel force.
In spite of voluble promises to the contrary large nuinbers of the 
reform party were arrested. Its remaining leaders scattered and took 
refuge in foreign compounds. And thus came an end to a political 
party \diose aims were to modernize and strengthen the nation and at the 
same time to maintain the independence of the Korean Kingdom.
As in Japan, positive and successful reform was possible only 
from the top. The Korean government, like the Chinese, made a few 
concessions and promises to the advocates of reform, but grudingly 
and only under pressure. Every opportunity to eliminate the source of 
the pressure was sought by the ruling elite. Therefore, the task of 
governing Korea was solely left to self-righteous and often corrupt 
conservatives vho fancied that their rule might be perpetuated through 
the manipulation of international rivalries.
An appraisal of the international status of Korea from the Sino- 
Japanese War to the turn of the century reveals that she had now entered 
fully into the Western state system and renounced completely her alle­
giance to an international order founded on Confucian principles. 
However, there was the almost helpless physical condition of the
nation a nation corrupt, underdeveloped, archaic, and buffeted about
by the stresses of modern power-politics.
■ But conditions were generally good and, from 1898, Korea enjoyed
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comparative prosperity, and there were undoubted signs of progress.
Many foreigners were doing business in the country, more schools were 
started, the army was supplied with modern weapons, and drilled along 
modern lines, native newspapers flourished, and Korea entered the World 
Postal Union.
Since there was no single foreign overlordship, a tendency toward 
Confucian statism appeared. Being only recently released, however, 
from the status of a nation traditionally under the hand of a stronger 
power, Korea gave little evidence of an ability to control her own 
affairs properly. Since the Emperor had divested himself of his Japanese 
and progressive advisers in 1896, the Korean government had become more 
and more conservative, tending toward the administration on the Confucian 
pattern, rather than that of the west.
Seoul National University, Kuksa Kai-sul, pp. 432-433; Major 
Herbert H. Austin, A Scamper Through the Far East (London: Edward 
Arnold, 1909), p. 176.
CHAPTER TV
RUSSO-JAPANESE DIPLOMATIC COMPETITION, 1899-1904
The Nishi-Rosen Protocol
'The Russian loss of her influence in Korea was due to a large
extent to the active nationalistic movement of the Independence Club.
But this was not the only reason. By this time, Russia had become more
concerned with her position in Manchuria than in Korea. In order to
facilitate her advance in Manchuria, it was necessary for Russia to
avoid conflict with the powers, particularly with Japan. What Russia
had at this time in mind was the leasing of Port Arthur and she decided
to buy off the Japanese by making concessions in Korea.^
On March 27th, 1898, Russia obtained from China a lease of Liaotung
2Peninsula where the harbor of Port Arthur and Dairen are located.
This Russian move was directed toward Japan as a demonstration of her 
supremacy in the East. Russia leased Port Arthur after Germany had
3leased Kiaochow Bay including the city of Tsingtao, but her lease of
4Port Arthur led England to seize Wei-Hai-wei. The Japanese government
^Langer, The Diplomacy of Imperialism, II. p. 471.
2John V. A. MacMurray, Treaties and Agreements with and concerning 
China (2 Vols.; New York: Oxford University Press, 1921), I. pp. 119-212.
^Ibid., pp. 112-118.
^Great Britain was opposed to any alienation of Chinese territory, 
and viien Russia leased the Liaotung peninsula, -the British sought a 
counter-weight and leased Wei-hai-wei in Shantung Province for as long 
a period as Port Arthur would remain in the Russian possession. Conven­
tion for the Lease of Wei-hai-wei between Great Britain and China signed 
on July 1, 1898.
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was indignant over .the Russian move, and it became necessary for Russia
to pursue a conciliatory course with Japan, which Count Witte explained,
(In order) to pacify them (England and Japan) we obligated 
ourselves to build a free commercial port, in the vicinity 
of Port Arthur. This failed to satisfy the Japanese.
Fearing a clash with that country we were forced to yield 
ground to it in Korea. We withdrew our soldiers and military 
instructors from that country and we recalled our counsellor 
to the Korean Emperor, who in a short time had acquired 
complete influence over the finance of the country.
Japanese Foreign Minister Nishi, quick to take advantage of the 
weak diplomatic position of Russia, proposed to Rosen, Russian Minister 
in Tokyo, that an agreement be made which would help to avoid inter­
ference by Japan with Russian policy in Manchuria, and by Russian with 
Japanese policy in Korea. Japan also, unprepared for a trial of strength 
with Russia, returned to her previous policy of conciliation in order 
to safeguard her vital interests in Korea.
Rosen agreed and forwarded the Japanese suggestion to his govern­
ment. Russian Foreign Minister, Lobanov's reply was delayed, but when 
it arrived, it said only that Russia could not declare Korea outside 
her sphere of influence. The matter was allowed to rest. But since 
something had to be done to allay Japan's excitement with regard to 
Russia and Korea, Rosen was allowed finally to negotiate.^ The resulting 
agreement, more favorable to Japan than Russia, was signed in Tokyo on 
April 25, 1898, and subsequently this agreement became the basis for the
7lengthy negotiations preceding the Russo-Japanese war.
^Abraham, Yarraolinsky, The Memoirs of Count Witte (Garden City; 
Page & Co., 1921), p. 106.
^Rosen, Forty Years of Diplomacy, pp. 157-159.
7Asakawa, Russo-Japanese Conflict, pp. 271-272.
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, This agreement not only recognized the independence of Korea but 
it also included in the second article the desirable principles of the 
former agreement, and gave full recognition to the economic interests 
of Japan in the peninsula. The entire protocol read as follows :
Article I. The Imperial governments of Japan and Russia 
definitely recognize the independence and the perfect sov­
ereignty of Korea, and mutually engage to abstain from all 
direct interference in the internal affairs of that country.
Article II. Desirous of removing all possible cause 
of misunderstanding in the future, the Imperial governments 
of Japan and Russia mutually engage, in case Korea should 
have recourse to the counsel and assistance of either Japan 
or Russia, not to take any measure regarding the nomination 
of military instructors and financial advisers, without 
having previously arrived at a mutual accord on the subject.
Article III. In view of the great development of the 
commercial and industrial enterprise of Japan, in Korea, 
as also of the considerable number of the Japanese subjects 
residing in that country, the Russian Imperial government 
shall not obstruct the development of the commercial and 
industrial relations between Japan and Korea.
Close examination of this agreement indicates that it put Russia 
and Japan on an equal footing of abstention, with the exception that 
Japan was given an economic free hand in Korea. Thus Russia recognized 
Japanese influence in Korea while Japan recognized Manchuria as out of 
her sphere by not opposing directly Russia's lease of Port Arthur and 
Dairen. This "exchange policy although it was not clearly defined
9in the protocol, constituted the Japanese Russian policy in 1898."
The Nishi-Rosen agreement was favorable to Japan in two particular 
ways. Inasmuch as it signified a measure of Russian retreat, it gave
QJ. A. (Korea), XXXI, No. 154, pp. 182-184; Asakawa, Russo- 
Japanese Conflicts, pp. 271-272.
9Akagi, Japan's Foreign Relations, p. 174.
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the Japanese new stature and prestige. Also by recognizing Japanese 
interests it encouraged the further grov/th of Japanese economic projects, 
a factor which had accompanied political efforts since the opening of 
K o r e a . T h e  Daiichi Bank had formed the core of economic development 
since its establishment in Korea in 1878. In the succeeding years its 
share in the economic life increased as it served in the role of a 
central bank of Korea, exercising its extensive powers through the promo­
tion of business, the issuing of bank notes, the regulation of the 
coinage, and the collection of custom receipts.
By August, 1898, Japanese economic interests held a predominant 
place in Korea. More than three quarters of Korea's foreign commerce 
was carried on with Japan. Japanese merchants outnumbered any othfer 
foreign group and, settled largely in the towns, they controlled most 
of the shipping and the fishing industries along the coast. On August 
21, .1898, Ito visited Korea, where he stated for a civilized and indepen­
dent Korea:
The sole object of the Japanese has always been to 
assist Korea . . .  to be a civilized and independent 
state. Japan's good wishes for Korean independence are 
all the more sincere and reliable because her vital 
interests are bound up with those of your country. A 
danger to Koreari^independence will be a danger to 
Japan's safety."̂
A month following Ito's speech (August 21), the Japanese obtained 
a concession for the Seoul-Pusan railroad and numerous other rights,
12such as mines, coastal fishing privileges, inland navigation, and whaling.
^^Makoto, Hori, Nichiro Senso Zengo ("The Russo-Japanese War, Its 
Prelude and Aftermath") (Tokyo; 1940), pp. 18-21; Harrington, God,
Mammon and the Japanese, p. 305.
^^Quoted in Dong, Chon, Japanese Annexation of Korea, p. 243,
12Hung-su Kang, Chosun Tongnip Hyoltu Sa ("History of the bloody
struggle for Korean Independence") (Seoul; Koryo Hunwha Sa, 1946), pp.
17-21.
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As a result of this Russo-Japanese division of the spoils in Korea, 
it was apparent that Korea was in the process of being divided into 
two spheres of influence: the Japanese predominant in the south and 
the Russians in the north. However, Russia soon returned to Korea to 
compete with Japan more energetically than ever.
The Renewal of Rivalry
With the coming of 1899 the existing compromise "exchange policy" 
of 1898 between Japan and Russia came to an end. Russo-Japanese ri­
valry in Korea was renewed with the arrival in Seoul of A. Pavlov of 
Russia and Hayashi of Japan as ministers early in 1899. A. Pavlov, 
had been Russian Charge d'Affairs at Peking before coming to Seoul.
Prior to his arrival Russian influence in Korea had been declining some­
what. Pavlov had orders from his government to adopt a new policy of 
pure intrigue, and by maintaining in positions of power Koreans hostile
to the Japanese, to harass and injure Japanese interests in every way
_ , 13possible.
From this time on until the final rupture in 1904, Russo-Japanese 
interests in Korea constantly clashed, and unfortunate Korea was to suffer 
from aggressive demands and vigorous protests of these rival powers.
Being caught between the two rival neighboring powers, Korea in 1899 
attempted to neutralize herself through the help of a third power.
Still regarding the United States as a possible guardian of Korea, the 
Emperor of Korea requested the American minister in Seoul to approach 
President McKinley. The American minister in Seoul, Allen, interviewed 
the President and the Secretary of State, Hay, but President McKinley
13Rosen, Forty Years of Diplomacy, pp. 215-219. The Nishi-Rosen 
Convention did not settle the Korean question. Russia remained inter­
mittently active in Korea pressing demands for concessions on the gov­
ernment and trying to secure a port for her use. Japan worked feverishly 
to strengthen her position. Evidently, the two parties interpreted 
the convention differently. The Japanese thought that the convention 
had placed Korea at its disposal, but Waen it became obvious that the 
Russian government did not intend to leave Korea completely to Japan, 
the Japanese government began to strengthen its navy and army.
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14was not interested in the Korean problems.
At this time, Japan had been preparing to meet Russia by force.
Japan adopted an aggressive policy both in her diplomacy and armament
to advance in Korea and to meet Russia. Russia, however, determined to
15secure naval ports in the peninsula, namely Masanpo and Chinhai Bay 
for she deemed the Korean peninsula indispensable to her commercial 
and naval purposes in the Far East and to the protection of her interests 
in Manchuria.
Even after the Deer Island affair ended in fiasco and the Russians 
obtained the Port Arthur lease, they still did not cease trying to 
acquire the port in Korea. On May 1, 1899, the port of Masanpo was 
opened for foreign trade. By the terms of the opening, a foreigner 
was permitted to buy land within a three-mile radius of the port.
On the sixth day of May Admiral RIakaroff, Commander of the Eastern 
Squadron of the Russian Navy, and Pavlov, with Colonel Stralbitzki, 
Russian military attache in Seoul, selected an area to be used as coal 
yards for the Russian Steam Navigation Company at a strategic point on 
the coast within the three mile limit. They did not, however complete 
the purchase, whereupon the Japanese quickly completed the purchase of 
the shoreline of the land that the Russians selected. On September 14, 
the Russian Charge d'Affairs informed the Korean government that, under 
the instruction of the Russian Foreign Minister, he would be obliged 
to take action in order to protect Russian interests if the Japanese
"̂̂ Harrington, God, Mammon and Japanese, p. 322.
^^Chinhai Bay is located in the extreme southwest of the Korean 
peninsula.
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contract was not canceled. On October 4, again, he threatened to seize 
the land."^
As he attempted bribery and applied pressure on the Korean gov­
ernment, he seemed to be a true successor to De Speyer, Finally, on 
March 10, 1900, the Russian fleet arrived at Chemulpo with a show of 
force, and on March 18, 1900, Russia obtained the lease of less strategic 
lands at the port, with a promise from the.Korean government that Kojedo 
Island near the harbor entrance would not be alienated. This action 
started a land race between Japan and Russia. In May, 1900, Russia
tried to least Tja-pok on the inner shore of Masanpo, but finding again
17that Japanese subjects had already leased it, finally acquired the 
lease of Pan-kumi upon the outer shore for the purpose of erecting a 
jospital, warehouse, and a recreation ground for the use of the Russian 
Navy.
The rivalry continued with both powers, growing increasingly aggres­
sive, until March, 1901, when Russia failed to lease Chin-hai Bay. At 
this time, Russia ceased her efforts, although Japan continued her 
acquisition until October of that year.^^
Russia tried again to have MacLeavy Brown removed from control of 
Korean customs. Together with France, she attempted to lend the Korean 
Emperor five million yen, to be guaranteed by "sympathetically managed 
customs," but this project was dropped in. the face of violent opposition
^^The North China Herald, (Shanghai: Vol. LXI-XCVI), September 4, 
1899, p. 477.
17Langer, The Diplomacy of Imperialism, II, p. 609.
18.Asakawa, Russo-Japanese Conflict, pp. 276-278.
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by the British Charge, Mr. Gubbins. On March 18, 1901, Russian pres­
sure had induced the Korean Emperor to take over Brown's house, but 
strong British pressure was successful in having the house restored 
to him. On May 20, 1901 Brown was again forced to vacate his official 
residence as well as the customs office building, but was saved by an
earnest representation made by the Japanese Minister, Harashi, to
19the Korean Emperor.
The victories of the Japanese at Masanpo and Chinhai Bay were of
the utmost significance, preventing as they did the connection of
Vladivostok with Port Arthur by the development of a naval fortress
at the very door of Japan. The tvjo rival powers also struggled for
the whaling and fishing business along the Korean coast. And then
rivalry further developed over the construction and control of Korean
railroads. The line from Seoul to Wiju as well as that of from Seoul
20to Pusan were Japanese concessions. Japanese influence in Korea was 
such that American Minister Allen in 1901 wrote from Seoul: "Japan 
will undoubtedly get this country soon", "I am working to perfect
21some American interests before Korea falls into Japanese control."
In Russia, meanwhile, there appeared an aggressive move led by 
Bezobrazov, a retired captain of cavalry, who strongly advocated the 
restoration of former Russian influence in Korea by means of securing
y —
various concessions. The leaders of this movement favoured even the
^^Ibid., pp. 278-279.
20Lee, Hankuk Sa, p. 805.
^^Quoted in Harrington, God, Mammon and the Japanese, p. 197.
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annexation of Korea. In January, 1900, Bezobrazov thought of forming
a semi-official Eastern-Asiatic industrial cooperation "for the purpose
22of exploiting the Korean forest" around the Yalu River. By 1901, 
Bezobrazov's plan was materialized and Japan was carefully watching 
Russian activity around the Yalu River. However, Witte on July 28, 
1901, warned the foreign minister, Lamsdorff, against Russia's pro­
voking trouble with Japan over Korea: " . . .  an armed clash with 
Japan in the near future would be a great disaster for us . . .  .
Between the two evils, an armed conflict with Japan or the complete
_ 23cession of Korea, j. would choose the second". It is not clear how
much influence Witte exerted on Russia's foreign policy, but at this 
time the Russian government had no desire to establish friendly rela­
tions with Japan.
Russia's idea was to approach Japan with a proposal for the
neutralization of Korea. Russia asked Japan if she intended to settle
24the Korean issue by direct understanding with Russia.
Japan's reply was an emphatic refusal. She stated flatly that 
she would not negotiate the question of Korea until the pre-Boxer 
situation had been restored in Manchuria. 'Ihe Japanese drew a clear 
difference between the situation in 1898 and the present. At that 
time, Russia had just received the rights she had demanded in the 
Kuantung region of Manchuria. Having been granted by lease, these
22Yarmolinsky, The Memoirs of Count Witte, p. 116; Romanov;
Russia in Manchuria, pp. 267-278.
23Yarmolinsky, The Memoirs of Count Witte, p. 117.
24Romanov, Russia in Manchuria, p. 375.
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rights were necessarily temporary in nature. The present situation, 
however, involved an occupation which had the appearance of permanence. 
Therefore, the Japanese government intended to postpone negotiations 
on the Korean question until Russian Military occupation of Manchuria 
had ended. Meanwhile, the Nishi-Rosen agreement of 1898, which had 
recognized Russia's lease rights in Kuantung and the predominant 
economic interests of Japan in Korea, was assumed by Japan to con­
stitute an adequate safeguard for both nations.
The Japanese reply might have been interpreted as a virtual ultima­
tum. It stated frankly and unequivocally her general views and laid 
down specific guidelines for future policy which she followed closely 
during the coming years: Japan would not tolerate Russia's continued 
occupation of Manchuria; the questions of Manchuria and Korea were 
inseparably associated in her view; the recognition of Japan's predom­
inant interests in Korea would be a precondition to any further considera­
tion of the Korean problem; Japan's interests in Korea had in her view 
already received Russian approval in the agreement of 1893; and, by 
implication at least, Japan was determined upon a limitation of the 
Russian interests in Manchuria.
Japan continued her search for diplomatic if not military support 
for dislodging the Russian armies from Manchuria. The concerted protests 
which she had inspired from Great Britain, Germany, and the United States 
had served their purpose. In early March, 1901, she took the next step 
by announcing her determination to go to war with Russia if she could
25be assured that Prance could be restrained from joining in the conflict.
25Lansdowne to Lascellers, March 8, 1901, "Communications to Baron 
Hayashi", Great Britain Foreign Office. British Documents on the Origin 
of the War, 1898-1914, (Vols. 2. London, 1927-1938), II, p. 41-42. 
Hereafter cited as Brit. Doc.
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Japan'S most effective diplomatic support, in view of the intended 
showdown with Russia, came from the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. The nego­
tiations for this alliance were begun in April, 1901, when the Japanese 
Minister in London, Baron Hayashi, made some cautiously worded proposals 
suggestions to Lord Lansdowne, the British Foreign Minister. N o t  
until June, 1901, vdien the Ito cabinet was replaced by one headed by 
Katsura and, more particularly, after September, when Komura had assumed 
his post as foreign minister, was the coast clear to discuss an alliance 
with a real prospect of success. By mid-October, Japan had made definite 
ahd iserious proposals which formed the basis for discussing the actual 
terms for an alliance.
Parallel with the early evolution of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance,
consideration continued to be given to following the pattern of the
Nishi-Rosen agreement by seeking a direct understanding with Russia.
Russia encouraged this by continuing to urge a settlement which would
include the neutralization of Korea. This proposal was made in January,
271901, and it found Ito receptive. This time the proposal was said to 
have come from Witte, the Russian Minister of Finance.
On November 25, 1901, the tempo of negotiations was stepped up 
with the visit of the Japanese statesman, Ito to St. Petersburg. He 
favored a direct agreement with Russia on the Korean problem. While
^^Landowne to MacDonald, April 17, 1901, Brit. Doc., II, p. 89.
27Izvolsky to Lamsdorff, Jan. 17, 1901, Krasni Archiv, as trans­
lated in the Chinese Social and Political Science Review: "On the Eve 
of the Russo-Japanese War (December, 1900-January, 1902)," pp. 125-139.
28Romanov, Russia in Manchuria, p. 376.
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in the Russian capital, he presented a series of proposals to the
29Russian Foreign Minister, Lamsdorff» In November, 1901, Lamsdorff
forwarded these to Nicholas II with his own parallel list, as a possible
basis for agreement with Japan.
Both Ito and Lamsdorff agreed on the first proposal : "Mutual
guarantee of the independence of Korea". For the second, Ito suggested:
"Mutual obligation not to make use of any part of Korean territory for
strategic purposes." Lamsdorff wanted: "Mutual obligation (or Japan
promises) not to use any part of Korean territory for strategic purposes."
On Ito's third proposal, "Mutual obligation not to resort to any military
operations on the Korean coast such as might endanger a free passage
through the Gulf of Korea." The Russian Minister concurred in principle
suggesting only that it might be changed to read, "Japan promises".
Ito's fourth proposal read as follows:
Recognition by Russia of Japan's freedom of action in 
Korea in political, industrial, and commercial respects as 
well as exclusive right of Japan to come to Korea's assis­
tance with advice and action directed to helping her fulfill the 
obligation incurred by every well ordered government,including 
military assistance in so far as necessary for suppressing 
riots and every kind of disorder ^jkely to endanger the peaceful 
relation between Japan and Korea.
Lamsdorff would not consent to Japan's freedom of political action, 
but wanted Japan to obtain Russian agreement before advising Korea. Ito 
also inserted two additional proposals :
29Hamada, Prince Ito, pp. 145-148.
Malozemoff, Russian Far Eastern Policy, 1881-1904, with 
Special Emphasis on the Causes of the Russo-Japanese War (Berkeley:
ITS J
31,
University of California Press, 1958), p- 172
Langer, The Diplomacy of Imperialism, pp. 755-769,
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In the case provided in the preceding article, Japan 
promises to send to Korea only the number of troops absolutely 
necessary and to recall her troops as soon as their purposes 
have been fulfilled. It is agreed, at the same time, that 
Japanese troops shall never cross the boundary, to be defined 
exactly of a district, in the future and situated along and 
close to the Russian border, and promises in nggWay to hinder 
Russia's liberty of action in these distridts.
Ito and Lamsdorff agreed that this agreement, if reached, would
replace all previous ones.
On December 2, 1901, Ito had a frank discussion with Witte. Witte
admitted that it was Japan, not Russia, that had vital interests in
Korea, but that Russia had to protect her Far Eastern railways. Ito
repeated the agreements he had given Lamsdorff, and promised to guarantee
Korean independence, and that no coastal ports would be built to menace
Russia. Witte gave his approval of any agreement reached on that basis.
But Lamsdorff proposed that if Japanese troops were to be allowed in
Korea, the northern part of the country should be in any case remained
unoccupied by them.
Neither government was willing to concede enough. On December 23rd,
Ito gave a "farewell to Russia" speech stating: "I must confess that
with your draft as the basis for negotiation, there do not appear to
be any hope for concluding agreements which will have a real and lasting 
33effect." Ito had to contend with the hostility of a large group in 
the Japanese government vdiich had no desire to reach accord with Russia. 
It was' this group, which included Yamagata and Katsura, maintained 
that agreement with Russia would at best be a temporary expedient. It 
was convinced that Japan would eventually have to come to grips with
a i ^ ,  p. 769.
33Hamada, Prince Ito, p. 159.
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Russia and that, to prepare for this struggle, Japan should seek an 
alliance with Great Britain. On January 30, 1902, the Japanese gov­
ernment signed the Anglo-Japanese alliance with the advice of the 
privy council headed by Ito.'’̂
This event marked a turning point of Russian policy. To counter­
balance the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, Russia and France, extended their 
old alliance to include the Far East, with the avowed intention of
assuring the status quo, and thereby maintaining the peace and indepen-
35dence of China and Korea.
It is clear that throughout Ito's negotiations with Russia, Japan 
neglected most arbitrarily Korea's right to self-government. Consequently, 
libs moves in Russia were the studied tactics of scheming imperialists.
In this matter both Russia and Japan were playing political football at 
the expense of K o re a. W he n Japan ignored Russia's desire for harmon­
ious relations with her over Korea and concluded an alliance with England 
instead, Russia favored the neutralization of Korea. Alfred E. Buck, 
American Minister in Tokyo, in his dispatch, dated August 15th, 1902, 
stated :
. . .  in recent conversation wiLh Mu. Iswolsky, the Russian 
minister here, it seems to be probable that his Government 
will make a movement in the direction securing the cooperation 
of several powers in guaranteeing the inviolability of the
34Brit. Doc., II, 114-120.
35Korea: Treaties and Agreements, pp. 34-35. The Korean Emperor, 
at first, viewing the Anglo-Japanese and Russian-French understandings 
with misgivings, instituted a reform movement to allay the threat which 
these agreements portended for this country. However, he later came 
to view them as, in effect, neutralizing Korea and therefore making 
her position sure.
^^Lee, Hankuk Donqrip Undong Sa, p. 243,
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37Korean government.
Isowolsky hoped that the United States, Russia, and Japan would 
cooperate in the move toward Korean neutralization and then have the 
support of Great Britain, France and Germany also. But Japan, her 
purpose in Korea being to secure a supremacy in Korea, refused Russia's 
movement for a joint guarantee of Korea's territorial inviolability.
It is significant that Japan advocated for Korea's independence and 
territorial integrity, but she, was the first to refuse the Korean 
independence.
37Quoted in Treat, Diplomatic Relations between United States
and Japan, 1895-1905, pp. 164-165.
The Final Negotiation
On August 28, 1896, the Emperor of Korea signed an agreement with
a Russian merchant of Vladivostok for the exploitation of the forests
along the Yalu and Tuman Rivers.This concession, which at first
seemed to be merely a commercial transaction, was, in fact, to become
not only a powerful tool in the hands of Russian expansionists, but
39also a cause of much contention among the Russian court faction.
This appeared to'be a solid commercial transaction, and one in 
which the Emperor would get substantial returns for his grant. But 
there was a certain absurdity in the fact that Russia (with two million 
square miles of Siberian forests) requested more from the Korean govern­
ment. This was obvious to Japan and reinforced her feelings that Russia
was preparing some sort of aggression against Japanese interests in 
40Korea.
In November, 1897, Brinor, a merchant of Vladivostok vAio had 
secured Yalu timber concessions from the Korean Emperor, came to St. 
Petersburg seeking to see the concessions. He aroused the interests 
of Volia Liarski and Bezobrazov. In 1898, these two men approached the 
Grand Duke, Alexander Mikailovich, with the idea of persuading the Tsar
This concession was granted by the Korean King during the time 
he was taking refuge at the Russian Legation. The concession was granted 
to Brinor for a period of 5 years. He was authorized to solicit capital 
for the enterprise and to form a Korean timber company with headquarters 
at Vladivostok and branches at Seoul.




to obtain it as his personal property. As an added inducement, they 
tried to have a railroad run through the concession area. Though this 
failed, the Tsar agreed to investigate the territory. As a temporary 
measure, the Bureau of Emperor's Dominions bought the concession from 
Brinor and financed the investigation."^^
Experienced investigators dispatched by the Court to Korea, 
spared no superlatives in describing the benefits to be derived by 
Russia from that concession. According to their testimony, the exis­
tence of rich gold mines was suspected in and around the Yalu district.
The Grand Duke, Alexander, head of the Yalu concession committee,
thought the situation looked promising if carefully and tactfully 
42handled. But the plans of his associate did not call for any such 
caution. The cabinet transferred the concession in a fictitious sale 
to Maticemin on the condition that it be transferable to a third person 
or company at any time under instructions from a minister of the Imperial 
cabinet.
As the five year limit for beginning work on the Yalu expired,
Russia notified Korea on April 13, 1901, that she would exercise her 
option to extend the lease for twenty years. The Russian government 
chose to interpret the original agreementto include all streams 
draining into the Yalu, thus giving Russia control of a vast area. At 
about the same time, certain Russian diplomats attempted to extend the
41Valadroir Guroko, Features and Figures of the Past : Government 
and Opinion in Reign of Nicholas II (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 1939), p. 250.
42Alexander, Grand Duke of Russia, Once a Grand Duke. (New York: 
Farrar and Rinehart Co., 1932), p. 206.
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Trans-Siberian Railway to the Korean border with a view to annexing 
Korean territory. This enraged the Grand Duke, Alexander, vdio resigned 
as head of the Yalu Committee, predicting that war would result from 
such schemes, and declaring that he wanted no responsibility for it.
On April 23, 1901, the East Asiatic Company's statute was confirmed
by the Committee; but this was a hollow gesture as shortly thereafter 
the company was dissolved for lack of capital.
Following the Russo-Chinese Treaty of April 1, 1902, Russia 
started to evacuate Manchuria, beginning at Mukden. But Admiral 
Alexeiev ordered this stopped.
The Yalu timber concession assumed more importance 
than ever and in order to support it and to seek other
understanding in North Korea, Admiral Alexeiev sent
mounted forces with guns to Feng-Huan-Cheng. At the 
same time, we allowed the operation in connection with 
the Korean timber concession to go on, despite the fact 
that this enterprise was striving to give it a political 
and militar^^status contrary to instructions from St.
Petersburg.
So long as Russia had held to her intention to withdraw her troops 
from Manchuria and to stay out of North Korea, there had been little 
danger of a break with Japan, but this move of Russia brought the 
powers "alarmingly near a rupture,"Alexiev sent 150 mounted rifle’s 
and a cossack regiment to Korea in order to support the Timber Company
Alexander, Once a Grand Duke, p. 207. The East Asiatic Company 
had a political charter, under the Tsar's supervision directed toward 
development of the Russian principles and perhaps toward implantation 
of the Russian ideas in Korea.
44Kuropatkin, General, The Russian Army and the Japanese War,
2 Vols., (London; John Murray, 1909), I. p. 170.
45Kuropatkin, General, The Russian Army and the Japanese War,
I, pp. 170-171.
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45against possible Japanese attack."
Furthermore, to assist the timber company, Pavlov had extended 
the Russian telegraph line from Possiet to Kiong-hung across the Tuman 
River. But on February 22, 1903, the Korean Foreign Minister, Park, 
ordered it removed. In the meanwhile, it was discovered that St. 
Petersburg had nothing to do with the building of the line which had 
recently been removed. In reprisal, Pavlov succeeded in securing the 
dismissal of Park from his post, but his demands for the right to 
reconstruct the line met with no success until April, 1904, when the 
line was extended from Wigu on the Yalu to Port Arthur and Harbin.
On March 26, 1903, a conference was held to discuss the advisability 
of transforming the Yalu concession into a strictly commercial stock­
holders ' company. Witte mentioned the potential international complica­
tions, but no one took a strong stand against this policy of transfer­
ence to a commercial company. The new organization was called the
Russian Timber Company of the Far East, and had a cabinet subsidy of 
47250,000 rubles.
In April, 1903, the Russian government informed the Korean govern­
ment that "Baron Junburg would henceforth represent the interests of
the timber syndicate in Seoul which would now commence its work upon 
48the Yalu." The original contract for the Yalu concession had nowhere 
mentioned the use of Yongampo, a point near the mouth of the Yalu.
A6Rosen, Forty Years of Diplomacy, pp. 213-214.
47Gurko, Government and Opinion in the Reign of Nicholas II,
p. 279.
48Asakawa, Russo-Japanese Conflict, p. 291.
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The agreement signed on July 20, 1903, between Cho Sung-hyup for the
Korean government and Bojisco for the company, coming rather ex post
facto, raised strong protest within the Korean government.
Construction work was begun in May, 1903. Additional structures
were added over .the summer, and at the same time, Russian troops were
moved up close to the frontier on the Manchurian side of the river.
Pavlov was accused by the Korean government of building a fort at
Yongampo. He at first denied it, then had all traces of the fortifica- 
49tion obliterated.
In the second week of June, four Russian war vessels under Admiral 
Stark made a visit to Chemulpo, obviously to support Pavlov. On the 
11th, the Korean council of state decided that the Charge d'Affairs' 
conduct was contrary to Russian treaties, and the situation began 
to look ominous. Seeking a solution to the problem, Japan opened 
direct negotiations with St. Petersburg with regard to the relative 
position of the two powers in Korea.
In July, Pavlov further irritated the Korean government by setting 
up illegal telegraph lines between Wiju, Yongampo, and Antung in Man­
churia. The Korean government tore down the wires; whereupon the 
Russians attempted to lay submarine cables. These were also removed 
by the Koreans.As negotiations on the lease continued, not only 
Japan, but both England and the United States protested strongly to
49Romanov, Russia in Manchuria, pp. 267-278. 
^^Lee, Hankuk Tongrip Undong Sa, p. 246. 
^“Lee, Hankuk Tongrip Undong 3a, p. 246.
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Korea, requesting that Yongampo be opened to foreign trade. The court 
and the government disagreed sharply on this issue. The former was 
under Russian domination, but the latter was attempting to mitigate 
the terms of an earlier agreement.
On August 27, 1903, Pavlov remained at the foreign office from one
to six o'clock in the evening, but the Korean Foreign liinister evaded
52a meeting and resigned. The Russian aroused no good will by remaining 
at Yongampo. In September the Russians further fortified the port, 
and erected a new telegraph line between Wiju, Yongampo, and Antung. 
Conditions worsened until October 23, when 500 Russian troops and two
officers crossed the Tuman River into Korea, and a Japanese warship
53anchored near Yongampo.
Friction in the Yalu region had strained Russo-Japanese relations 
to the breaking point. Following the events of October, Japanese mer­
chants and bankers in Seoul began calling in their money and refusing 
to make loans. Japan therefore sought to settle the tension in Korea 
through a direct negotiation with Russia. On June 23, 1903, the four 
principals of the Japanese cabinet and five privy councilors met before 
the Throne, and decided on the principles upon which negotiations with
^^Ibid, pp. 246-247,
53J. A. (Korea), XXXVI, No. 401, pp. 452-458, Russia interpreted 
the Yalu Concession to embrace all streams draining into the Yalu 
River, thus giving her control of a vast area in Northern Korea. She 
therefore selected the favorable port of Yongampo, near the mouth of 
the Yalu River, as a shipping outlet for the timber it contained, 
although Yongampo was far removed from the actual forest area involved.
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54Russia should be opened. Having thus formulated the policy to be 
pursued. Baron Komura, Japanese Foreign Minister, telegraphed the 
Japanese Minister at St. Petersburg, on July 28, as follows:
The unconditioned and permanent occupation of 
Manchuria by Russia would create a state of things 
prejudicial to the security and interest of Japan. The 
principle of equal opportunity would thereby be annulled, 
and the territorial integrity of China impaired. There 
is, however, a still more serious consideration for the 
Japanese government. That is to say, if Russia was 
established on the flank of Korea, it would be a con­
stant menace to the separate existence of that Empire, 
or at least would make Russia the dominant power in 
Korea. Korea is an important outpost in Japan's line 
of defence, and Japan considers her independence essential 
to her own response and safety. Moreover, the political, 
as well as commercial and industrial interests and influ­
ence Japan possesses in Korea are paramount over those of 
other powers. These interests and influences Japan, 
regarding her own security, cannot consent to surrender 
to, or share with, another power.
The Imperial government, after the most serious 
consideration, has resolved to consult the Russian 
government, in a spirit of conciliation and frankness, 
with a view to the conclusion of an understanding designed 
to compare questions which, at this time, are the cause 
of their anxiety. In the estimation of the Imperial 
government, the moment is opportune for making the 
attempt to bring about the desired adjustment, and it 
is believed that failure of this opportunity^^would 
result in no room for another understanding.
To this request made by Japan, Lamsdorff, on behalf of Russia,
55agreed to the negotiations which was exactly what Russia had desired.
"Decision of the Imperial Conference", June 23, 1903, Gaimusho 
(Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan), Nihon Gaiko Monjo ("Japanese 
Diplomatic Documents"). (Vol. XXXVI-I, Tokyo, 1956-1950), pp. 1-4. 
Hereafter cited as Nihon Gaiko Monjo. This conference was attended 
by the following elder statesmen and cabinet ministers; Ito Hirobumi, 
Yamagata Aritomo, Inoue Kaoru, Prime Minister Katsura Taro, War 
Minister Terauchi Masatake, and Foreign Minister Komura Jutaro.
55Komura to Kurino, July 28, Nihon Gaiko Monjo, XXXVI-I, pp. 8-13.
56 ■'Malozemoff, Russian Far Eastern Policy, 1881-1904, p. 238.
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On August 12, Kurino submitted the first Japanese proposals as follows;
I. A mutual agreement to respect the independence 
and territorial integrity of the Chinese and Korean 
Empires, and to maintain the principle of equal opportun­
ity for the commerce and industry of all nations in those 
countries.
II. A reciprocal recognition of Japan's preponderating 
interests in Korea and Russia's special interests in the 
railway enterprise in Manchuria, and or the right of Japan 
to take in Korea, and of Russia to take in Manchuria, such 
measures as may be necessary for the protection of their 
respective interests as defined; subject, however, to the 
provisions of Article I of this agreement.
III. A reciprocal understanding on the part of Russia 
and Japan not to impede the development of those industrial 
and commercial activities, respectively, of Japan in Korea 
and of Russia in Manchuria, which are not inconsistent with 
the stipulations of Article I of this agreement.
IV. A reciprocal agreement that, in case it should 
be- found necessary to send troops by Japan to Korea, or 
Russia to Manchuria, for the purpose, either of protecting 
the interests mentioned in Article II of this agreement, 
or of suppressing insurrection or disorder liable to 
create international complications, the troops so sent 
are in no case to exceed the actual number required, and
are to be forthwith recalled as soon as their missions
are accomplished.
V. The recognition on the part of Russia of the 
exclusive right of Japan to give advice and assistance 
in the interest of reform and good government in Korea, 
including necessary military assistance.
VI. This Agreement to supersede all previous 
agreements between Japan and Russia respecting Korea.
The same dispatch told Lamsdorff that the plan stated above was
"presented for the consideration of the Russian government in the firm
belief that it may be found adequate to serve as a basis upon which to
construct a satisfactory arrangement between two governments" and
5 7Asakawa, Russo-Japanese Conflict, p. 304; J. A. (Korea). XXVII, 
No. 10, pp. 7-12.
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assured him that "any amendment or suggestion he may find it necessary 
to offer will receive the immediate and friendly consideration of the 
Japanese government." The project was called "little more than a 
logical extension and amplification of the principles already rec­
ognized by, or of conditions embodied in the previous engagements 
concluded between the two governments."^^
At first it appeared that Lamsdorff saw no difficulty except that 
of the Japanese railway to Manchuria. But Japan's control of Korea 
was distasteful to Russian Far Eastern policy, and soon new obstacles 
began to arise. On August 23, 1903, Lamsdorff suggested that the 
negotiations should be conducted in Tokyo. There followed some dip­
lomatic exchanges between the two governments. Lamsdorff wanted the 
negotiations held in Tokyo instead of St. Petersburg in order to take 
advantage of Alexeiev's knowledge of local conditions. Komura objected 
on the ground that the negotiations were on the matter of principles, 
not local details, but Russia stood firm, and the Japanese were compelled 
to acquiesce.
In September, 1903, Alexiev telegraphed the Tsar that Japan inten­
ded to land troops either at Chemulpo or at the mouth of the yalu; and
if they did, he would attack the Japanese fleet. The Tsar replied that
59he did not want war against Japan,
On October 3, the Russian counter-note was received in Tokyo.
The Russians demanded recognition by Japan of Manchuria as her littoral
58Asakawa, Russo-Japanese Conflict, p. 304.
59Gurko, Government and Opinion in the Reign of Nicholas II,
p. 307.
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"as in all respects outsider her (Japan's) sphere of interests" and 
excluded that territory from all other discussion in the agreement.
In regard to Korea, the Russians ignored completely the open door clause 
of the Japanese suggestions; insisted on previous knowledge if Japan 
were to send troops to Korea; forbade the use of Korean territory by 
Japan for strategic purposes, particularly that part of the Korean 
coast which would menace the Straits of Korea; called for "mutual 
engagement to consider that part of Korea lying to the north of the 
thirty-ninth parallel as a neutral zone into which neither of the 
contracting parties shall introduce troops.
On the basis of Japanese and Russian proposals, Komura and Rosen 
negotiated and haggled, until, on October 30, 1903, Japan presented 
her irreducible minimum: Japan's rights in Korea which had been agreed 
upon were included, and her railway connection to Manchuria. Russia 
was granted free passage in the Korean straits, which Japan would not 
threaten. A neutral zone was suggested which would extend fifty kilo­
meters on either side of the Korean-Manchurian frontier. Japan would 
recognize Manchuria as being outside her sphere of special influence 
for Russian recognition of Korea as being outside hers. Japan also 
agreed to recognize "Russia's special interests in Manchuria and of 
the right of Russia to take such measures as may be necessary for the 
protection of those interests." Also included was an agreement that 
neither power would interfere with "commercial and residential rights 
and immunities" previously acquired in each other's sphere of interests,
^^J. A. (Korea), XXXVII, No. 10, pp. 12-16; Rosen, Forty Years of 
Diplomacy, pp.222-228.
^^Asakawa, Russo-Japanese Conflict, pp. 324-326.
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This Japanese concession made certain steps in the direction of 
Russian ideas, but not enough. The Russian reply of December 11, con­
ceded connection of the railway and deleted the clause requiring her 
previous knowledge of Japanese troops being sent to Korea, but other­
wise remained firm on the earlier stand.
In the conference on December 15, 1903, with Grand Duke Alexiev
and Lamsdorff, the Tsar decided not to give up northern Korea.
Komura was very unhappy about the Russian reply of December 11 and
expressed his dissatisfaction in a note to Lamsdorff on December 23.
His major complaint related to the exclusion of Manchuria from the
agreement, but he also desired the deletion of the neutral zone 
63clause.
The Tsar and Lamsdorff continued to make pacifying statements to 
Japan, but the Russian reply, which arrived in Tokyo on January 6, 1904, 
made no major concessions. It insisted that there be no strategic use 
of any part of Korea and demanded the continuation of the neutral zone, 
saying that this would eliminate misunderstanding and would resemble 
the zone between Russian and British possessions in Central Asia. If 
these were agreed to, Russia would approve a clause wherein Japan would 
recognize Manchuria as outside her sphere of interests, and Russia 
would agree not to interfere with the rights of Japan and other powers 
as under previous treaties with China-exclusive of establishment of 
settlements. The Japanese would not agree, and in their answer said: 
"further delay . . .  will be extremely disadvantageous to the two
^^Gurko, Government and Opinion in the Reign of Nicholas II, 
pp. 284-285.
^^Asakawa, Russo-Japanese Conflict, pp. 330-331.
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countries." Later the same month, Japan accused Russia of sending 
troops to Korea.
The intent of Russia to violate accepted rights and interests was 
also stressed in notifying the United States. Komura instructed the 
Japanese minister in Washington, Takahira, to convey the message in 
these terms :
To Russia, whose development of commercial and indus­
trial enterprises of Japan in Korea by an international 
compact as far as back 1898, this state of affairs must 
be better known than to any other power, and it cannot 
be a matter of surprise to her that Japan finds it impos­
sible to acquiesce in an exceedingly abnormal and precar­
ious condition which would inevitably result from Russia's 
remaining indefinitely in the flank of Korea, which is 
an important outpost of Japan's line of defence, and from 
the neutralization of a considerable territory of Korea 
comprising about one-third of the whole peninsula . . .
Takahira was further instructed to emphasize the fact that Japan
was contending with a determined opponent of all except Russia's own
rights and interests in China and Korea. The measure of his success in
conveying a sense of Russia's unyielding determination is found in an
entry in John Hay's diary for January 5, 1904:
. . .  it is evident that no attempt at mediation will do 
any good. Russia is clearly determined to make no con­
cessions to Japan. They think that now is the time to 
strike, to crush Japan and to eliminatggher from her 
position of influence in the Far East.
The Japanese government now considered that the critical point had 
been reached. On February 3, the cabinet and privy councilors held a
64Ibid., pp. 337-339.
^^Foreiqn Relation, 1903, p. 621.
^^W. R. Thayer, The Life and Letters of John Hay, (2 Vols., 
Boston, 1919), II, p. 370.
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conference, and again on the next day in the presence of the Emperor. 
On February 5, Komura wired Kurino, instructing him to send a telegram 
to Lamsdorff breaking off relations between Japan and Russia. The 
communication was to say that:
The Imperial government of Japan, having exhausted 
without effect every means of conciliation with a view 
to the removal from their relations vàth the Imperial 
Russian government every cause for future complications, 
and finding that their just representation and moderate 
and unselfish proposals made in the interest of a firm 
and lasting peace in the Far Bast are not receiving due 
consideration, and that their diplomatic relations with 
the Russian government have, for these reasons, ceased 
to possess any value-the Imperial government of Jag^ 
have resolved to sever those diplomatic relations.
The first reason listed for the diplomatic rupture was :
The government of His Majesty the Emperor of 
Japan regards the independence and territorial integrity 
of Korea as essential to the repose and safety of their 
own country, and they are consequently unable to view 
with indifference any action tending to render the 
position of Korea insecure. The obstinate rejections 
by the Russian government, by means of amendments 
impossible of agreement, of Japan's proposals respecting 
Korea, the adoption of which the Imperial government 
regards as indispensable to assure the existence of the 
Korean Empire and to safeguard Japan's preponderating 
interests in the peninsula; and the obstinate refusals 
of Russia to enter into an engagement to respect China's 
territorial integrity in Manchuria, vdiich is seriously 
menaced by the continued occupation of the province, 
notwithstanding Russia's treaty engagements with China 
and her repeated assurances to other powers possessing 
interests in those regions-have made it necessary for 
the Imperial government seriously to consider what 
measures of self-defence they are called upon to take.
This wire crossed one from Lamsdorff to Rosen, acceding to Japan's
^^Komura to Kurino, Feb. 5, 1904, Nihon Gaiko Monjo, XXXVII-1, 
pp. 92-95, 97-101.
58Asakawa, Russo-Japanese Conflict, pp. 342-343.
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requests, and saying that Russia would make every possible concession
in Korea, but would not want to see that country used for a strategic
69purpose against her. But, by then, it was too late. The Japanese
notes reached Lamsdorff at 4:00 P.M. on-February 6. On February 8, the
first naval engagement in Korean territory took place outside Chemulpo
harbor. This initial attack was followed by a naval engagement at Port
70Arthur on the night of February 9.
The Russian declaration of war, issued on February 10, 1904, made 
no mention of the Manchurian issue, but stayed in strict conformity 
to the Russian proposals. It read as follows:
We proclaim to all our faithful subjects that 
in our solicitude for the preservation of peace so dear 
to our hearts, we have put forth every effort to assure 
tranquility in the Far East. To these pacific ends, 
we declared our assent to the revision, proposed by 
the Japanese government, of the agreement existing 
between the two Empires concerning Korean affairs.
The negotiation initiated on this subject was, 
however, not brought to a conclusion, and Japan, not 
even waiting the arrival of our last reply and pro­
posals of our government, informed us of the rupture 
of the neogtiations and of diplomatic relations with 
Russia.
Without previously notifying us that the rupture 
of such relations implied the beginning of warlike 
action, the Japanese government ordered its torpedo boats 
to make a sudden attack on our squadron in the outer 
roadstead of the fortress of Port Arthur. After receiving 
the report of our Viceroy on the subject, we at once 
commanded Japan's challenge to be replied by arms.
While proclaiming this our resolve, we, in unshakable 
confidence in the help of Almighty, and firmly trusting 
in the unanimous readiness of our faithful subjects to
69Gurko, Government and Opinion in the Reign of Nicholas xx,
p. 285.
70Asakawa, Russo-Japanese Conflict, pp. 344-345.
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defend the Fatherland, invoke God's b^gssing of our 
glorious forces of the Army and Navy.
The Japanese declaration of the same date, reiterated that country's 
view of the negotiations and placed blame for their breakdown on Russia. 
The sections dealing with the Korean question stated:
The integrity of Korea is a matter of constant 
concern to this Empire, not only because of our 
traditional relations with this country, but because 
the separate existence of Korea is essential to the 
safety of our realm. Nevertheless, Russia, in disregard 
of her solemn treaty, pledges to China and her separate 
assurances to other powers, is still in occupation 
of Manchuria and has consolidated and strengthened her 
hold upon those provinces and is bent upon their final 
annexation. And since the absorption of Manchuria by 
Russia would render it impossible to maintain the 
integrity of Korea and would, in addition, compel the 
abandonment of all hope for peace in the Extreme East, 
we determined in those circumstances to settle the 
questions by negotiations and to secure thereby 
permanent peace.
With that object in view, by our order, made 
proposals to Russia, and frequent conferences were 
held during the course of six months. Russia, however, 
never met such proposal in a spirit of conciliation, 
but by her wanton delay, put ;off the settlement of the 
question, and by ostensibly advocating peace on one 
hand while she was on the other advancing her naval 
and military preparation, sought to accomplish her ovTn 
selfish designs.
We cannot admit that Russia had any serious or 
genuine desire for peace. She has rejected the proposals 
of our government, the safety of Korea is in danger; 
the vital interests of our Empire are menaced. The 
guarantees for the future which we have failed to 
secure by peaceful negotiation, we can now only seek 
by an appeal to arms.
71Asakawa. Russo-Jaoanese Conflict, on. 345-347.
72Korea; Treaties and Agreement, pp. 52-53.
CHAPTER V 
DEMISE OF THE KOREAN KINGDOM 
Korean Neutrality and Japanese Violation
By the time of the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese war, Korea was 
definitely under Japanese economic influence. Japan practically 
monopolized the steam tonnage in Korean ports, increased her trade with 
Korea, encouraged Japanese emigrants, controlled the railways and 
prevented Russia from leasing Masanpo and Chin-hai Bay. Even in the 
Yalu timber concession, the Japanese were already there. The attitude 
of the Koreans during this period of the Russo-Japanese struggle was, 
as a whole, rational and consistent. What the Korean government wanted 
first of all was to be freed from both Russia and Japan. However, she 
found herself as "a shrimp between two whales."
What was the nature of the policy with which the Korean Emperor 
and his court attempted to devise to meet the exceedingly critical 
situation into which the country was being forced by the conflict going 
on between Russia and Japan? They declared a policy of strict neutrality 
toward the approaching Russo-Japanese conflict on January 23, 1904.^
But the Japanese without Korea's consent established military stations 
every fifteen miles along the route between Seoul and Pusan. On January 
24th, General Ijichi came to Seoul as military attache of the Japanese
The Korean Review, IV (1904), pp. 70-72; Korea, because of her 
lack of power, was unable to enforce this neutrality and later suc­
cumbed to Japanese pressure for support in the war with Russia. See 
also Lee, Hankuk Dongrip Undong Sa, p. 289.
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Legation in Seoul, and asked the Korean government to clarify its stand
toward Russia and Japan. On January 26th, the Korean Foreign Minister
Yi Chi-yong, informed the Japanese Legation of her strict neutrality
toward Japan, demanding the speedy withdrawal of Japanese military
2stations.
The Japanese violated the neutrality of the Korean government by
bringing military supplies to Korea on January 28th. On February 8th
the Japanese informed the people of Seoul through posted notices that
what Japan was about to do was dictated by motives of right and justice
and that the property and personal rights of Koreans would be respected.
At 4:00 P.M. the same day Japanese ships entered Inchon. This was
immediately followed by the landing of her troops on Korean soil.
Japan had never recognized the neutrality of Korea.^ On February 8,
1904, Lloyd C. Griscom, American I4inister in Tokyo, reported:
. . .  a few regiments have already been sent to Korea, 
enough to take possession of Seoul. There is no concealment 
made of the intention to make Korea into a Japanese Province.
. . .  Already strict secrecy is maintained, and the law
prohibiting the publication of news bearing on such matterg
(military and naval activities) is being rigidly enforced.
Soon after the declaration of war, a large number of Japanese troops
surrounded the palace. The Japanese Minister Hayashi Gonsuke proposed
2The Korean Review, IV (1904), pp. 83-85; Mun, Kun-se Il-bon Cho- 
son Chimtu Sa, p. 542; See also, Lee, Hankuk Sa, p. 905.
3Because of this action and the declared neutrality of Korea, a 
great controversy arose over the legality of Japan's action according 
to international law.
4Quoted in Treat, Diplomatic Relations between the United States
and Japan, 1895-1905, p. 196.
-134-
to the Korean government the conclusion of a treaty of alliance with 
Japan. Yi Chi-yong, Korean Foreign Minister, and Ku Wan-hi, his 
counsellor, were intimidated, but the Cabinet resisted the pressure for 
one week. Finally, they were induced to sign a protocol with Japan on 
February 23, 1904,^ by the terms of which Korea practically allied 
herself with Japan. The protocol consisted of six articles, which 
stated in part:
Article I. . . . the Imperial Government of Korea 
shall place full confidence in the Imperial Government 
of Japan, and adopt the advice of the latter in regard 
to improvements in administration.
Article II. ' The Imperial Government of Japan shall 
in a spirit of firm friendship ensure the safety and 
repose of the Imperial House of Korea.
Article III. The Imperial Government of Japan 
definitely guarantee the independence and territorial 
integrity of the Korean Empire.
Article IV. In case the welfare of the Imperial 
House of Korea or the territorial integrity of Korea 
is endangered by aggression of a third power of inter­
nal disturbances . . . Japan shall immediately take such 
necessary measures as circumstances require, and . . .  
occupy . . .  sugh places as may be necessary from strategic 
points of view.
On March 7, 1904, Marquis Ito Hirobumi, then President of the 
Japanese Privy Council paid a visit to Korea and, as a result, the 
Japanese Government in May, 1904 reached the following decisions:
Park, Hankuk Tonq-sa, pp. 155-156. When the protocol was signed, 
Yi Yun-in, vice-president of the Korean Privy Council, and several 
other high officials resigned in protest. Finance Minister Yi Young- 
ik, the chief opponent of the protocol, was abducted to the Japanese 
Legation on the day of signature. A Korean mob threw bombs into the 
houses of Yi Chi-yong and Ku Wan-hi to express their opposition to 
the Korean Japanese Alliance.
^Korea: Treaties and Agreements, pp. 36-37. This treaty was
signed between Korean Acting Foreign Minister, Yi Chi-yong and 
Japanese Minister, Hayashi.
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"(1) Korea should be made a Japanese protectorate at the proper time;
(2) until the arrival of such an opportunity, Japan should strive to
obtain practical results in giving political, diplomatic, and military
protection and in developing Japan's interests in Korea. Both (the
Prime Minister) Count Katsura (1847-1913) and (the Minister of Foreign
Affairs) Baron Komura (1855-1911) feared the objection of the powers
should Japan announce these decisions at once, especially in the face
of the declared purpose of war against Russia, and so adopted a plan
7of a more gradual procedure."
On June 17th, the Japanese requested the Korean government to open
all uncultivated land and other natural resources to the Japanese.^ But
the proposal raised such a storm of protest from Korea that the Japanese
9dropped the matter. The Koreans, meanwhile, organized Po An Hoi 
("Society for the Promotion of Peace and Safety") whose obj ective was 
to defeat the Japanese purpose in Korea. The opposition of this society 
was so effective that the Japanese determined that it should be crushed. 
The Japanese police, on July 16th, broke up its meeting and arrested 
the leaders. Other Japanese raids were made upon the society and more 
of its members were arrested and its papers confiscated. The Japanese 
then warned the government that these attempts to stir up a riot must 
be put down with a stern hand and demanded those responsible for the
7Agaki, Japan's Foreign Relations, pp. 266-267.
®Seoul National University, Kuk-sa Kaisul, p. 663.
9Lee, Han-kuk Sa, pp. 906-967. See also Seoul National University, 
Kuk-sa Kaisul, pp. 663-665. It had among its membership some of the 
leading Korean officials. It held meetings at the Cotton Guild Center 
of Seoul and a good deal of excited discussion took place as to ways 
and means for defeating the aggression of Japan.
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anti-Japanese memorials be arrested and punished. If the Korean gov­
ernment failed to comply with this request, the Japanese threatened 
to take the law into their own hands.
The agitation was not confined to Seoul, for leading Koreans sent 
out circular letters to all the country districts urging the people 
to come to Seoul to .participate in a potent demonstration which should 
convince the Japanese of Korean determination to remain an independent 
nation. Many of these letters werw suppressed by the Japanese police 
but in spite of this, the news spread far and wide and the society 
enrolled thousands of members in every province.
By the summer of 1904, Japanese influence in Korea was such that 
Walter C. Hillier in June of that year was quoted as saying: "Korean 
independence is promised to the world but it stands to reason that it 
will be an independence strictly under the control of Japan, who has 
Egypt before her as a model.
The Japanese began to formulate a definite policy paving the way, 
gradually but safely for her ultimate goal to absorb Korea. The first 
move toward this goal was the Korean-Japanese agreement of August 
22nd, 1904, which provided:
Article I. The Korean Government shall engage as 
financial adviser to the Korean Government a Japanese 
subject recommended by the Japanese Government, and all 
matters concerning finance shall be dealt with after his 
counsel has been taken.
Article II. The Korean Government shall engage as 
a diplomatic adviser to the Department of Foreign Affairs 
a foreigner recommended by the Japanese Government, and
■̂̂ Walter C. Hillier, "Korea: Its History and Prospects," Fort­
nightly Review, June, 1904, quoted in Dennet, Roosevelt and, the 
Russo-Japanese War, p. 117.
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all important matters concerning foreign relations 
shall be dealt with after his counsel has been taken.
Article III, The Korean Government shall consult 
the Japanese Government previous to concluding Treaties 
or Conventions with foreign powers and in dealing with 
important diplomatic affairs such as granting of con­
cessions to or contracts with foreigners.H
By this agreement Japan was permitted to control Korea's finan­
cial and diplomatic affairs including the control over granting of 
concession to foreigners. As a result of this agreement Megata
Tai-ietaro, a Japanese, was given control over Korean finances and D. W.
_ 12 Stevens, an American in the service of the Japanese foreign Office,
v/as appointed as an adviser to the Korean Foreign Office. The Japanese 
advisers were also appointed to the police and education departments 
of the Korean government. The other foreign advisers to the Korean 
government were gradually eliminated. Step by step, the administra­
tion was Japanized. The hand of Japanese control in Korea became
13heavier and heavier.
By the end of 1904, Japan had secured "exclusive interests'" in 
Korea. Her influence was preponderant in Korea and paramount in the 
palace. She controlled the railway from Pusan to Wiju, and had
Korea: Treaties and Agreements, p. 37. Treaty between Japan
and Korea signed by Japanese Minister Hayashi and Yun Chi-ho, Acting 
Foreign Minister of Korea.
12Assassinated in San Francisco by a Korean, Chang In-whan, March 
23, 1908.
13The Korean Review, IV, (1904), pp. 306-312. The Japanese 
military authorities in Korea decreed that Japanese time should be 
used for all public work, and they changed the names of the towns 
from Korean to Japanese. Numerous Japanese gendarmes were brought 
in and established themselves everwhere, They assumed control of 
all political activities. Anyone \dio protested against Japanese 
action was arrested and imprisoned.
-138-
established her own police force, post office, telephone, cable and
wireless telegraph system. And to quote Hamilton;
Their interpretation of the laws of their own country, 
is corrupt. Might is right; the sense of power is 
tempered neither by reason, justice nor generosity . . .  
Transformation has taken place with transmigration . .
The Japanese became so aggressive in their treatment of 
the people that, had the choice of two evils been pos­
sible in view of these^gvents, the Koreans would have 
preferred the Chinese.
There was no attempt at concealment of the Japanese scheme to 
annex Korea and the news of Russian losses, soon indicated that Japan 
had come to stay. Only a diplomatic combination could force her to with­
draw and prevent eventual absorbtion of Korea. Clutching at straws, the 
Emperor of Korea bid for that combination. He appealed to all powers 
counting most on the United States on the ground of the Korean-American 
treaty of 1882.^^ But President Roosevelt ignored the plea stating 
that American interests in Korea were economic rather than political. 
During 1905, The United States recognized Japan's interests in Korea, 
in return for Japan's promise to stay out of the Philippines. Japan's 
ally. Great Britain, also approved Japan's intervention in Korea.
Having driven the Russians out of Korea and having brought the 
entire peninsula under its military control, the Japanese on April 1st, 
1905, imposed another agreement on Korea, by which the control of postal, 
telegraph and telephone services of Korea v/as transferred to Japan. The 
preamble to the agreement said that the transfer was made because it
"̂̂ Augus, Hamilton, Korea, (New York: Charles Scribners Sons, 1904), 
pp. 152-157.
^^Korean-American Treaty of 1882 provided for "perpetual peace 
and friendship" and stated that, "If other powers deal unjustly or 
oppressively with either Government, the other will exert their good 
offices on being informed of the case, to bring about an amicable 
arrangement, thus showing their friendly feelings."
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was found "expedient from the standpoint of the administration and 
financing of Korea to rearrange the system of communication (in Korea), 
and, by amalgamating it with that of Japan, to unite the two systems 
into one common to both countries.
Thus, the Japanese by April, 1905, controlled Korean military, 
political and economic affairs, and in June the Shimpoto (the Progres­
sive Party), led by Count Okuma, was able to demand for one of the 
peace terms :
. . .  Korea is already under our protection and our actual 
power in Manchuria is recognized by the Powers. It is 
therefore reasonable to demand that Russia abandon her 
privileges in Korea and Manchuria and be prg^ented from 
interfering in our enterprises there . . .
Furthermore, the Japanese government on June 26th presented a
statement of her ambition in Korea for the information of the United
States, which stated in part:
As this peninsula forms the natural outer zone of 
the defence of «Japan, the Imperial Government believes 
it essential to their safety that their predominance 
there should be kept intact. The Korean administration 
continues to be a hot bed of intrigues, conspiracy 
and corruption, despite the best efforts of the 
Imperial Government to root out those evils; and there­
fore . . .  it will be necessary to place Korea entirely 
within the sphere of the Japanese influence and to 
assume thg^complete control and direction of the destiny 
of Korea.
Here the Japanese government demanded "complete control" of Korea under 
the disguise of "the defence of Japan" and the reform of Korea. Japan
^^Korea: Treaties and Agreements, pp. 38-40.
17Quoted in Dennett, Roosevelt and the Russo-Japanese War, p. 204. 
See Herbert Croly, Willard Straight, New York: The MacMillan Co., 1924, 
p. 165.
Treat, Diplomatic Relations between the United States and Japan, 
1895-1905, pp. 245-246.
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stated that she has defeated both China and Russia in an attempt to 
maintain "independence of Korea." But now Japan wanted to destroy 
the independence of Korea v^ich she had guaranteed so many times. It 
is to be noted that the word "reform" reappeared in the Japanese 
rationalization of her Korean venture in place of the word "indepen­
dence" of Korea. It is not necessary here to repeat how many times 
Japan professed the independence of Korea right down to the declara­
tion of war on Russia and the protocol of February 23rd, 1904.
On August 13th another agreement was signed between Korea and 
Japan concerning the coastwise and inland navigation of Korea. The 
Japanese were permitted to navigate the Korean coasts and inland
waters, and to lease land "for the purpose of building warehouses at
19the place where their vessels call". By this time, Japan's war with
Russia was wearing to a close. Both parties were approaching a' state
of exhaustion. Russia's supply problem was almost insurmountable, and
20Japan was on the verge of bankruptcy. If Russia had continued a slow 
retreat, shortening her lines of communications while lengthening those 
of Japan, the war may well have ended in a stalemate. Korea would have 
been pressured into the position becoming a buffer-state and peace 
would have been established on a rational basis.
But this was not to be. The Japanese-initiated peace negoti­
ations were taking place at Portsmouth, New Hampshire, under President
Theodore Roosevelt's good offices. Russia would not recognize Japanese
21victories saying: "Not an inch of land, not a ruble of indemnity.'.'
19Korea: Treaties and Agreements, pp. 44-45.
20Yarmolinsky, The Memoirs of Count Witte, p. 150.
^^Ibid., p. 153.
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Russia's delegate, Witte, bluntly told Komura, the Japanese delegate:
22"There are no victors here and, therefore, no defeated."
Under the circumstances the choice of an American setting for the
conference was unfortunate and unfair. Neither the American people nor
23the administration was "neutral" as between the two contestants.
So, when the inevitable deadlock occurred in the negotiations, the use 
of outside:pressure to break the impass became not only desirable but 
imperative, for collapse of the negotiations would be a reflection upon 
the diplomatic skill of the Roosevelt administration in having staged 
the affair on American soil. It was certain considering the existing 
temper of the American people and government, that such pressure would 
be exerted in Japan's favor rather than in Russia's.
Furthermore, it would have to be a secret understanding, since, as 
it later transpired, it involved the sacrifice of Korean independence 
and the removal of her legation from Washington. It also meant the 
abrogation of every Korean treaty with foreign governments. If such a 
proposition had been made publicly, the question would have been asked 
whether, if no treaty can be signed without the concurrence of the 
Senate, a treaty could be abrogated without its consent. It would have 
meant inevitable delay and perhaps a prolonged controversy. This, under 
the circumstances, would have been impractical. The negotiations could 
not be delayed weeks, perhaps months, while the matter was being threshed 
out in Congress. Something had to be done immediately.
^^Ibid., p. 153.
23Winston B. Thorstein, "American Public Opinion and the Port- 
mouth Peace Conference", American Historical Review, LIII (Apr., 1948), 
pp. 439-445.
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President Roosevelt, in the emergency, assumed full responsibility. 
He learned that the Japanese though reluctantly, would be satisfied with 
the reversion of the Liaotung Peninsula and all Manchurian territory 
to China and the cession of one half of the island of Sakhalien.
The only remaining question involved the disposition of Korea®
Japan proposed that she be given a protectorate over that unhappy coun­
try, promising to preserve her dignity and independence. To this, 
President Roosevelt, on his own responsibility, agreed. Russia made no 
attempt to preserve her influence in Korea reserving her energy for the 
more important issue in Manchuria. Article II of the Peace Treaty, 
signed September 5, 1905, read:
The Imperial Russian government, acknowledging that 
Japan possesses in Korea paramount political, military 
and economic interest, engages neither to obstruct nor 
to interfere with the measure of guidance, protection 
and control lAhich the Imperial government of Japan may 
find it necessary to take in Korea. It is understood 
that Russian subjects in Korea shall be treated exactly 
in the same manner as the stüsjects or citizens of other 
foreign powers. They shall be placed on the same footing 
as" the subjects of most favored nations. It is also 
agreed that in order to avoid all causes of misunder- 
■ standing, the two high contracting parties will abstain 
on the Russian-Korean frontier from taking military 
measures which may menace the security of Russian-Korean 
territory.
By the provision of the treaty, Japan's preponderant influence in 
Korea was once more admitted. Between the two powers, — Great Britain 
and the United States—  which might have objected to Japan's absorption 
of Korea, the United States was eliminated as a factor by reason of her 
sympathy with Japan, Britain was eliminated by the Anglo-Japanese 
alliance.
24Korea: Treaties and Agreements, pp. 46-55.
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The Japanese drove the Russians out of Korea and by the Peace 
Treaty, Korea was arbitrarily awarded to Japan. Thus Japan's priv­
ileges were practically unrestricted in Korea. The Koreans were 
shocked by the news of the conclusion of the treaty. The Korean govern­
ment protested the terms of the treaty stating, "the treaty of Port- 
mouth violated the law of nations on the ground that Japan and Russia
concluded a treaty which awarded Japan Korean sovereignty without
25accord with Korean government."
25Wangsong Sinmun, (Seoul), September 7,^1905.
Anglo-American Policy in Korea
With a free hand in Korea. Japan could now move toward her final 
step of the annexation. It has been pointed out in the Russo-Japanese 
war that both the United States and England became somewhat "friendly 
allies" of Japan, and that both recognized Japan's interests as being 
"paramount" in Korea at the close of war.
President Roosevelt's view of the Russians characteristically 
changed as they moved into the orbit of his established position in 
Far Eastern affairs. Before 1900, his feeling toward the Russian 
ranged from disregard to one of approval, considering them to be bearers 
of civilization to the Asian people of the empire. After 1900, however, 
his view underwent a change and he began to see them in an increasingly 
less favorable light as they appeared to menace the most important civ­
ilizing influence of British-American interests. VJhen the Russians 
refused to honor their pledge to withdraw their troops from Manchuria, 
his opposition to them rose sharply and he remained committed against 
them throughout the Russo-Japanese war.
President Roosevelt and Secretary Hay agreed that the Russians 
were untrustworthy. This produced a very unfortunate relationship 
in view of his future role as peace-maker. The Russian ambassador in 
Washington, Count Cassini, reported evidence of these poor relations 
to his government. Secretary Hay expressed this view in his diary on 
March 1, 1904 :
26Whitney A. Griswold, The Far Eastern Policy of the United States, 
(New York; Harcourt Brace & Co., 1938), pp. 104-105.
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Cassini came at three, stayed till five. His object 
was to hand me a memorandum from Russia which, like 
everything from that country, has a false bottom.
He talked for an hour about American unfriendliness.
I told him that the ^^ps were cleverer - they talked 
of our friendliness.
When Japan was fighting the Russians, President Roosevelt believed
that "Japan was fighting the battle of America in Manchuria" and he
was prepared to help Japan. As a "near ally", the United States
appeared least likely to place obstacles in Japan's path and at the
outbreak of war had assumed the protection of Japanese interests in
Russia. The United States also had extended her good office to help
several hundred Japanese to leave Russia.
When Japan landed her troops on Korean soil in the face of the
proclamation of neutrality issued by the Korean government, the Emperor
of Korea believed that the United States would "do something . . .  to
28retain as much of her (Korean) independence as possible." But
President Roosevelt in his letter to Hay, dated August 28, 1905,
said: "We cannot possibly interfere for the Koreans against Japan.
29They could not strike one blow in their own defense." Since Pres­
ident Roosevelt knew that he could not prevent Japan's action, he 
realistically accepted the inevitable. However, on another occasion 
he had said: "To be sure, by treaty it was solemnly covenanted that
Korea should remain independent."^^
27Thayer, The life and letters of John Hay, II, p. 374.
28Quoted in Harrington, God, Mammon, and the Japanese, p. 326.
29Roosevelt to Hay, August 28, 1905, E. E. Morrison (ed.).
Letters of Theodore Roosevelt, (8 Vols., Cambridge, Mass., 1951-1954)
IV, p. 112.
30Quoted in McKenzie, Korea Fight for Freedom, p. 101. However, 
President Roosevelt said: "Korea itself was helpless to enforce the
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President Roosevelt apparently recognized America's future role in
the Pacific when he stated: "I believe that our future history will be
more determined by our position on the Pacific facing China than by
31our position on the Atlantic facing Europe." He was particularly 
interested in the maintenance of the balance of power in the Pacific 
and when Port Arthur and Mukden fell and Russia's Baltic fleet was 
almost annihilated at Tsushima, he began to fear Japan's over-expansion.
The immediate significance of the Japanese victory to President Roose­
velt lay in its bearing on the security of American interests in the 
Pacific area. American commerce in the Far East as well as possession 
of the Philippines was at stake and almost certainly in danger. While 
certain that a victorious Russia would "organize northern China against 
us", he was also fearful that, if the Japanese won out, it "may possibly 
mean a struggle between them and us in the future." His analysis con­
vinced him that it would be unfortunate if Japan drove Russia completely 
out of eastern Asia, and that it would be of great benefit for the 
United States if a balance of force could be maintained between the
32two rival nations "so that each may have a moderate action on the other."
In order to reestablish a balance of power, designed to check 
Japanese over-expansion and protect the Philippines, Roosevelt wanted 
to bring an end to the Russo-Japanese War. Before the signing of the
treaty, and it was out of the question to suppose that any other nation, 
with no interest of its own at stake, would do for the Korean what they 
utterly unable to do for themselves."
31Quoted in Dennett, Roosevelt and Russo-Japanese War, p. 406.
32Roosevelt to Lodge, June 16, 1905, letters of Theodore Roose­
velt, V, pp. 831-832.
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Portsmouth treaty, Roosevelt felt that there must be not only an equality 
of military power between Russia and Japan, but a direct confrontation 
of the two nations on the mainland. This meant giving Japan freedom of 
action in Korea and leaving Russia some substantial interests in conti­
guous Manchuria. This would, at the same time, solve the problem of 
Korea's political instability, which, he would have agreed with the 
Russian and Japanese governments, was a disturbing factor in interna­
tional relations.
By expressing his approval of Japan's Korean policy in an informal 
and largely noncommittal agreement. President Roosevelt was making an 
unfortunate bargain for Korea. The arrival of Secretary of War Taft 
in Tokyo on July 25, 1905, was a unique opportunity for both the United 
States and Japan to transact the important arrangements with complete 
secrecy. For even Lloyd Griscom, the American minister in Tokyo, was 
unaware that Taft was doing anything more than making a courtesy call 
on his way to the Philippines.^"^
In conversations between Secretary Taft and Japan's Prime Minister, 
Katsura, Taft brought up the concern over the Philippines and also said 
that he believed Japanese suzerainty over Korea would contribute to 
lasting peace in the Par East. Katsura, in turn, disavowed any aggres­
sive Japanese designs against the Philippines. Following this exchange 
of views on July 27, 1905, an "agreed memorandum" of the decision was 
drawn up, which some have called the "Taft-Katsura Agreement." Although
33Dennett, Roosevelt and Russo-Japanese War, pp. 112-114.
34Tayler Dennett, "President Roosevelt's Secret Pact with Japan," 
Current History, October, 1924, pp. 151, It was the United States that 
suggested to Japan the establishment of a protectorate over Korea.
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the memorandum was not a formal agreement of any kind, it did embody
35President Roosevelt's ideas. He cabled Taft that the conversations 
were absolutely correct and that "I confirm every word you have said."^^ 
In short, Roosevelt promised Japan that his government would not inter­
fere with Japanese action in Korea in order to protect the Philippines.
The Taft-Katsura memorandum provided another step toward Japanese 
control over Korea. Roosevelt was cognizant of the concurrent Anglo- 
Japanese negotiations and, like the British, realistically accepted 
what could not in any case be prevented short of using force. "It is
the reason", says a Japanese historian Agaki, "why President Roosevelt
37later gave a deaf ear to the Korean appeal." But President Roosevelt 
failed to realize that Japan fought with Russia primarily to gain the 
control of Korea and not to guarantee the independence of Korea and 
China, and the American policy facilitated Japan's intention not to 
guarantee the Open Door but "to destroy their economic interest in the 
Far East."
In recognizing Japan's free hand in Korea, President Roosevelt in 
March, 1905, replaced H. N. Allen, American Minister to Seoul from 1897
35Agaki, Japan's Foreign Relations, pp. 272-273. Taft agreed that 
Japan's success in the war entitled her to extend sovereign control over 
Korea to the extent of preventing Korea from assuming troublesome inter­
national engagements as in the past.
^^Roosevelt to Taft, July 31, 1905, Letters of Theodore Roosevelt, 
IV, p. 1293.
37Quoted in Dong, Chon, Japanese Annexation of Korea, p. 284. 
Syngman Rhee and Yoon Pyung-koo presented a petition to President 
Roosevelt to safeguard Korean independence by invoking the Treaty of 
1882. President Roosevelt said, "I am glad that you have come to me.
I would be glad to do anything I can in behalf of your country, but 
unless this petition comes through official channels I can not do 
anything with it." R. T. Oliver, Syngman Rhee (New York; Dodd Mead 
and Co., 1954), pp. 84-85.
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to 1905. According to Allen, "to have some one in Seoul who would not
be too friendly with the Koreans as to be unable to do his bidding."
Allen's successor, E. V. Morgan, however, did not stay in Seoul long
because on November 24, 1905, America withdrew its legation from 
39Korea. Thus the United States became the first nation to recognize 
Japan's complete control over Korea.
The belief of the Emperor of Korea that the United States would 
save his country from falling under the control of the Japanese is one 
of the striking aspects of this period. And this Korean confidence was 
on the basis of the "good office" clause of the Treaty of 1882. How­
ever, it is important to note here that the term "good office" has a 
definite meaning in western international law. Under it, a third state 
may offer to bring about negotiation in an international dispute and 
yet avoid the charge of unfriendly intervention. Should the contending 
state accept this offer, the way is then open for mediation through the 
third state. The United States was therefore not bound to take cog­
nizance of any condition in Korea until officially requested by the 
Korean government.
To Korea, however, the clause in the treaty with the United States 
did not appear to be merely a legal phrase subject to an interpretation. 
The United States was viewed as a nation having no territorial or politi­
cal ambitions in Korea and who could be relied on to check those states
that did have such ambitions. This impression was due, first, to the
40earlier actions of the United States, such as that in 1894. In the
38Quoted in Harrington, God, Mammon and the Japanese, p. 332.
39Ibid., p. 333.
^^In the beginning of the Sino-Japanese War, the Korean king had
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second place, the personal attitudes and sympathies of the American 
diplomatic representatives had given Korea the impressi)n that the 
United States would save Korea from calamity. The Korean habit of 
mind viewed the United States not as bound legally to extend "good 
offices" in certain rigidly defined circumstances but, instead, as 
cast in the Far Eastern role of the "elder brother" of Korea. That 
is, to those who knew little of the legal implications of "good 
offices", the phrase was interpreted as meaning benevolent assis­
tance in time of stress.
As to England, she had already recognized in the Anglo-Japanese 
41alliance of 1902 Japanese special interests in Korea in exchange for 
Japanese recognition of English special interests in China. When Japan 
defeated the Russians in 1905, the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alli­
ance was revived. In this renewed treaty signed between the two 
countries on August 12, 1905, Great Britain recognized "the right of 
Japan to take such measures of guidance, control and protection of 
Korea as she nay deem proper and necessary to safeguard and advance 
(her) paramount political, military, and economic interest in Korea."
In return, Japan recognized British "special interests on the Indian 
frontier and the right to take such measures which she may find necessary
asked the good offices of the American government because the American 
government expressed her willingness to preserve the independence of 
Korea by "good office" clause of the Treaty of 1882.
41In the first Anglo-Japanese Treaty of Alliance signed on July 
30, 1902, Japan united with Great Britain in declaring that the sole 
purpose of the Alliance was to preserve the status quo and general 
peace in the Far East, and that they were especially interested in 
maintaining the territorial integrity of Korea and China, recognizing 
Japan's special rights in Korea and English special rights in China.
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42for safeguarding her. Indian possessions."
British Foreign Minister Lansdowne in his dispatch to the British
Ambassador at St, Petersburg, dated September 6, 1905, frankly said;
"Korea, owing to its close proximity to the Japanese Empire and its
43inability to stand alone, must fall under the control of Japan."
The government of Korea strongly protested to the government of 
England, but being a victim of power politics, Korea accomplished 
nothing. Highly indignant over the case, Yi Han-yong, Korean minister 
at London, committed suicide. Before committing suicide, minister Yi 
stated: "Whatever measures were taken by the British in Korea ought to
be agreed in full accord with the Korean government. The sovereignty 
of Korea was an international question; that this sovereignty could 
not and should not be cancelled out by a bilateral act on the part of 
Japan and England; that the principle of signing a treaty which violated
the sovereignty of Korea was one that the entire Koreans could not
..44approve."
Thus Korea was left alone without friend and powers to whom she 
might turn for help. The fate of Korea was now clearly decided. Korea 
would be absorbed by Japan. There was no longer any international 
obstacle in Japanls move in Korea. Therefore, Japan decided to take a 
definite move toward destroying the independence of Korea,
42Korea: Treaties and Agreements, pp. 40-42.The renewal treaty 
was both defensive and offensive and required the military cooperation 
of both parties if either were attacked by even some other single 
power. This new agreement was to be valid for ten years.
^^Quoted in Dong, Chon, Japanese Annexation of Korea, p. 287.
44Whangsong Shin Mun (Seoul), October 22, 1905. See also Kim,
Yun Chi-ho Sunsanq Yakchon, p. 178; Seoul National University, Kuk-sa 
Kai-sul, p. 667.
The Korean Protectorate Treaty
In September, 1905, Hayashi, who had formerly been Japanese min­
ister in Seoul, was sent to Korea as an Imperial Plenipotentiary to do 
the spadework for the establishment of a Japanese protectorate over 
Korea and to make recommendations for that purpose. His lengthy report 
to Foreign Minister Katsura, dated September 25, 1905, is rather revealing 
with respect to Japanese attitudes and intentions. Hayashi concentrated 
on the Korean court, describing the Emperor of Korea as being pro-Rus­
sian, anti-Japanese in the Russo-Japanese war and as having made 
attempts to contact Russians. His "various groups oppose each other 
to his profit." His "dream" was to be "Emperor-dictator". The Japanese 
financial adviser, says Hayashi, made a sincere effort, but ran into 
the Emperor's opposition. "Therefore it is very difficult to clean up 
the Court, but it is very important to do this if the evil roots in 
Korean politic are to be cut. If we can clean up the court and then 
cut off the weeds from the root, we can achieve success in improving 
government administration in Korea as a whole. Even though it neces­
sitates the use of some pressure, we must get some Japanese officials 
into high place to watch the Emperor and reform the order of the court.
The leaders of the Japanese government intended to have their 
"improvement" without annexing Korea. And at this point the Japanese 
directed the whole Korean operation to Marquis Ito Hirobumi. When Ito 
as a Special Envoy of the Emperor of Japan, left for Seoul on
45Quoted in Hilary Conroy, The Japanese Seizure of Korea; 1868- 
1910, (Philadelphia; University of Pennsylvania Press, 1959), p. 333.
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November 5, 1905, the purpose of his mission was obvious to the Japanese
press. The Jiji Shimpo (Tokyo) "hoped for something practical, such
as a treaty of protection for Korea." The Kokumin Shimbun stated that
"one of Ito's probable tasks was to consolidate the peculiar relations
45. . .  between Korea and Japan."
On November 9, 1905, Ito arrived at the Korean capital on a special
mission to put relations between Japan and Korea on a new basis. He
brought with him a message from the Meiji Emperor to the effect that he
hoped the Korean Emperor would follow the direction of Ito, and come to
an agreement with him, as it was essential for the maintenance of peace
47in the Far East that he should do so. ‘ In the meantime, the Emperor 
of Korea was cognizant of the significance of the mission to Korea 
headed by a person of Ito's reputation. He therefore thought it wise 
to delay giving him a formal audience as long as possible under the 
pretext of being ill. On November 15, Ito was at last received in 
formal audience. He presented to the Korean Emperor demands which
48amounted to the establishment of a Japanese protectorate over Korea.
45Chong-sik Lee, "Korean Nationalist Movement, 1905-1945" (Ph.D. 
Diss,- University of California, Berkeley, 1951), p. 75.
47Upon his arrival, Ito delivered to the Emperor of Korea an auto­
graphed letter from the Emperor of Japan Wnich stated in part: I, the 
Emperor of Japan, hereby congratulate your majesty on the restoration 
of peace in the Far East, and in order that the friendly relations of 
our two nations shall become a degree closer, I hereby send my Special 
Ambassador. I also inform your majesty that I shall hereafter guard 
the integrity of Korea and the personal safety of the Imperial House­
hold .
■ 48Gaimusho (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan), Nihon Gaiko 
Nenpyo Narabini Shuyo Bunsho, 1840-1945, ("Diplomatic Chronology and 
Documents of Japan") (2 Vols.: Tokyo; Niho Kokusai Rengo Kyokai, 1955),
I. pp. 233-234. The establishment of a protectorate over Korea was 
decided on April 8, 1905, long before the end of the Russo-Japanese
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They provided that the Japanese Foreign Office in Tokyo was here­
after to handle the Korean foreign affairs; Japanese diplomatic and 
consular officials were to represent, Korean interests abroad, that 
Korean envoys in foreign courts be recalled; and further that Japan would 
be represented at the Korean capital by a Regident-General with Res­
idents in smaller towns. The Resident-General was to be the supreme 
administrator in Korea. The Residents in different districts were to 
have the powers of supreme local governors. In return, Japan was to 
guarantee "to maintain the security and respect the dignity of the 
Korean Imperial House."
The Korean Emperor and his cabinet ministers were aghast at hearing 
these unthinkable demands. The demands met a pointblank refusal. The 
gist of conversation between the Korean Emperor and Ito, as reported 
at the time, was as follows:
The Emperor said:
Although I have seen in the newspapers various rumors 
that Japan proposed to assume a protectorate over Korea, I 
did not believe them, as I placed faith in Japan's adherence 
to the promise to maintain the independence of Korea which 
was made by the Emperor of Japan at the beginning of the 
war and embodied in a treaty between Korea and Japan. When 
I heard you were coming to my country I was glad, as I 
believed your mission was to increase the friendship between 
our countries, and your demands have therefore taken me 
entirely by surprise.
To which Ito rejoined;
These demands are not my own; I am only acting in
war. This decision was later confirmed by another cabinet decision 
of October 27, 1905 in which it was decided that: 1) the protectorate 
should be established in early November, 1905; 2) Marshall Hasegawa 
Yoshimichi, commander of the Japanese army in Korea should be ordered 
to render "necessary assistance" to facilitate the plan; and 3) if 
the Korean government refused to agree, then Japan should unilaterally 
establish the protectorate.
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accordance with a mandate from my Government, and if Your 
Majesty will agree to the demands which I have presented 
it will be to the benefit of both nations and peace in 
the East will be assured for ever. Please, therefore, 
consent quickly. ?
The Emperor replied;
From time immemorial it has been the custom of the 
rulers of Korea, when confronted with questions so 
momentous as this to come to no decision until all the 
Ministers, high and low, who hold or have held office, 
have been consulted, and the opinion of the scholars 
and the common people have been obtained, so that I 
cannot now settle this matter myself.
Said Marquis Ito again;
Protests from the people can easily be disposed 
of, and for the sake of the friendship between the two 
countries Your Majesty should come to a decision at 
once.
To this the Emperor replied;
To assent to your proposals would mean the ruin 
of my country,^pnd I will therefore sooner die than 
agree to them.
The conference lasted almost five hours but accomplished nothing. 
Japanese minister Hayashi summoned Pak Che-sun, Korean Foreign minister 
to the Japanese Legation on the following day in an attempt to obtain 
the proposed treaty. Meanvdiile, Ito summoned remaining cabinet members 
to his hotel (Sontaik Hotel in the suburb of Seoul) and asked their 
approval of the Japanese proposed protectorate treaty over Korea. The 
Korean ministers expressed their opinion saying, "Since Japan guar­
anteed the independence of Korea, we cannot yield our sovereignty."^^
Ito dismissed the meeting, accomplishing nothing. But the Japanese
49Quoted in McKenzie, Korea Fight for Freedom, pp. 89-90. McKen­
zie was the special correspondent of The Daily Mail (London) in the 
Far East.
*̂̂ Kim, Yun Chi-ho Sunsanq Yakjun, p. 182.
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were determined to give the members of the cabinet no time to renew 
their strength. They were called again to the Japanese Legation at
2:00 P.M. on November 17 but again the conference had to adjourn without
nx. 51 results.
Kwon Chung-hyun, Minister of Agriculture, Commerce and Industry 
who participated in the conference later said, "On November 17, we (all 
members of Korean cabinet) were summoned to the Japanese Legation. 
Minister Hayashi demanded an immediate approval of the proposed 
protectorate treaty. Upon this terrible request, I told him that 
your request is a most grave matter to our country. Therefore we must 
ascertain Korean public opinion, so that we can not settle this matter 
ourselves. Immediately after my proposal, Hayashi angrily replied 
that you must come to a decision at once. At this moment, Ito accom­
panied with Marshall Hasegawa, the Commander of the Japanese Army in 
Korea entered the conference room and ordered us to go to the Palace
to discuss this matter before the Emperor. We left the Japanese
52Legation at once and proceeded to the Palace."
Meanwhile, the Japanese army under command of Marshall Hasegawa
had been making a great demonstration of military force around the
palace. For days, they had been parading, fully armed, through the
streets, in front of the Imperial Residence, and around the government
buildings. Machine guns were in the streets and even field guns were
brought out to command the strategic points of the city. They made
53feint attacks, occupied gates, put their guns in position, and did
^^Park, Hankuk Tonqsa, pp. 205-206.
52Quoted in Kim, Yun Chi-ho Sunsang Yakjon, p. 182.
53Wangsung Shinmun, (Seoul) November 20, 1905. See also
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everything short of actual violence to impress the Koreans that they
were prepared to enforce their demands. All this kind of display had
a sinister and terrible meaning to the Emperor and his cabinet Min- 
54isters. They vividly recalled memories of the murder of Queen
Min by the Japanese in 1895.
That night, before the conference resumed, Japanese soldiers,
with fixed bayonets, entered the palace and stood near the royal
apartment of the Korean Emperor. A rigid cordon of Japanese soldiers
and gendarmes was thrown around the palace. Ito arrived at 9:00 P.M.
for the conference, accompanied by Marshall Hasegawa, Minister Hayashi
and other Japanese military police. A fresh attack was begun on the
cabinet ministers. Ito demanded an audience with the Emperor. The
Emperor refused on the ground that he was in great pain because of
55his very sore throat.
By this time, the courtyard of the cabinet chamber was filled with 
Japanese soldiers and the ministers in the cabinet chamber could hear 
the rattling of swords. This coercive atmosphere, after all, was not 
without effect. The ministers had fought for days and nights, and 
they had fought alone since Ito's arrival. Not a single foreign 
representative had offered them help. The conference scene gradually
Korean Daily News, (Seoul), November 20, 1905.
54Marshall Hasegawa was ordered to render "necessary assistance" 
to the success of Ito's plan. Nihon Gaiko Nenpyo narabini Shuyo 
Bunsho, 1840-1945, I, p. 235.
55Seoul National University, Kuk-sa Kaisul, p. 669. Ito made 
his way into the Emperor's presence and personally requested an 
audience = The Emperor said "please go away and discuss the matter 
with Cabinet Ministers." See also Wangsong Shinmun, (Seoul), November 
20, 1905.
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assumed the appearance of a street brawl. International courtesy was 
case aside. The Japanese shouted, "Agree with us be rich, or oppose 
us and perish," and thereupon Marshall Hasegawa drew his sword. "Cut 
us down if you dare" said Prime Minister Han, Kyu-sul. "We will show 
you," retorted the Marshall, and the Japanese military police officers
dragged the Prime Minister away into a side room under Japanese
. , 56custody.
Prime Minister Han withstood both the blandishments and the threats
of Ito and Marshall Hasegawa. Koreans remember him best for the speech
he is reported to have made when, in exasperation, Hasegawa half drew
his sword in an effort to intimidate the Prime Minister into supporting
the protection treaty. Turning to Ito, Prime Minister Han spoke as
follows "When you have placed us under something worse than the mouth
of a cannon or at the point of a sword, how can your threats or your
alternatives of life and death move me? When you are taking something
more precious than my name, can you think that I care to let that name 
57live?"
The rest of the cabinet members feared that the Prime Minister might 
really be killed. Minute after minute passed, and still the Prime Min­
ister did not return. Then a Japanese military police officer reported
^^Park, Hankuk Tonqsa, p. 208. See also, Kim, Yun Chi-ho Sunsanq 
Yakchon, pp. 184—185.
57Chun, Cho, Kankuk Shinmun Sa, (History of Korean Newspapers) 
(Seoul; Iljokak, 1960), pp. 123-126. See Hwang, Maechon Yarok 349-351. 
According to Professor Ladd, who accompanied Ito and later published 
a strongly pro-Japanese account of the trip saying that there were 
no other Japanese guard or soldiers in attendance and no Japanese 
intimidation. George Ladd, In Korea with Marquis Ito, (New York;
Charles Scribners, Sons, 1908), pp. 261-262.
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58to Marshall Hasegawa that "the Prime Minister was executed." The 
frightened ministers could only see submission or sacrifice of their 
lives before them. "Nothing can be saved by our dying. The Japanese
59always get their way in the end," said Minister of Education Yi Wan- 
yong. At one 0'clock on the morning of November 18, five of the 
ministers gave their consent to the treaty.
Thus at one o ’clock P.M. November 18, 1905, the convention provid­
ing for control of Korean foreign affairs by Japan was signed. The 
convention read:
Article I. The government of Japan through the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Tokyo, will hereafter have 
control and direction of the external relations of Korea.
Article II. The government of Japan undertalces to 
see to the execution of the treaties actually existing 
between Korea and other powers, and the government of 
Korea engages not to conclude hereafter any act or engage­
ment having an international character, except through 
the medium of the government of Japan.
Article III, The government of Japan shall be 
represented at the Court of His Majesty, the Emperor of 
Korea, by a Resident-General who shall reside at Seoul 
primarily for the purpose of taking charge of and 
directing the matters relating to diplomatic affairs, 
and have the right of private and personal audience 
of His Majesty the Emperor of Korea. The Japanese 
government shall have the right-to station Residents 
at the several open ports and such other places in 
Korea as they may deem necessary. Such Residents 
shall, under the direction of the Resident-General,
^^Hwang, Maechon Yarok, p. 352; Park, Hankuk Tongaa, p. 209.
59Chong, Hankuk Kenyon Sa, II, pp. 173-174.
^^Park, Hankuk Tonqsa, pp. 210-211. The ministers who gave their 
consent were : Park Che-sun (Foreign Affairs), Yi Wan-yong (Education), 
Yi Kun-tack (Defence), Yi Chi-yong (Home Affairs), and Kwon Chung-hyon 
(Agriculture, Commerce and Industry). The minister who withheld their 
consent were : Han Kyu-sol (Prime Minister), Min Yong-ki (Finance), and 
Yi Ha-yong (Justice).
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exercise the powers and function hitherto appertaining 
to Japanese Consuls in Korea, and shall perform such 
duties as may be necessary in order to carry into full 
effect the provisions of this agreement.
Article IV. The stipulations of all treaties and 
agreements existing between Japan and Korea not incon­
sistent with the provisions of this agreement shall 
continue in force.
Article V. The government of Japan undertake to 
maintain gÿe welfare and dignity of■the Imperial House 
of Korea.
Korea thus entered a new phase of existence. Heretofore, all the 
nations, who had at various times achieved predominance in Korea, had 
maintained the fiction that their functions were purely advisory.
Japan had now overstepped this position and assumed direct control.
The declaration of the Japanese government, accompanying the announce­
ment of the Protectorate treaty, justified the move in her opinion by 
"the unwise action of Korea especially in the domain of her interna­
tional concerns", and stated that:
The relations of propinquity have made it necessary 
for Japan to take and exercise, for reasons closely con­
nected with her own safety and repose a paramount interest 
and influence in the political and military affairs of Korea.
The measures hitherto taken have been purely advisory, but 
the experience of recent years has demonstrated the insuf- 
fiency of measures of guidance alone. The unwise and improv­
ident actions of Korea, more especially in the domain of 
her international concerns, has in the past been the most 
fruitful source of complications. To permit the present unsat­
isfactory condition of things to continue unrestrained and 
unregulated would be to invite fresh difficulties, and 
Japan believes that she owes it to herself and to her
^^Korea: Treaties and Agreements, pp. 55-56; Foreign Relations, 
1905, pp. 612-513. One often hears of a treaty concluded under 
duress. Nowhere else is there a better example in the 20th century 
than the case of this convention. This treaty was to be effective 
"until the moment arrives when it is recognized that Korea has
attained national strength" a new promise which Japan never
showed any intention of fulfilling.
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desire for the general pacification of the extreme East to 
take the steps necessary to put an end once and for all to 
this dangerous situation. Accordingly, with that object in 
view and in order at the same time to safeguard their own posi­
tion and to promote the well-being of the Government have 
resolved to assume a more intimate and direct influence 
responsibility than heretofore in the external relations 
of the peninsula. The Government of His Majesty and the 
Emperor of Korea are in accord with the Imperial Government 
as to the absolute necessity of the measure, and the two 
governments, in order to provide for the peaceful and 
amicable establishment of the new order of things, have 
concluded the accompanying compact, the protectorate 
treaty . . . .
The Japanese authorities announced in Washington on November 20, 
that Korea had "voluntarily" entered into an agreement granting Japan 
a protectorate over the country and the American Government, apparently 
without consulting with Korea as to the truth of the statement, recog­
nized the validity of Japan's claim.Whatever may be the real history 
of the transfer thus made, of the means taken to secure the document, 
it is a historic fact that the governments of Europe and America were 
very prompt in withdrawing their legations from Seoul and in aclcnow- 
ledging Japanese supremacy in Korea,
Japan fought Russia to annex Korea, to satisfy Japanese chauvinism, 
to cripple the dominance of Russia in Manchuria whose hand stretched 
into the Korean peninsula, and also to replace Russian influence in 
Manchuria with Japan's own influence. After the war, therefore, the 
Japanese protectorate over Korea was the first phase toward final 
annexation. This true meaning of the Japanese protectorate has been
^^Foreiqn Relations, 1905, p. 613. 
^̂ Ibid.
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54thus far made explicit.
Japan won the Russo-Japanese war. However, Japan wanted peace as 
much as Russia. If the Russo-Japanese war was a total war for Japan, 
it was a regional war for Russia; Japan sought to avoid any complica­
tions with Russia in the peace negotiations by exposing her further 
aggressive designs for fear of being frustrated again by another inter­
vention by a coalition of powers.
Japan was very sensitive to the feelings of other Powers in her 
international politics, and this sensitivity became obvious especially 
after the Sino-Japanese war. For instance, when the earlier agreement 
concerning financial and diplomatic advisers for Korea was concluded 
with Korea on August 22, 1904, Japan made it clear that Article III 
of the agreement, which provided for Japanese supervision of Korean 
foreign affairs, was "not intended to place an impediment in the way 
of legitimate enterprise of foreigners in the sphere of commerce and 
industry . . .  Even in connection with the protectorate treaty,
Japan promised to the other interested Powers to keep an "open door" 
in Korea and to uphold their existing treaties with K o r e a . A l s o  in 
his address to the members of the Constitutional Party, Ito pointed out 
the necessity of the Japanese government to act in accordance with
^‘Mitoru Komatsu, Meiji Gaiko Hiwa, (Hidden Story of Meiji Diplo­
macy) (Tokyo; 1935), p. 344.
^^Ibid., p. 296.
^^Takahira to Adee, August 30, 1904, Foreign Relations, pp. 138-
439.
^^McDonald to Lansdovme, in Brit. Doc. II, p. 132.
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international sympathy. He said :
. . .  It is not with regard to Korea alone, but with regard 
to the whole problem of the Par East, that nothing opposed 
to the sentiment of the powers should be done. No strong 
country whatsoever can march forward independently and at 
its own arbitrary convenience. If Japan, puffed up by her 
victories in war, should forfeit the sympathy of the powers^g 
she will be paying up for herself misfortune in the future.
To the gratification of Ito and his followers who favored grad­
ualist diplomacy in regard to Korea, no foreign intervention ensued 
in the wake of the conclusion of the protectorate treaty. However, 
there had been some voices raised sgainst Japanese protectorate moves 
by foreign residents in Korea and by the other Powers interested in 
Korean problems. And, the Japanese government for the moment had to 
be satisfied with the role of guidance in Korean affairs. Chpan, by 
provisions in the protectorate treaty, left many problems in Korea 
unsolved; each time the knot of control was tightened, there followed 
fresh riots among the Koreans.
68Wilson to the Secretary of State, February 13, 1906, in 
Foreign Relations (1906), p. 1028.
CHAPTER VI
KOREA'S STRUGGLE FOR INDEPENDENCE 1905-1907
Korean Reaction Against the Japanese Protectorate
The passive resistance of the Korean people to Japanese rule began 
soon after the signing of the Treaty of November 18, 1905. As the news 
spread throughout the country, the people of various districts assembled, 
particularly in the North, and started to march southward to die in
front of the palace as protest against the Japanese enforced protec­
torate treaty. But many of them were stopped by the foreign mission­
aries who told them: "It is of no use dying in that way. You had
better live and make your country better able to hold its ovm.
The Wangsung Shinmun, a leading Korean daily in Seoul, expressed 
the sèntiraent of the people in its editorial as follows :
When it was recently made known that Marquis Ito would 
come to Korea, our deluded people all said with one voice
that he is the man who will be responsible for the main­
tenance of friendship betv/een the three countries of the 
Far East (Japan, China and Korea) and believing that his 
visit to Korea was for the sole purpose of devising good 
plans for strictly maintaining the promised integrity and 
independence of Korea.
But, OhI How difficult it is to anticipate affairs in 
this world. Without warning a proposal containing five 
clauses was laid before the Emperor, and we then saw how 
mistaken we were about the object of Ito's visit. However, 
the Emperor firmly refused to have anything to do with these 
proposals, and Ito should then, properly, have abandoned 
his attempt and returned to his own country.
Is it worth while for any of us to live any longer?
Our people have become the slaves of others, and the
^Quoted in McKenzie, The Tragedy of Korea, p. 138.
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spirit of nation which had stood far 4,000 years, since
the days of Tan-Kun has perished in a single night. Alas!
fellow countrymen, alas!
A number of leading officials, including all the surviving ex-prime 
ministers and more than a hundred men who had previously held high 
office under the Crown v/ent to the palace and demanded that the Emperor 
should openly repudiate the treaty on the ground of Japanese violation 
of international law and to execute those five ministers who had 
acquiesced in it. The Emperor sought to temporize with them, for he 
himself feared that if he took too openly a hostile attitude toward 
the Japanese, they might harm him. The memorialists sat down in the 
palace building, refusing to move and demanding an answer. Some of 
their leaders were arrested by the Japanese police. The storekeepers 
of Seoul put up their shutters as a symbol of their mourning. The 
Japanese gendarmes descended on the petitioners and threatened them 
with mass arrest if they remained around the palace any longer. There­
after they moved on to the street where they attempted to hold a meeting,
3but they were dispersed again by the gendarmes.
Min Young-hwan, a former Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Pleni­
potentiary to the Tzar, Minister of War and Special Korean Ambassador 
to England, insisted that-the convention was not legally concluded. He 
perceived the loss of both Korea's sovereignty and its dignity in this
4agreement. Just before committing suicide as a protest against Japan's
2Wangsung Shinmun (Seoul), November 24, 1905. See also McKenzie,
The Tragedy of Korea, pp. 139-140.
3Lee, Hankuk Tongrip Undong Sa, pp. 246-265.
4Committing suicide is an oriental custom of passive resistance.
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aggression and as a means of rousing the nation to regain its indepen­
dence, I“Iin wrote his "Farewell and Last Appeal to the People". In it 
he said in part : "It pains me to think that my twenty millions fellow 
Koreans shall perish in the coming struggle for existance . . . .
Although I die in the body, I shall not be dead in soul, and even after 
death I shall endeavor to assist you in your good efforts. Therefore 
exert yourselves to the utmost, redouble your natural power and strength,- 
educate yourselves and restore our independence and l ib e rt y. Ch o Pyong- 
se, ex-prime minister, also took his life as a protest. Several other 
statesmen did the same, while many others resigned. Foreign Minister, 
Park Che-sun, the last one to sign the treaty, was particularly angry 
with himself for having signed the treaty when he observed the univer­
sally unpopular sentiment against it; he tried to kill himself in front 
of Minister Hayashij crying : "It is you who have made me a traitor to
my country."^ Hayashi thwarted his attempt to committ suicide and sent 
him to a hospital for treatment.
However, suicides, resignations and lamentations were ineffective 
The Japanese gendarmes commanded the cities and villages and they were 
supported by Japanese soldiers who were ready to impose their will be 
use of force if necessary. But unrest and discontent among the Koreans 
continued. Opposition to the Japanese was growing in strength. The so-
7called Uibyonq (the Righteous Army) constituted the core of the local
^The Korean Review, V. (November, 1905), pp. 427-428. See also 
"Min Young-iAan", Ibid., VI. (Nov., 1906), pp. 406-412. liLn Young- 
whan committed suicide on November 29, 1905.
^Hwang, Maechon Yarok, pp. 351-362.
7Uibyonq was organized by Korean Confucian leaders for the armed 
revolt against Japanese in Korea.
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opposition and its major centers were situated in the southern provinces. 
Their significance in particular lay in the fact that all the opposition 
forces were led by former high government officials.
The first such revolt was led by Chai Ik-hyon vdio had been a pro­
vincial governor. Chai had submitted memorials to the Emperor admon­
ishing against sloth and corruption in the government and warning of 
Japanese intrigue. Further-for he was widely respected as a Confucian 
scholar-he had sent letters regarding the same topics to his followers
throughout Korea. The Japanese, therefore, called him a disturber of
0the peace and urged the Korean government to expel him. When the pro­
tectorate was established, Chai submitted two memorials to the throne, 
denouncing the five ministers who signed the Japanese protectorate 
treaty, and he also sent a long letter to the Japanese authorities 
denouncing Japan's aggression. Although closely watched by Japanese 
troops, he succeeded in gathering the followers in May 1906. These 
were joined soon by others. This group occupied several towns, and 
Chai's force numbered to several hundred. But the Uibyong was quickly
9put down by the Japanese. Chai was arrested and was expelledi 
The Japanese government, in the meantime, consolidated her 
Resident-General's powers in Korea. The Japanese Imperial Ordinance 
No. 267, issued on December 20, 1905, provided the organization and 
functions of the Japanese Resident-General which read in part:
Article II. A Resident-General (Tokan) shall be
^Hwang, Maechon Yarok, pp. 224-226. Chai was expelled to Taima 
Island. Seoul National University, Kuk-sa Kai-sul, p. 674.
9Hwang, Maechon Yarok, pp. 370-378.
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appoxnted to the Residency-General. The Resident-General 
shall be of the Shin—nin rank. The Resident—General shall 
be under the direct control of the Emperor. With regard 
to matters appertaining to foreign policy, he shall make 
representations to the Emperor and ask imperial sanction 
through the Minister of State for foreign affairs and the 
Minister President of State, and with regard to all other 
affairs, through the Minister President of State.
Article XI. Besides the Resident-General there shall 
be appointed to the Resident-General, 1 (Chokunin), Direc­
tor of Agricultural, Commercial, and Industrial Affairs, 1 
(Chokunin of Sonin); Director of Public Affairs, 1 (Chokun­
in or Sonin); Police Inspectors, 2 (Sonin); Experts, 5 - •
(Gishi); Interpreters, 10 (Sonin); Clerks, Police Sergeants, 
Assistant Experts, Assistant Interpreters . . . .
Article XXV. The Resident may ask the command of 
Imperial forces stationed in his locality to dispatch 
troops, if he deems such measure necessary for preserv­
ing peace and order; provided that there is no time to 
ask the Resident-General for instructions.
Article XXVI. With regard to such Korean local admin­
istrative measures as may be necessitated by obligations 
based on the treaty. Residents may, when they think the 
matter too urgent to allow time for reference to the 
Resident-General for instructions, directly cause the 
respective local Korean authorities to carry out the 
required measures, and render their reports to the 
Resident-General afterward.
Article XXII. The Residencies shall be established 
at important places in Korea. The location of the Resi­
dencies and the extent of their jurisdiction shall be 
fixed by the Resident-General.
Article XXIII. Each Residency shall have the follow­
ing functionaries: Resident (Sonin), Vice-Resident (Sonin),
Clerks (Han-nin), Police Sergeants (Han-nin), Interpreters 
(Han-nin). In addition to the above functionaries, Police 
Inspectors of Sonin rank shall be appointed to those Resi­
dencies wherever the Resident-General deems it necessary to 
have more than two Vice-Residents, one of the latter shall 
mainly deal with judicial affairs. The personnel the 
Residency shall be fixed by a separate regulation.
In addition. Article XXXIII specified that "A police shall be
attached to the Residency-General and each Residency," the size of the
^^Foreiqn Relations, 1906, pp. 1024-1026.
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force "shall be fixed by the Resident-General." Also, the Japanese
garrison forces were stationed in Korea under the jurisdiction of the
Resident-General =
On close examination of these articles, it is clear that both the
Resident-General and the Resident were given powers more than those
which were stipulated in the treaty of November 18. Thus the Resident-
General became a virtual dictator in Korea by Imperial Ordinance No. 267.
On December 21, 1905, Ito was appointed Resident-General of Korea.
Ito had advocated a gradual policy toward Korea, and upon conclusion
of the protectorate treaty, Ito gave an interview to the representatives
of the press in Seoul in which he said in part:
Now that the new treaty between Japan and Korea is con­
cluded, it is believed by many Japanese even that Korea has 
been given to Japan, and this rash belief has caused bad 
feeling and misunderstandings betv/een the two countries. The 
most important point that I wish to impress upon you is that, 
although the new relations between Japan and Korea have now 
been definitely established by the conclusion of the protec­
torate treaty, the sovereignty of Korea remains as it was, 
in the hands of the Korean Emperor, and the Imperial House 
of Korea and Government exists as it did before. The new 
relations do but add to the welfare and dignity of the 
Korean Dynasty and the strengthening of the country. It is 
a great mistake to look upon the new treaty^|s a knell sounding 
the doom of Korea's existence as a Kingdom.
On the eve of his departure for Korea to assume the post first 
Resident-General, Ito was by no means straight forward in his defense 
of Korea. He stated his policy, " <. . . it will be the duty of the 
government of this Empire to take it upon itself in accordance with the
^^Ito before his appointment insisted that he as Resident-General 
in Korea should be given the authority of Commander-in-Chief in Korea. 
Without this unity of Command he threatened to refuse the appointment.
Ito Ko Zenshu, I, pip. 313-316.
12Quoted in A. J. Brown, The Mastery of the Far East (New York: 
Charles Scribners Sons, 1921), p. 197.
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protocol 5 but governmental corruption is of remote origin, and to reform
13it.in a day is no easy task . . . Thus, xto's policy regarding
the administrative reforms in Korea resulted in a complete overhauling 
of the existing structure.
Ito also outlined his policy regarding the poverty of the Koreans 
saying; " . . .  if it be neglected and no means devised for relieving 
it, this Empire will not only be violating its responsibility as pro­
tector of Korea, but will also itself suffer in the end."̂ '̂  The protec­
torate treaty meant to Ito that Japan should promote the économie devel­
opment of Korea. He likewise stated that the Japanese population should 
be absorbed by Korea.
However, the meanings and implications of Ito's policy statement 
surpassed the role of the Japanese in Korea as understood from the 
provisions of all the agreements between Korea and Japan which were 
effective at the time. His speech before the Constitutional Party 
clearly indicates this ambivalence of Japan's Korean policy. He stated 
that the Japanese enforcement of the protectorate over Korea was a 
final solution of the Korean problem and that the solution in reality, 
the realization of the community of interests between Japan and Korea, 
still belonged to the future. He also reminded the members of the 
Constitutional Party of the fact that Korea did not submit herself 
voluntarily to Japan, for the question of forfeiting independence was 
involved in the Japanese imposition of the Protectorate Treaty on Korea.
13Foreign Relations, 1906, p. 1030,
14Foreign Relations, 1906, p. 1031,
15Foreign Relations, 1906, p. 1032,
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The Korean Emperor with his Court group did not entertain the idea 
of sitting tight until the time of eventual Japanese annexation of his 
Kingdom. He saw clearly that he was really under the domination of 
the Japanese, and made his palace a center of intrigue against the 
Japanese to save his toppling nation.
The Emperor Appeals to the Foreign Powers
Like the majority of the Korean people, the Emperor was deeply 
displeased by the protectorate treaty Ito and Hayashi had succeeded 
in concluding with his country. The Japanese statesmen had been 
analyzed correctly: the conduct of foreign relations was the single
most important power of the Emperor. With Korea practically defenseless 
before the Japanese army, the only way open to him - besides quietly 
submitting - was to seek help from outside.
The Emperor of Korea was aware of Japan's plan to establish a pro­
tectorate over Korea and, on October 20, 1905, a few weeks before the 
arrival of Ito, he sent a personal message of appeal to President Roose­
velt seeking American assistance against the impending Japanese threat. 
The message was entrusted to Professor B. Hulbert, Dean of the Imperial 
Normal College in Seoul, the Emperor's trusted advisor. Hulbert arrived 
in Washington on November 17, 1905 and sought an interview with the 
Secretary of State Elihu Root, who was too busy to see him.^^ Horace 
Allen, the former American Minister to Seoul, had earlier advised his 
government not to invoke the treaty of 1882 between Korea and the 
United States. The American minister in Seoul, E. V. Morgan, had sent 
a cable to Washington concerning Hulbert's intention, which was to 
demonstrate to Roosevelt that Korea was being treated "unjustly and 
oppressively by Japan" and to urge that the United States should endeavor
Homer B. Hulbert, "The Opening of Korea", The Voice of Korea 
(Washington D. C.), Vol. II, No. 26, January 5, 1945. Professor 
Hulbert was selected by tlue United States government in 1885 as one 
of three Americans to go to Korea, at the request of the Korean 
government, to engage in modernizing the Korean educational system.
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to bring about a just settlement under the terms of the Korean-American 
Treaty of 1882.^^
. . When Hulbert was finally allowed to present the message on Novem­
ber 20, the Japanese government had already formally notified Washington 
that Korea had been duly placed under the Japanese protectorate.^^ The 
message of appeal from the Korean Emperor to President Roosevelt read 
in part as follows :
Ever since 1883 the United States and Korea have main­
tained friendly treaty relations. Korea has received many 
proofs of the good will and the sympathy of the American 
Government and people. The American Representatives have 
always shown themselves to be in sympathy with the welfare 
and progress of Korea. Many teachers have been sent from 
America who have done much for the uplift of our people.
But we have not made the progress that we ought. This 
is due partly to the political machinations of foreign powers 
and partly to our mistakes. At the beginning of the Japan- 
Russia war the Japanese Government asked us to enter into 
an alliance with them, granting them to use of our territory, 
harbours, and other resources, to facilitate their military and 
naval operations. Japan, on her part, guaranteed to preserve 
the independence of Korea and the welfare and dignity of the 
royal house. We complied with Japan's request, loyally 
lived up to our obligations, and did everything that we had 
stipulated. By so doing we put ourselves in such a position 
that if Russia had won, she could have seized Korea and annexed 
her to Russian territory on the ground that we were active 
allies of Japan.
It is now apparent that- Japan proposes to abrogate their 
part of this treaty and declare a protectorate over our 
country in direct contravention of her sworn promise in the 
agreement of 1904. There are several reasons why this should 
not be done.
In the first place, Japan will stultify herself by such 
a direct breach of faith. It will injure her prestige as a 
power that proposes to work according to enlightened laws.
17Morgan to Root, October 19, 1905, Foreign Relations, p. 623.
18Foreign Relations, 1905, p. 626.
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iTi the second place, the actions of Japan in Korea during 
the past two years give no promise that our people will be 
handled in an enlightened manner. No adequate means have been 
provided vdiereby redress could be secured for wrongs perpetrated 
upon our people. Tne finances of the country have been gravely 
mishandled by Japan. Nothing has been done towards advancing 
the cause of education or justice. Every move on Japan's 
part has been manifestly selfish.
The destruction of Korea'',s independence will work her a 
great injury, because it will intensify the contempt with 
which the Japanese people treat the Koreans and will make 
their acts all the more oppressive.
We acknowledge that many reforms are needed in Korea.
We are glad to have the help of Japanese advisers, and 
we are prepared loyally to carry out their suggestions.
We recognize the mistakes of the past. It is not for 
ourselves we plead, but for the Korean people.
At the beginning of the war our people gladly welcomed 
the Japanese, because this seemed to herald needed reforms 
and a general bettering of conditions, but soon it was seen 
that no genuine reforms were intended and the people had 
been deceived.
One of the gravest evils that will follow a protec­
torate by Japan is that the Korean people vd.ll lose all 
incentive to improvement. No hope will remain that they can 
ever regain their independence. They need the spur of national 
feeling to maJce them determine upon progress and to make them 
persevere in it. But the extinction of nationality will 
bring despair and instead of working loyally and gladly in 
conjunction with Japan, -the old time hatred will be intensified 
and suspicion and animosity will result.
It has been said that sentiment should have no place in 
such affairs, but we believe, sir, that sentiment is the 
moving force in all human affairs, and -that kindness, sym­
pathy, and generosity are still v/orking between nations 
as between individuals. We beg of you to bring to bear 
upon this question the same breadth of mind and the same 
calmness of judgment that have characterized your course 
hitherto, and having weighed the matter, to render us what 
aid you can consistently in this our time of national danger.
In this urgent appealing letter, the Emperor admitted that "Korea
19Quoted in Congressional Records, 56th Cong; 1st Sess. (1919), 
pp. 6814-6815. See also, Korean Review, I, No. 7 (Sept., 1919),
pp. 1—2.
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needed help in reorganizing the government and was willing to see a
joint protectorate of friendly powers formed”. But he insisted that
"if Japan alone were given such a foothold in Korea it would mean the
20total extinction of her independence."
President Roosevelt rejected the Emperor's appeal for help, and 
addressed the following reply to Secretary Root:
I have read carefully the letter of the Korean Emperor 
handed to you by Mr. hulbert . . .  I understand from you that 
the Korean representative here, so far as you know, is 
unacquainted with the existence of such a letter and that 
IXir. Hulbert understands that it is the wish of the Emperor 
that the existence of the letter should be secret and 
nothing said to anyone about it and particularly not to 
the Japanese. Of course, these facts render it impossible 
for us to treat the letter as an official communication, 
for there is no way in which we could officially act 
without violating what Mr. Hulbert says is the Emperor's 
wish, moreover, we have been officially notified that the 
Korean Government has made the very arrangement with 
Japan which, in the letter of the Emperor he says he
does not desire to make. All things considered I do
not see that any practical action on the letter is open 
to us.
The matter, however, was not so easily disposed of. On November
25, 1905, the Korean Emperor sent a cablegram to Mr. Hulbert, reading
as follows : "I declare that so-called treaty of protectorate recently
concluded between Korea and Japan was extorted at the point of the
sword and under duress and therefore is null and void. I never consented
22to it and never will. Transmit to American government." On the same
day the Korean Minister to France, Min Young-chan, then in the United
States as "special envoy without credentials," called on Secretary of
20Congressional Records, 66th Cong; 1st Sess. (1919), pp. 6315- 
6816; Korean Daily News (Seoul), February, 1905.
21Quoted in Dennett, Roosevelt and the Russo-Japanese War, p. 304-305.
22Oliver, Synqman Rhee, p. 75.
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state, Root, related a similar story, and branded the treaty an invalid
instrument. To the Korean, however, the refusal of the United States
to become involved was made even more definite than it had been made
previously to Hulbert, for in the meantime Secretary Root had received
official notice of the agreement from the Korean legation in Washington
and was informed that this agency had transferred its function and
23effects to the Japanese envoy there. Said Secretary Root:
In view of this official communication, it is difficult 
to see how the government of the United States can proceed 
in any manner upon the entirely different view of the facts 
which you tell us personally you have been led to take by 
the information which you have received. It is to be 
observed, moreover, that the official communications 
from the Japanese Government agree with the official 
communications from the Korean Government, and are quite 
inconsistent with your information.
One important reason for the Japanese success in establishing a 
Protectorate over Korea was her careful efforts to secure the acquies­
cence of those major powers which might have raised any objection to her 
absorption of Korea. No Japanese action in Korea was ever undertaken 
without first testing the reaction of the major powers regarding the 
following claims: 1) Koreans were unfit for self government and 2)
Japanese interests in Korea were of such importance that she was con­
strained to assume the responsibility of ruling Korea. Among the powers, 
for instance, the United States was so thoroughly won over by Japan that
President Roosevelt deliberately refused to interfere when the Korean
25Emperor appealed to him for assistance.
23Foreign Relations, 1905, pp. 625-627.
^^Ibid., pp. 629-630.
25Tyler Dennett, "President Roosevelt's Secret Pact with Japan," 
Current History, October, 1924, p. 20.
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Subsequent to his unsuccessful attempt to appeal directly to the 
United States, the Emperor took every opportunity to send messages abroad 
protesting the Japanese enforced protectorate treaty» He managed some­
times to communicate with his friends vdio, though powerless, did their 
best to support his cause. Unfortunately his efforts were unsuccess­
ful, for his Japanese captors always interfered.
The Emperor believed that if he could only assure the powers that 
he had never consented to the treaty robbing Korea of her independence, 
they would reestablish diplomatic relations with Korea. The foreign 
legations in Korea had been withdrawn and replaced by either consulates 
or consulates general since the signing of the treaty of November 18,
1905. The Korean Emperor hoped that the great powers would return 
their ministers to Seoul if they were informed of the truth about the 
forcible and fraudulent conclusion of the treaty. However, the appeal 
was a total failure.
The Resident-General Ito at last decided to clear various hangers- 
on in the court, for he reasoned that the major source of various 
intrigues lay with them. On July 3, 1906, about fifteen Japanese
laruyama, the Japanese adviser in thepolice under the direction of
Korean police department, took charge of the court, allowing the passage
27only of those who possessed a pass issued by the Japanese authority.
^^Harrington, God, Mammon and Japanese, p. 233. The Korean Emperor 
enlisted the support of men such as Horace N. Allen, once American 
Minister in Seoul, to arouse public opinion in America in support of 
the Korean cause. The Emperor sent him $10,000 to be used for the 
cause of Korean independence. Allen later returned the money, for he 
and his many friends could not move the Roosevelt administration.
2 7Hv;ang, Maechon Yarok, pp. 394-395; Taehan Maeil Shinbo (Seoul), 
July 4, 1906.
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The Emperor thus became a virtual prisoner in his palace. Furthermore,
Ito urged the separation of the affairs of the court and the affairs
of government. This was designed to deprive the Korean Emperor of his
prerogatives in public administration. The Emperor however withheld
his approval and Ito was unable to implement his plan. And, rumors
were still reported to the office of the Residency-General that the
Emperor was communicating with foreign governments through means of
secret agents and Koreans abroad.
IcJhen the Second Peace Conference convened at the Hague in the
Summer of 1907, the Korean Emperor believed that the opportunity had
come at last to strike a blow for Korean freedom. Secretly, he sent
a three man delegation to the Hague Conference wiich was to open on
June 15. The carefully selected delegates were Yi Sang-sul, former
Vice Prime Minister; Yi Chun, ex-Judge of the Supreme Court; and Yi
Wi-jong, former Secretary at the Korean Legation in Russia. Yi Sang-
sul and Yi Chun had resigned in protest when the Protectorate Treaty 
28was signed. Amid great secrecy, these three men left Seoul on April 
20 armed with a credential issued by the Emperor v/hich read :
the powers with which she has ever been in friendly 
relation, we have, for this reason, the right to send 
delegates to all international conferences v/hich can 
be convoked for any purpose. But by the terms of the 
treaty of November 18th, 1905, which was extorted from 
us by force, the Japanese by menace and be a violation 
of all international equality deprived us of the right 
of direct communication with the friendly powers.
Not recognizing this act on the part of the Japanese, 
we desire hereby to appoint the official of the ex-Vice
Cha-hu-Yu, Hai A Mil Sa ("The Hague Emissaries") (Seoul): Yagil 
Sogum, 1948), pp. 43-46. See also Lee, Han-kuk Dongrip Undong Sa, 
pp. 274-275.
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Prime Minister, Yi Sang-sul, and Yi Chun, ex-Judge of the 
Supreme Court of Korea, and Yi Wi Chong, former Secretary 
of Legation at St. Petersburg, as Delegates Extraordinary 
and plenipotentiary to the International Peace Conference at 
the Hague, for the purpose of making clear to the represen­
tatives of the povjers the violation of our rights by the 
Japanese and the danger vÆiich presently threatens our 
country; and also to establish between my country and the 
foreign powers the direct diplomatic relations to which 
we are entitled by the fact of our independence.
Considering the three gentlemen named above to be 
men of high ability and of proved fidelity, we appoint 
them as our full representatives to the Conference at 
Hague, in the conviction that they g^ll faithfully serve 
us and the interests of the nation.
They went to Vladivostok, where they boarded the Trans-Siberian 
railway for St. Petersburg. They were later joined by Homer B. Hulbert, 
who lëft Seoul in May. They added Yi Wi-jong to the group in St. 
Petersburg and arrived in Hague on July 29, 1907. Upon arrival, they 
immediately went to see Count M. Nelidoff, Russian Chief Delegate and 
the Chairman of the Conference, and requested that the Korean delega­
tion be admitted to the Conference. They showed him the credentials 
they had brought from the Emperor of Korea. Count Nelidoff, however, 
told them that it was not within the power of the Conference Chairman 
to decide whether to admit the Korean delegation or to add the appeal
of Korea to the agenda and suggested that they might approach other 
30delegates. In spite of the disappointing manner in which they were 
first received, the courageous Korean delegation visited with and 
appealed to the delegations of the United States, Great Britain, and 
France. They also visited Dr. Van Tets, Foreign Minister of the
29Yu, Hai A Mil Sa, pp. 5 7-58. See also, The Independence (New 
York) LXIIl" (1907), p. 425*.
^^Lee, Hankuk Dckrip Undong Sa, pp. 274-277. Seoul National 
University, Kuk-sa Kai-sul, p. 677.
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Netherlands, who had called the Hague Peace Conference. The Korean 
Delegation insisted that: 1) the Treaty of November 18, 1905, had
never been approved or ratified by the Korean Emperor and therefore had 
no validity; 2) Japan consequently had no authority to control Korean 
foreign relations; and 3) Korea still had the right to send a delega­
tion to any international conference, such as the Hague Peace Confer- 
31ence.
However, the foreign powers, the United States, Great Britain and 
France refused to support the participation of Korean delegates to be 
recognized as Korea's official representatives to the Conference. Dr. 
Van Tets regretfully said to the Korean delegates that Korea had no
legal validity to be admitted to the international conference, for the
' 32foreign powers recognised the Japanese protectorate treaty over Korea.
In the meantime, the alerted Japanese delegation was very active
in obstructing the work of the Korean delegation. They spoke freely
to other delegations to the effect that Korea had duly transferred to
Japan the authority to conduct her foreign relations and that she was
33therefore in no position to send a delegation to the Hague Conference.
On July 5, 1907, Yi Sang-sul was allowed to present only the Korean
petition to the Conference. The petition stated that on November 18,
1905, Japan, by force of arms, had compelled the Korean Minister of
Foreign Affairs to sign, without the consent of the Emperor, a document
giving Japan control of Korean foreign relations. Since the signature
31Cha-hu, Yu, Yi Chun Sonsenq-chun ( "Biograph/-of Yi Chun) (Seoul; 
Tongbang Munhwa Sa), 1947, pp. 220-223; Park, Han-kuk Tong Sa, p. 246.
32Lee, Han-kuk Tongrip Undong Sa, p. 246.
^&u, Hai A m i  Sa, pp. 64-75.
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of this document had been extorted entirely by unjust violence, and 
since diplomatic relations between Korea and the foreign powers should 
not be interrupted save by her ovjn will, the petition requested interven­
tion by the members of the Conference and that admittance be granted 
to the Koreans to defend their rights and to expose the proceedings of 
the Japanese in Korea. The petition also pointed out; 1) Japan was 
deciding all political matters without the consent of the Korean Emperor ; 
2) Japan, relying on the strength of her army and navy, was exploiting
34Korea; and 3) Japan v/as destroying all existing laws and mores of Korea.
The official delegates were profoundly moved and decided to ascer­
tain whether the Korean Government had actually sent the delegation for 
that purpose. When the cablegram reached Seoul, where all telegraph 
services were controlled by the Japanese, it quickly got into the hand 
of Ito, the Japapese Resident-General in Korea. He immediately sent a 
reply to the effect that the Korean government had never sent such a
delegation. The Korean appeal was then officially rejected on the motion
35of the British delegate.
The Korean delegates did not leave, but adopted the alternative 
plan of attempting to arouse international public opinion in favor of 
the Korean cause. In this effort, they were aided by a prominent Dutch 
journalist, W. Stead, who permitted them to speak for hours before the 
International Press Institute (then meeting at the Hague). Yi Wi-jong 
spoke regarding the plight of Korea under theoppressive rule of Japan;
34Yu, Yi Chun Sonsaeng-chun, pp. 220-227.
35Ibid., pp. 238-240; Kang, Cho-son Dong-rip Hyol-tu Sa, p. 29.
Ito had interrogated the Korean Emperor and secured a denial of all 
knowledge of the deputation and its action. The Emperor being a 
"prisoner of Japanese" was not at liberty to declare the truth as it 
might entail grave personal consequence.
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his speech stirred a sympathetic reaction.
Although this mission failed, the Koreans thought repercussions 
were significant. The Korean attempt "surprised the world". The 
Japanese government was even more surprised and Resident-General Ito, 
who was directly responsible to his government for Korean affairs, 
was stunned at this turn of events.
^^Yu, Yi Chun Sonsaeng-chun, p. 241-242; The independent (New 
York) LXIII (1907).
The Abdication of the Emperor
The news of the presence of the Korean deputation at the Hague
Peace Conference caused much concern in Japan, and many discussions
were held by Japanese statesmen, as to what action they should take.
Count Okuma Prime Minister of Japan was said to have stated that if
the Korean Emperor had authorized a scheme so lacking in common sense,
he might properly be placed under restraint as not being right-minded.
Count Inouye, former Japanese Minister at Seoul was of the opinion that
the Korean Emperor should be brought to Japan where, seeing that
country's advancement, he would voluntarily cease his unfriendly
37attitude toward Japan.
In the meantime, Ito presented a memorandum to the Korean Emperor 
criticizing his act of dispatching Korean delegates to the international 
conference without the Resident-General's consent, thereby harming 
Japan's prestige in the international society and bluntly warning that 
she might consider a declaration of war against K o r e a . T h e  Hague 
mission affair convinced Ito that he could no longer tolerate the 
Emperor of Korea. Ito sent a telegram to his Tokyo government stating 
that " . . .  this kind of serious event happens because the protectorate 
treaty transferred the power only over foreign relations. In order to 
prevent further nuisance, we should control the internal administration
37Ladd, In Korea with Marquis Ito, pp. 418.
38Ko Kwon-san, Kinsei Chosen Kobosi (History of Rise and Fall of 
Modern Korea") (Tokyo: Koko Shoin, 1933), p. 216. See also Lee, Han- 
kuk Sa, p. 952. Ito notified the Emperor that his action was not only 
a violation of the Protectorate Treaty but also a hostile act that 




The Japanese possessed full control over Korea. The only obstacle
to full exercise of this control was the Emperor, who, though powerless,
yet continued to appeal to foreign powers. Now, however, the Japanese
had sufficient excuses to remove him from the throne ; and they easily
accomplished this without having to take direct action. The Korean
cabinet had been altered in May, 1907, and the cabinet ministers were
nominated not by the Emperor but by the Resident-General, Ito. Thus,
the cabinet of Premier Yi Wan-young, wholly Ito's tool, had been
40staffed ivith mostly pro-Japanese Koreans.
Ito instructed the cabinet of Yi Wan-young to recommend to the
41Emperor that he abdicate, lest Japan annex Korea at once. On July
19, 1907, the pro-Japanese cabinet ministers went to the Emperor and
demanded that he should abandon the throne in favor of the Crown Prince
to save his country from being conquered by Japan. The Emperor refused
at first but finally, with all hope of foreign sympathy or help gone
and with his own cabinet members urging his abdication, he weakened
and at three o'clock in the morning of the 20th of July agreed to retire
42in favor of the Crown Prince.
The Crown Prince, twelve years old, feeble of intellect, and who
39Midori Komatsu, Chosen Heigo no Rimen ("The Inside Story of the 
Korean Annexation") (Tokyo; Chugai Hyoronsha, 1920), pp. 30-31.
40Seoul National University, Kuk-sa Kai-sul, p. 580.
'^The Japanese sources concerning the abdication of the Emperor 
illustrate this in their insistence that it was not Ito but the Korean 
cabinet who forced abdication. See, Hilary Conroy, The Japanese Seizure 
of Korea: 1868-1910. (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 
1959),“pp.'351-353.
U2Lee, Hankuk Sa, pp. 954-955.
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could be little more than a tool in the hands of his pro-Japanese advisers, 
was crotvned as the new Emperor. The Japanese, having placed the imperial 
authority in such inept hands, were now able to secure without effort 
the imperial assent to vast new powers for the Resident-General, including 
veto power over all laws and the appointment of officials and, most impor­
tant, the right to appoint Japanese subjects as officials of the Korean 
government. This new agreement, known as "the Convention concerning 
Administration of Korea" was signed on July 24, 1907, and read:
Article I. The Government of Korea shall act under the 
guidance of the Resident-General in respect to reform in 
administration.
Article II. The Government of Korea engages not to 
enact any laws, ordinance or regulations, or to take any 
important measures of administration without the previous 
assent of the Resident-General.
Article III. The Judicial affairs in Korea shall 
be set apart from the affairs of ordinary administration.
Article IV. The appointment of all high officials in 
Korea shall be made upon the concurrence of the Resident- 
General .
Article V. The Government of Korea shall appoint as 
Korean officials the Japanese subjects recommended by the 
Resident-General.
.Article VI. The Government of Korea shall not engage 
any foreigner without the concurrence of the Resident- 
General .
Article VII. Article I of the protocol between Japan 
and Korea signed on the 22g^ of August, 1904, shall here­
after cease to be binding.
When this treaty transferring the entire domestic administration
^^Henry Chung, (Comp.), Treaties and Conventions between Korea and 
other Powers (New York; H, S. Nicholas Inc., 1919), pp. 221-223. This 
treaty was signed by Japanese Resident-General Ito and Korean Prime 
liinister Yi Wan-young. It placed in Japanese hands the actual func­
tions of Korean government; Kwan Bo, July 27, 1907.
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of Korea to Japan was si'gned, there was attached to it a secret memoran­
dum which provided that: 1) Japanese were to be heads of all courts 
and prosecutors' offices in Korea; 2) all chiefs of police in Korea 
were to be Japanese; 3) the holders of all the second-highest positions 
in national and provincial governments were to be Japanese; and 4) the 
Korean army would be disbanded, except one battalion which was to serve 
as the palace guard. As this was a secret agreement, the people were
unaware of it. Therefore,when the new Emperor issued a rescript order-
45ing the disbandment of the Korean army on August 1, 1907, the Korean 
soldiers arose in a futile resistance against the Japanese.
Various innovations fortified Japan's position in Korea. The new 
regulations for the imperial household were promulgated on November 29. 
By these terms, two thirds of its offices were closed, a separate 
accounting bureau was set up for it, and access to the Emperor was 
possibly only through the Minister of the Household. A Japanese became 
the director of the police for the entire country, and in each province 
the police forces were under Japanese control. Toward the end of 
1907, Ito, then in Japan, specifically denied that annexation of Korea 
was contemplated.^^ Nevertheless, Japan violated her repeatedly
44**Gaimusho, Nihon Gaiko Nempo Narabini Shuyo Bunsho, 1840-1945, 
pp. 276-277.
45Kwan Bo, August 1, 1907. The Korean Army at this time numbered 
about 6,200 men.
45Broivn, Mastery of the Far East, p. 205. Japan annexed Korea 
officially on August 22, 1910. Many pro-Japanese writers present Prince 
Ito, \\)ho forced a Protectorate Treaty over Korea and prepared the 
annexation of Korea, as a very benevolent statesman whose preoccupation 
was the freedom, and welfare of Korea. A Korean assassinated him. at 
Harbin in 1909 and then annexation followed. According to this inter­
pretation, Japan never desired annexation, but was forced to take this 
step because Koreans refused to follow reforms instituted by Japan.
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expressed promise to respect the independence of Korea and virtually 
"annexed" the Kingdom of Korea by 1907. Thus Korea died as even a 
nominally independent nation.
This explanation ignores blindly the fact that the Katsura cabinet 
with the participation of Ito, had decided as early as May 1904 that 
Korea should be absorbed.
CONCLUSION
The geography of Korea was a vital factor in deciding the fate of 
Korea. Korea consists of the peninsula projecting from the mainland of 
Asia, and of 3,497 islands. It is separated from Manchuria by the Yalu 
River, and from the Maritime Province of the Soviet Russia by the Tuman 
River. On the east the peninsula is washed by the Sea of Japan and on 
the west by the Yellow Sea.
The area of Korea is 85,228 sq. miles, i.e., slightly larger than 
that of Utah. Her population numbered 20 million, some ninety per cent 
of whom were peasants living in the countryside. The national economy, 
though changing, was still semifeudal in character.
Lying in the center of the triangle of East Asia as a nutcracker 
between China, Japan and Russia, Korea reflects the political influence 
of her neighbors in the political geography of her buffer position in ■ 
the Far East. Indeed, her geographical position had destined the 
country for trouble. If the Korean people have appeared stubborn in 
rejecting foreign overtures, a glance at their international relations 
reveal a pattern of interference by powerful neighbors.
The political institutions of Korea also influenced the fate of 
the Korean, kingdom. Korea was in theory, a kingdom ruled by a King.
In fact, the throne was occupied by do-nothing, besotted and utterly 
incapable sovereigns. The aristocratic families abosrbed complete 
authority. The Korean monarchy was in a serious state of disintegration. 
The people could take no part in politics because the government was 
conducted by a factional bureaucracy in which only a small elite was
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privileged to participate in the making or administering of political 
decision. Indeed, internal corruption and disunity has made Korea an 
easy prey to aggression at the same time that it has made political 
coherence difficult.
We find that in the fertile field for international intrigue, the 
struggle for power among the various factions in the Korean court sought 
the support of foreign powers. The tendency on the part of Korean fac­
tions to rely on foreign support was, in fact, an independence movement 
in a large sense. The factional leaders firmly believed that Korean 
independence could be maintained by skillful manipulation of international 
rivalries. However, the contending factions brought each other virtually 
to a standstill, at the cost of severe damage to both factions, disunity 
to the nation and to its leaders, and irreparable loss and hardship to 
the people. Furthermore, it openly invited the divide-and-rule technique 
by the powers.
For centuries the foreign relations of Korea had been limited to 
the sending of regular tribute missions to China. Korea closed its 
frontiers to all nations except China whose suzerainty it recognized,
Korea maintained a rigid policy of seclusion hoping to retain her 
independence by isolation. At the end of the nineteenth century, when 
Korea was forced into the Western international system, Korean response 
to foreign contact had been handicapped. Within the protecting cocoon 
of the Chinese tribute system the Korean court was unprepared for out­
side relations and had acquired the habit of depending on the "big 
country."
Korea as a weak and small nation, surrounded by imperialistic 
powers, attempted to retain her independence by playing one power against
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ths other. However, this approach was unsuccessful in the long run 
because the Korean statesmen were ignorant of what was being discussed 
by the imperialistic neighboring powers about the fate of Korea; if 
Korean officials knew about the designs of the surrounding powers on 
Korea, they turned to another great power for help. Something like 
the old Confucian relationship with China seemed to have been contem­
plated, and the traditional mode of thinking remained dominant. The 
Korean officials should have realized that the time had come to modern­
ize the country and strengthen Korean defenses. But the Koreans wished 
to find an easy escape by relying on what her "suzerain" or "protector" 
was willing to do for them. The delicate balance of power between 
Russia and Japan provided the Korean government an opportunity to pursue 
progressive policies toward reforming the country and strengthening 
its economic and military capability. It was likewise a tragic mistake 
of the Korean government to suppress the progressive movement which 
aimed at retaining genuine Korean independence by a program of moderniza­
tion.
The Korean government registered her protest when the Japanese 
protectorate threatened to become permanent, but she failed to receive 
the needed support from the United States- VJho is to blame for this?
It is inevitable to point out that the weakness in Korea's foreign 
policy was based on the tradition of unilateral dependence on a "suzer­
ain" power. The fact that Korea failed to free herself from this 
historical legacy is responsible for the weakness of her foreign policy.
It can be said vjithout much argument that the weakness of Korea 
was an invitation for imperialism on the part of the surrounding powers.
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However, foreign intervention provided the negative, yet the most 
powerful, symbol for the Korean independence movement led by the 
Tonghak, Independence Club, and the "Righteous Armies".
The American scholar in Korean affairs, George M. McCune made the 
following comment concerning Korean politics :
During the transition from traditional to modern times 
three important influences came to dominate Korean politics :
(1) the strong historical and cultural ties which bound 
together the Korean people as a single unit contributed to 
an intense nationalism which led the Koreans to resist almost 
fanatically foreign domination despite the v/eakness of their 
government; (2) the extreme conservatism and factionalism 
which pervaded the social and political order delayed and 
hindered reform which might have modernized the country; (3) 
the ancient ties with China which were considered a safeguard 
for independence instead of a limitation upon sovereignty 
led the Korean government to look with favor upon a policy 
of reliance upon a stronger neighboring state. These three
forces nationalism, conservatism, and reliance upon an
ally-— emerged as domination characteristics of Korean policy
Korea, however, must not bear the entire responsibility for her 
tragedy. In international power politics, small nations have always 
owed their independence either to the balance of power, or the prepon­
derance of one protecting power, or to their lack of attractiveness for 
imperialistic aspirations. It was inevitable that the international 
status of Korea be determined by the preponderance of Japanese imperial­
istic power.
If the powers had maintained a policy of non-interference in the 
affairs of the kingdom of Korea, her fate would have taken a different 
turn. The impacts of the power struggles by neighboring rival powers 
resulted in the loss of Korean independence. Japanese imperialism in 
particular advanced many arguments to justify her domination of that 
peninsula. These included self-defense, the modernization of Korea,
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and the superiority of Japanese civilization. But none of these arguments 
stand the test of a close i^ivestigation of international morality and 
justice. It is the principle of justice that all peoples and nationali­
ties should have the right to live on equal terms in liberty and safety 
with one another, whether they be strong or weak.
The tragedy of Korean experience in modern international relations 
emphatically proved that force is the instrument of achieving national 
interest. The exercise of indirect political control or territorial 
annexation is conditioned on the threat of force or its actual use.
The preponderant military power of a nation proved to be the decisive 
factor in securing economic concessions as well as imposing cultural 
and political values on an alien nationality.
Korean experience and the actual nature of international power 
politics thattook place in Korea have been evaluated. The question 
remains whether even with internal reforms and strong government Korea 
would have escaped Japanese take-over. If there were no power in the 
world at this time which possessed large enough interests in South 
Vietnam or sufficient conviction about the reign of law and order in 
international affairs to consider intervention at whatever cost, it 
is doubtful that South Vietnam could escape a communist take-over.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
I, Primary Sources
A. Korean: Primary Sources
A-an, 1395-1898 ("The Yi Dynasty Court Repository on Korea-Russia Rela­
tions"). Korean National Library, Seoul.
Hwa-an, 1882-1884 ("The Yi Dynasty Court Repository on Korea-China 
Relations"). Korean National Library, Seoul.
Il-an, 1894-1902 ("The Yi Dynasty Court Repository on Korea-Japan 
Relations"). Korean National Library, Seoul.
Kim, Ok Kun. Kapsin Hrok ("The Records of Year of Kapsin or Kim Ok- 
kun Diary"). Seoul National University Library, Seoul.
Kuksa Pyunjip Wuiwon Hae ("National History Editorial Committee"). (ed.)< 
Kap-oh Sil-ki ("The True Records of Year of Kap-oh). Seoul, 1958.
_______. (ed.). Sokum Chongsa ("Diary of Kim Yun-sik"). Seoul, 1958.
_________(ed.). Tonqhak-ran Kirok ("The Records on Tonghak Rebellion").
Seoul, 1958.
Naegak Popche-guk Kwanbo-kwa ("Official Gazette Section, Legislation
Bureau, Cabinet of Korea"). Kwan Bo ("Yi Dynasty Court Official 
Gazette") 1894-1910. Seoul.
Tongni Kyosop Amun ("Ministry of Yi Dynasty Foreign Affairs"). Tongni 
Kyosop Amun ("The Yi Dynasty Foreign Ministry Archives") 1882-
1896. Korean. National Library, Seoul.
_______. Tongni Kyosop Tongsang Samu Ilqi ('The Diary of the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs & Trade of Yi Dynasty"), 1882-1886. Seoul.
Yi Dynasty Court, Ilsonq Rok ("Daily Records of the Office of Royal 
Historians"), 1882-1896. Seoul National University Library, 
Seoul.
B. Japanese: Primary Sources
Gaimusho ("Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs"). Komura Gaikoshi 
(A History of Komura's Diplomacy). 2 Vols. Tokyo, 1953.
_______. Nihon Gaiko Nenpyo narabini Shuyo Bunsho, 1840-1945 ("Diplo­




  __ . Nihon Gaiko Monjo ("Japanese Diplomatic Documents"). Tokyo,
1956-1960.
Japanese Archives in Korea. The 1894-1910 Series, photographed for the
Hoover Institution, Stanford University. (Cited as J. A.(Korea).
Ito Hirobumi. Hisho Ruisan Gaiko-hen ("Classified Documents on Diplo­
matic Relations of Japan"). 3 vols. Tokyo: So-bun Kaku, 1935.
Katsuiku, Nokyu (ed.). Nikkan-Kappo-Hishi ("The Secret History of 
Japanese Annexation of Korea”). 2 vols. Tokyo: Kokurenkai
press, 1931.
Komatsu, Mitori (ed.). Ito Ko Jen Shu (Works of Prince Ito). 2 vols. 
Tokyo : Association for Works of Prince Ito, 1928.
C. English: Primary Source
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Korea: Treaties and
Agreements, Washington: 1921.
_______. Manchuria: Treaties and Agreements, Washington, 1921.
Congressional Record. Washington: 1919.
Chung, Henry (Comp.). Treaties and Conventions between Korea and other 
Powers. New York: H. S. Nicholas Inc. 1919'.
Great Britain Foreign Office. British Documents on the Origin of the 
War, 1898-1914. London: 1927-1938.
MacMurray, J. V. A. Treaties and Agreements with and Concerning China, 
1894—1919. New York: Oxford University Press, 1921.
Morison, E. E. (ed.). The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt. Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. 1951. Vol. IV.
Palmer, Spencer J. (ed.). Korean American Relations, Documents Per­
taining to the Far Eastern Diplomacy of the United States. 
Berkeley; University of California Press, 1961. vol. II.
Rockwill, W. W. (ed.). Treaties and Agreements with or concerning
China and Korea, 1894-1904. Washington: Government printing
office, 1908.
U. S. Department of State, Paper Relating to the Foreign Relations 
of the United States. Washington: 1884-1906.
D. Russian: Primary Sources
Krashi Archiv (Red Archive), as translated in the Chinese Social
-195-
Political Science Review: "On the Eve of the Russo-Japanese
War (December 1900 - January 1902)," in Ibid., 19 (1335-1936).
E. Memoirs: Primary Sources
Foster, Johm W. (ed.). Memoirs of the Viceroy Li Hung-chang. London: 
Constable and Co., Ltd., 1913.
Kuksa Pyunjip Wuiwon Hae ("National History Editorial Committee").
Min Chong-chonq Kong Yuko ("The Memoirs of Min Yong-whan").
5 vols. Seoul, 1958.
Pooley, A. M. (ed.). The Secret Memoirs of Count Tadasu Hayashi.
New York: The Knickerbroker Press, Î915.
Yarmolinsky, Abraham, (ed.). The Memoirs of Count Witte. Garder- 
Cutz: Doubleday, Page & Co., 1921.
F. Biographies: Primary Sources
Kim, To-tae (ed.). So Jai-pil Paksa Chaso-jon ("Autobiography of Dr.
So. Jai-pil). Seoul: Sunonsa, 1949.
Kim, Young-yi. Yun Chi-ho Sunsang Yakchun ("Biography of Yun Chi-ho") 
Seoul: Choson Ki-dok-kyo Kam-ri Won, 1934.
G. Books: Primary Sources
Chong, Kyo. Hanlcuk Kenyon Sa ("Later Year of Korean History").
National History Material Seriesp no. 5. Seoul, 1957.
Hulbert, Homer B. The-Passing of Korea. New York : Doubleday & Co.,
1906.
Hwang, Hyon. Maechon Yarok ("Records of Maechon"). National History 
Material Series, No. 1, Seoul, 1955,
Ladd, George T. In Korea with Marquis Ito. New York; Charles 
Scribner's Son, 1908.
Matsu, Munemitsu. Kenken-roku ("Records of Afflictions"). Tokyo, 1940.
Tabohashi, Kiyoshi. Kindai Nissen Kankei no Kenkyu ("Study of Japanese- 
Korean Relations in Modern Times"). 2 vols. Chosen Sotokuhu, 
1940.
H. Newspaper and Periodical: Primary Sources
The North-China Herald (Shanghai), Vol. LXI-XLXI, 1896, Vol. LXI- 
XCVI, 1899.
Independent (Seoul). 189 7-1899.
- 196-
Taehan Maeil Sinbo (Seoul), 1905-1906.
Wanqsuncf Shin Mun (Seoul),. 1901-1907,
Korean Repository. 5 vols, Seoul: The Tringual Press, 1892, 1895, 
1896, 1897, 1898.
The Korean Review, 6 vols. Seoul: The Methodist Publishing House, 
1901-1906,
Hulbert, H. B. "The Opening of Korea", The Voice of Korea, Vol. \6E, 
No. 26, January 5, 1945,
II, Secondary Sources
A, Korean: Secondary Sources
Choi, Nam-sun. Go-Sa-Tong (Records of Past Affairs), Seoul,
Chong, D-mu. Imo Kunran kwa Kpasin Chongbyon ("Imo Military Rebellion 
and the Political Change of the Year of Kapsin"). Seoul:
Dokhung So-rim, 1927.
Choe, Chun, Hankuk Sinmun Sa ("History of Korean Newspapers"). Seoul: 
Iljogak, 1960.
Kang, Hung-su, Choson Tonqnip Hyoltu Sa ("History of the Bloody Struggle 
for Korean Independence"). Seoul: Koryo Munwha-sa, 1946,
Kim, Sang-gi. Tonghak kwa Tonqhak-ran ("Tonghak and the Tonghak 
Rebellion"), s'eoul : Taesung Chulpan Sa, 1947,
Lee, Byong-do, Kuksa Taikv/ar: ("The Records on Korean History").
Seoul: Paik-young-sa, 1954,
Lee, Do-ha. Chondokyo Chanqkon Sa ("The Records on TOnghak Religion 
2 vols, Seoul: Chongsimri won, 1939,
Lee, Sun-kun. Hankuk Sa ("History of Korea"), Seoul: Chindan Hakhoi,
1964.
_______, Hankuk Dokrip Undong Sa ("The Records on Korean Independence
Movement"). Seoul: Sangmu won, 1956,
 _____ , Choson Kunse Chonqchi Sa ("The Records of Modern Korean
Politics"), Seoul: Chong-um Sa, 1954.
Min, Tae-won, Kapsin Chongbyon kwa Kim Ok-kun (The Kapsin Revolution 
and Kim Ok-kun"), Seoul: Kukche Munhwa Hyophoe, 1947.
Mun, Chung-chang. Kunse Ilbon Yi Choson Chimto Sa ("The History of 
Japanese Aggression to Korea"), Seoul: Seoul National
-197-
Unil^ersity Press, 1964.
]̂ïun, Ilpyong. Hanir± Osipnyon-Sa ("Fifty Years History of Korean- 
American Relations"). Seoul: Chongviia-sa, 1945.
Oh, Chi Y. Tonqhak Sa ("History of Tonghak"). Seoul: Hapmun Sa, 1946.
Park, Eun-sik. Hankuk Tongsa ("A Tragic History of Korea"). Seoul: 
Talsong Inseso, 1945.
Sin, Ki-suk. Tongyang Uekyo Sa ("The Records on Oriental Diplomacy") 
Seoul: Tongkuk Murhwa Sa, 1948.
Sonu, Hun. Doksukunq Yi Milsa ("Secret History of Diksu Palace").
Seoul : Sekwan Chulpan-sa, 1956.
Seoul National University History Research Room. Kuk-sa Kaisul 
("Lecture on Korean National History"). Seoul: Dukhung
Su-rim, 1947.
Yu Cha-hu. Hae A Milsa ("The Hague Emissaries"). Seoul: Yugil
Sojom, 1948.
■ B. Japanese: Secondary Sources
Katswiku N. Nikkan Kappo Hi-shi ("Secret History of Japanese Annexa­
tion of Korea). Tokyo : Chugai Hyoronsha, 1920.
Komatsu, Mitoru. Meiji Gaiko Hiwa ("Secret Story of Meiji Diplomacy"). 
Tokyo, 1936.
Hori, Makoto. Nichiro Senso Zengo ("The Russo-Japanese War, Its Prelude 
and Aftermath"). Tokyo, 1940.
Weems, C. N. (ed.). Hulbert's History of Korea. (London: Routledge & 
Kegan Paul, 1962.
Wilkinson, W. H. The Korean Government, Shanghai: Kelly & Walsh Ltd.,
1897.
_______. Korean Reform and Independent Movement, 1881-1898. Ann Arbor :
Michigan University Press, 1954,
C. English: Secondary Sources
Akagi, Roy H. Japan's Foreign Relations, 1542-1936. Tokyo: Hakuseido 
Press, 1937.
Asakawa, K. The Russo-Japanese Conflict, Its Causes and Issues.
London: Archibald Constable & Co., 1905.
Brov/n, Arthur Judso. The Mastery of the Far East. Nevj York: Charles 
Scribner's Son, 1919.
-198-
Dennett, Tyler. Roosevelt and Russo-Japanese War. Garden City: 
Doubleday, Page & Co., 1925.
Griswald, A. Whitney. The Far Eastern Policy of the United States. New 
York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1938.
Guroko, Valadmir. Features and Figures of the Past: Government and
Opinion in the Reign of Nicholas II. Stanford : Stanford
University Press, 1939.
Hamilton, Augus. Korea. New York : Charles Scribner's Sons, 1904.
Harrington, Fred Harvey. God, Mammon, and the Japanese, Dr. Horace N.
Allen and Korea-American Relations, 1884-1905. Madison, Wiscon­
sin: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1944.
Langer, VJilliam L. The Diplomacy of Imperialism, 1890-1902, 2 vols.
New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1935.
Lee, Chong-sik. The Politics of Korean Nationalism. Berkeley: Uni­
versity of California Press, 1903.
Malozemoff, A. Russian Far Eastern Policy, 1881-1904, with Special 
Emphasis on the Causes of the Russo-Japanese War. Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1958.
Morse, Hosha Ballou. The International Relations of the Chinese Empire. 
London: Longmans, Green, & Co., 1918.
Nelso, M. Frederick. Korea and the Old Orders in Eastern Asia. Baton 
Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1946.
Oliver, R. T. Syngman Rhee. New York: Dodd Mead & Co., 1954.
Takeuchi, Tatsuji. War and Diplomacy in the Japanese Empire. Garden 
City: Doubleday, Doran & Co., 1935.
Treat, Payson J. Diplomatic Relations Between the United States and 
Japan, 1853-1895. 2 vols. Stanford University, California:
Stanford University Press, 1932.
. Diplomatic Relations Between the United States and Japan, 1895- 
1905. Standford University, California: Standford University 
Press, 1938.
D. Russian: Secondary Source
Ror'inov, B. A. Russia in Manchuria (1892-1906). Leningrad: Publication 
26 of the A. S. Enukidze Oriental Institution, 1928. Trans­
lated by Susan Wilbur Sones, Russia in Manchuria (1892-1906).
Ann Arbor, Michigan: Edward Brothers, Inc., 1952.
E. Biographies: Secondary Sources
-199-
Croly, Herbert, Willard Straight. New York: The MacMillan W., 1924.
Haiaada, Kengi, Prince Ito. Tokyo: The Sanseido Co., 1936.
Thayer, W= R= The Life and Letters of John Hay, 2 vols. Boston: 1919.
Yu, Cha-hu. Yi Chun Sonsenq-Chun ("Biography of Yi Chun")Seoul: 
Tongbang Munhwa Sa, 1947.
F. Articles: Secondary Sources
"The Abdication of the Emperor of Korea", The Independent (New York), 
July 25, 1907, pp. 183-184.
Baldwin, E. F. "Korea and Japan at Hague," The Outlook (New York),
September 7, 1907, pp. 27-28.
Dennett, Tyler, "President Roosevelt's Secret Part with Japan",
Current History, October, 1924, pp. 15-21.
"Korea, Japan and Russia", Review of Reviews, XXX, No. 174; July,
1904, pp. 93-94.
Lee, Byung-do. "Tonghakran ui Yoksajok Uiyi", Sasang Ke (Seoul),
August, 1954, pp. 26-28.
Lowell, Percival. "A Korean Coup de'tat". The Atlantic Monthly, 
November, 1886. pp. 599-618.
McCune, G. M. "Russian Policy in Korea : 1896-1894," Far Eastern Survey, 
XVI, No. 16, August 15, 1945, pp. 272-274.
"Russia in Korea," The Saturday Review, LXXXV, No. 2217, April, 1898, 
pp. 548-550.
Sin, Ki-sok. "Tai Wen Kun ui Kuchi Sokhoe Chungkulc ui Taehan Kansup 
ui Ilchol" ("A Study of Kidnapping and Release of Tai Wen Kun 
by China - An Aspect of China's Intervention of Korea"), 
Chongchi Hak, I. No. 1, April, 1905, pp. 27-35.
Thorstein, W. B. "American Public Opinion and the Portmouth Peace 
Conference", American Historical Review, LIII. April 1948, 
pp. 489-445.
G. Unpublished sources
Chon, Dong, "Japanese Annexation of Korea: A Study of Korean-Japanese 
Relations to 1910": Ph.D. Diss., University of Colorado,
Boulder, 1955.
Lee, Chong-sik, "Korean Nationalist Movemenu, 1905-1945": Ph.D. Diss., 
University of California, Berkeley, 1961.
